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Abstract 
 
This thesis consists of an introductory chapter, three main chapters, and a 
concludingchapter. In Chapter 2, which was nominated for an EFMA 2014 Best Paper Award, 
I provide a novel risk-based explanation for the profitability of global momentum strategies. I 
show that the performance of past winners and losers is asymmetric in states of the global 
market upturns and downturns. Winners have higher downside market betas and lower upside 
market betas than losers, and hence their risks are more asymmetric. The winner-minus-loser 
(WML) momentum portfolios are exposed to the downside market risk, but serve as a hedge 
against the upside market risk. The high returns of the WML portfolios compensate investors 
for their high risk asymmetry. After controlling for this risk asymmetry, the momentum 
portfolios do not yield significant abnormal returns, and the momentum factor becomes 
insignificant in the cross-section. The two-beta CAPM with downside risk explains the cross-
section of returns to global momentum portfolios well. 
In the third chapter, published in the Review of Finance and the winner of EFMA 2013 
John Doukas Best Paper Award, I propose a new factor – the global downside market factor – 
to explain high returns to carry trades. I show that carry trades have high downside market 
risk, i.e. they crash systematically in the worst states of the world when the global stock 
market plunges or when a disaster occurs. The downside market factor explains the returns to 
currency portfolios sorted by the forward discount better than other factors previously 
proposed in the literature. GMM estimates of the downside beta premium are similar in the 
currency and stock markets, statistically significant and close to their theoretical value. I show 
that the high returns to carry trades are fair compensation for their high downside market risk.   
In the fourth chapter, I study whether or not countries‟ macroeconomic characteristics are 
systematically related to the downside market risk of their currencies. I find that the downside 
risk is strongly associated with the local inflation rate, real interest rate and net foreign asset 
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position. Currencies of countries with higher inflation and real interest rates and lower 
(negative) net foreign asset position (debtor countries) are more exposed to the downside risk 
whereas currencies of countries with low inflation and real interest rates and positive net 
foreign asset position (creditor countries) exhibit „safe haven‟ properties. Since inflation and 
real interest rates determine nominal interest rates which determinecurrency returns which, in 
turn, determine capital flows and net foreign asset positions, these macroeconomic variables 
are related. But the local real interest rate has the highest explanatory power in accounting for 
the cross-section of currency exposure to the downside risk. This suggests that the direction of 
currency trading is the reason why some currencies are exposed to the downside risk more 
than others. High currency downside risk is a consequence of investments in high-yield risky 
currencies and flight from them in „hard times‟. Currencies of low-yield creditor countries, on 
the contrary, provide a hedge in „hard times‟ because capital flies back to them. Currency 
exposure to the downside market risk has increased significantly in the 2000s when the 
volume of currency trading by institutional investors increased.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
According to the traditional asset-pricing theory, an asset has high expected returns if its 
covariance with the stochastic discount factor is high. This theory does not distinguish 
between good and bad states of the world, between gains and losses. But extensive 
psychological evidence suggest that investors treat gains and loses differently, and hence, 
upside and downside risks should have different implications for asset pricing.  
In fact, the importance of upside and downside risks was recognized as early as the first 
theoretical asset-pricing models were developed. Roy (1952) suggests that economic agents 
care particularly about the downside risk. Markowitz (1959) proposes using semi-variance as 
a proper measure of risk. Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) provide an extended version of the 
CAPM where the market beta is separated into the upside beta and the downside beta. Longin 
and Solnik (2001) consider upside and downside correlations, and Ang and Chen (2001) 
propose a measure of correlation asymmetry and show that the asymmetric correlation is 
priced in the US equity market. 
There are different reasons that investors may be more averse to losses than they are 
attracted to gains: behavioral loss aversion in the utility function (Barberis et al., 2001), 
rational disappointment aversion in the utility function (Gul, 1991), binding short-sale 
constraints (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001), wealth constraints (Kyle and Xiong, 2001), funding 
liquidity constraints and liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), fund flow 
considerations and other reasons. In such settings, assets with higher downside risk relative to 
their upside risk should have higher expected returns. 
Ang et al. (2006) were the first to provide extensive theoretical and empirical evidence 
on pricing of downside and upside risks. They show how upside and downside risks may be 
priced cross-sectionally in an equilibrium setting.In a theoretical model with Gul‟s (1991) 
disappointment aversion utility function, which down-weights elating (above the certainty 
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equivalent) outcomes relative to disappointing (below the certainty equivalent) outcomes, 
they show that the traditional market beta „is not a sufficient statistic to describe the risk-
return relationship of an individual stock‟ because agents are particularly concerned about the 
downside risk. They show numerically that the traditional CAPM alpha is increasing in the 
relative downside beta, decreasing in the relative upside beta and, hence, increasing in the 
downside-upside beta asymmetry. Assets should have higher expected returns if they have 
higher relative downside betas because such assets perform poorly in bad states of the world 
when the marginal utility of wealth is high and asset returns are particularly important. Assets 
with high relative upside betas, on the contrary, do not require a high risk premium, because 
the marginal utility of wealth is low in such states. Therefore, measures of downside risk have 
greater explanatory power for describing the cross-section of expected returns.  
Ang et al. (2006) also test the validity of their two-beta CAPM in the US stock market. 
They find that, indeed, the upside and downside risks are priced differently, and that the two-
beta CAPM has a much higher explanatory power than the traditional CAPM. Even after 
controlling for other risk factors (size, book-to-market, momentum, liquidity and volatility), 
the estimates of the downside risk premium are statistically significant.  
This thesis is devoted to the study of downside risk pricing in stock and currency 
markets. I provide extensive and novel evidence that exposure to downside risk can explain 
expected returns in these markets better than other risk factors previously proposed in the 
literature. I show that the anomalous returns to currency carry trade portfolios and momentum 
portfolios are, in fact, a compensation for their high exposure to the downside market risk.  
In parallel to my study, Lettau et al. (2014) provide further evidence on downside risk 
pricing in stock, currency, commodity and bond markets. Our papers together show that the 
downside risk is a unifying explanation for returns in different asset markets.  
The results of this thesis can be summarized as follows. 
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Inchapter 2, I provide a novel risk-based explanation for the profitability of global 
momentum strategies. I show that the performance of past winners and past losers is 
asymmetric in states of the global market upturns and downturns. Winners have higher 
downside market betas and lower upside market betas than losers, and hence their upside and 
downside risks are asymmetric. Greater relative downside risk and lower relative upside risk 
of past winners are compensated by higher returns. Indeed, such asymmetry in upside and 
downside market risks explains the returns to the cross-section of global momentum 
portfolios well. 
Although numerous explanations for the momentum anomaly have been put forward, 
their upside and downside market risks have not been studied thoroughly. DeBondt and 
Thaler (1987) findthat past winner stocks have greater downside betas than upside betas. Ang 
et al. (2001) find that the US momentum portfolio has positive and significant loading on a 
factor that reflects downside risk, and that the downside risk factor explains some of the 
cross-sectional variation in returns to momentum portfolios. Lettau et al. (2014) consider six 
US Fama-French size-momentum portfolios and find some evidence that the returns are 
“broadly positively associated with the downside beta”.  
Building on these studies, I show that the downside risk alone does not fully explain the 
returns to the cross-section of momentum portfolios because the upside risk plays a 
significant role too. In fact, it is the difference in the upside and downside betas (beta 
asymmetry) which varies across momentum portfolios significantly. For any set of 
momentum portfolios considered, the asymmetry in betas is monotonically increasing from 
past losers to past winners. As a result, the winner-minus-loser momentum portfolios are 
exposed to the downside risk, but hedge against the upside risk.  
In the cross-sectional tests, I show that the relative downside beta, which captures the 
extra downside risk and, hence, the downside-upside risk asymmetry, explains the returns to 
the momentum portfolios well, whereas the traditional beta has no explanatory power. The 
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relative downside beta premium is approximately 3-4 percent per month, highly statistically 
significant and similar in magnitude to the estimates obtained for the stock and currency 
markets (Lettau et al., 2014; Dobrynskaya, 2014).  
In chapter 3, published in the Review of Finance, I propose the global downside market 
risk factor to explain currency returns. When we examine the downside market risk of carry 
trade portfolios, we observe a clear risk-return relationship. High interest rate currencies have 
high and statistically significant downside market risk, which can be measured by the 
downside beta, the „disaster beta‟ or the coskewness1 with respect to the global stock market 
return; by contrast, low interest rate currencies have zero downside risk and hence can serve 
as a hedging instrument. Whereas the consumption betas or traditional market betas of carry 
trade long-short portfolios are rather small, the downside market betas are several times 
higher and statistically significant, especially if we measure them in the worst states of the 
world (e.g., when there is a market crash or a disaster event).  
I show that the spread in the downside market betas and the coskewness across currency 
portfolios sorted by interest rate is sufficient to justify the spread in their returns. The GMM 
estimates of the downside beta and coskewness premiums in the currency market are highly 
significant. Moreover, the estimation of the downside beta or coskewness CAPM for currency 
and stock portfolios jointly produces a good fit of the model, whereas the traditional CAPM is 
rejected on several grounds. The downside risk has much higher explanatory power for the 
cross-section of returns in both markets, and the downside risk premiums are similar in both 
markets and are close to the theoretical values. In fact, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
downside risk is priced similarly in the currency and stock markets. I conclude that the high 
excess returns to carry trades are not a free lunch but rather fair compensation for their high 
downside market risk. 
                                                          
1
 Coskewness is measured as beta with respect to the market volatility, Rm
2
. 
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In chapter 4, I study whether or not there is a systematic relationship between currency 
exposure to the downside market risk and macroeconomic characteristics of the respective 
countries. I try to answer the question as to which currencies tend to crash when the stock 
market goes down and which currencies serve as a „safe haven‟. Although in chapter 3 I show 
that the level of the nominal interest rate is strongly associated with currency downside risk, 
the nominal interest rate is not necessarily the only and best determinant of currency exposure 
to the downside risk.   
The main findings of chapter 4 can be summarized as follows. Firstly, currencies 
systematically differ in terms of their exposure to the downside risk indeed and the spread in 
the downside betas of currencies is high and significant. Moreover, currency exposure to the 
downside risk has increased dramatically since the beginning of the 21
st
 century in parallel 
with the growing volume of currency trading. 
Secondly, currency downside betas are strongly associated with particular levels of 
three out of eight macroeconomic variables considered: the inflation rate, the real interest rate 
and the net foreign asset position. Countries with high inflation rates, high real interest rates 
and low (negative) net foreign assets have currencies with high exposure to the downside risk 
whereas countries with the opposite characteristics have currencies with „safe haven‟ 
properties.  
These three macroeconomic variables are, in fact, related, because higher inflation and 
higher real interest rates in an economy lead to higher nominal interest rates and higher 
nominal currency returns, which, in turn, lead to higher capital inflows and lower net foreign 
assets. The high explanatory power of these variables for the downside risk suggests that the 
direction of currency trading is the reason why some currencies are exposed to the downside 
risk more than others. Currencies of debtor countries with high returns (investment 
currencies) have higher exposure to the downside risk because capital is withdrawn in bad 
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times. Currencies of creditor countries with low returns (funding currencies) provide a hedge 
in bad times because capital flies back to them.  
In a multivariate setting, when inflation and/or real interest rates are controlled for, the 
net foreign asset position becomes an insignificant determinant of currency downside risk. 
Whereas the real interest rate has the highest explanatory power in the recent „post-euro‟ 
period, the inflation rate was a better determinant of currency risk in the 90s. I do not find 
evidence, that other macroeconomic variables, previously suggested in the literature, are 
systematically related to currency risk.    
My findings shed some light on why a carry trade is a very risky investment strategy. 
Since nominal interest rates can be high due to high real interest rates, high inflation rates or 
both, I decompose nominal interest rates into inflation and real interest rates and form double-
sorted currency portfolios. I show that currencies with the same level of real interest rates but 
different inflation rates have the same downside risk, whereas, controlling for inflation, 
currencies with higher real interest rates have a higher downside risk. Therefore, the high 
downside risk of carry trades turns out to be a consequence of high real interest rates in the 
investment countries and low real interest rates in the funding countries, rather than the 
nominal interest rates. When nominal and real interest rates correlate significantly (e.g. in 
developed countries), high levels of these rates in an economy are both associated with high 
downside risk of its currency, but when the correlation between these rates is low, the real 
interest rate has the highest explanatory power for currency exposure to the downside risk. 
Overall, the results of this thesis suggest that we should pay greater attention to an 
asset‟s downside risk because it is a more relevant measure of risk than the overall market risk 
and it carries an extra return premium in different asset markets.  
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Chapter 2 
Asymmetric Risks of Global Momentum Strategies 
 
2.1.INTRODUCTION 
Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), the momentum anomaly has received a lot of attention. 
Buying past winners and selling past losers generates abnormal returns in the short run, which 
cannot be explained by conventional risk measures (e.g. the standard deviation and the market 
beta) and provide evidence for market inefficiency. Momentum strategies proved to be 
profitable around the world, at the level of national equity indices (e.g. Asness, Liew, and 
Stevens, 1997; Richards, 1997; Cenedese et al., 2013) and at the individual stock level 
(Rouwenhorst, 1998, 1999), among currencies (Okunev and White, 2003; Menkhoff et al., 
2012), commodities, bonds and other assets (Gorton et al., 2008; Asness, Moskowitz, and 
Pedersen, 2013).  
In this chapter, I provide a novel risk-based explanation for the profitability of global 
momentum strategies. I show that the performance of past winners and past losers is 
asymmetric in states of the global market upturns and downturns. Winners have higher 
downside market betas and lower upside market betas than losers, and hence their upside and 
downside risks are asymmetric. Greater relative downside risk and lower relative upside risk 
of past winners are compensated by higher returns. Indeed, such asymmetry in upside and 
downside market risks explains the returns to the cross-section of global momentum 
portfolios well. 
The importance of separating the overall market risk into the upside and downside risks 
for asset pricing was recognized in early papers (e.g. Roy, 1952; Markowitz, 1959; Bawa and 
Lindenberg, 1977) and was articulated in Ang and Chen (2002) and Ang et al. (2006) for the 
US stock market. More recently, Lettau et al. (2014) and Dobrynskaya (2014) provide further 
convincing evidence that the models with downside risk (e.g. two-beta CAPM) have greater 
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explanatory power in the stock, currency, commodity and bond markets. They show that the 
downside risk is a unifying explanation for returns in different asset markets.  
Although numerous explanations for the momentum anomaly have been put forward, 
their upside and downside market risks has not been studied thoroughly. DeBondt and Thaler 
(1987) findthat past winner stocks have greater downside betas than upside betas. Ang et al. 
(2001) find that the US momentum portfolio has positive and significant loading on a factor 
that reflects downside risk, and that the downside risk factor explains some of the cross-
sectional variation in returns to momentum portfolios. Lettau et al. (2014) consider six US 
Fama-French size-momentum portfolios and find some evidence that the returns are “broadly 
positively associated with the downside beta”.  
Building on these studies, I show that the downside risk alone does not fully explain the 
returns to the cross-section of momentum portfolios because the upside risk plays a 
significant role too. In fact, it is the difference in the upside and downside betas (beta 
asymmetry) which varies across momentum portfolios significantly. For any set of 
momentum portfolios considered, the asymmetry in betas is monotonically increasing from 
past losers to past winners. As a result, the winner-minus-loser momentum portfolios are 
exposed to the downside risk, but hedge against the upside risk
2
.  
In the cross-sectional tests, I show that the relative downside beta, which captures the 
extra downside risk and, hence, the downside-upside risk asymmetry, explains the returns to 
the momentum portfolios well, whereas the traditional beta has no explanatory power. The 
relative downside beta premium is approximately 3-4 percent per month, highly statistically 
significant and similar in magnitude to the estimates obtained for the stock and currency 
markets (Lettau et al., 2014; Dobrynskaya, 2014).  
                                                          
2
 The finding that the momentum portfolios perform badly in states of global market upturns goes in line with 
Daniel and Moskowitz (2013), who show that momentum portfolios crash when the market rebounds after a 
market decline, and when the market return is high. 
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My findings are similar no matter which set of momentum portfolios I consider. I study 
the US, global and regional momentum portfolios of individual stocks, global momentum 
portfolios of country indices, currency momentum portfolios and US short-term and long-
term equity reversal portfolios. I show that momentum is a global phenomenon indeed, and its 
upside-downside risk structure is similar around the world and in different asset markets. 
Hence, the upside-downside risk asymmetry can be considered a unifying explanation of 
returns to momentum portfolios in various markets. The results are robust to different 
estimation methodologies (Fama-MacBeth, 1973, and Hansen‟s GMM, 1982) and different 
periods of study.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I describe the theoretical 
asset pricing models with downside risk to motivate my risk measures. Section 2.3 is devoted 
to the data description and portfolio formation. In section 2.4, I present the portfolio statistics 
and the results of the cross-sectional tests for different sets of momentum and reversal 
portfolios. Section 2.5 is devoted to robustness tests. Section 2.6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.2.CAPM WITH UPSIDE AND DOWNSIDE RISKS 
The importance of upside and downside risks was recognized as early as the first theoretical 
asset-pricing models were developed. Roy (1952) suggests that economic agents care 
particularly about the downside risk. Markowitz (1959) proposes using semi-variance as a 
proper measure of risk. Bawa and Lindenberg (1977) provide an extended version of the 
CAPM where the market beta is separated into the upside beta and the downside beta. Longin 
and Solnik (2001) consider upside and downside correlations, and Ang and Chen (2001) 
propose a measure of correlation asymmetry and show that the asymmetric correlation is 
priced in the US equity market. 
Ang et al. (2006) show how upside and downside risks may be priced cross-sectionally 
in an equilibrium setting. In a theoretical model with disappointment aversion, they show 
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numerically that the traditional CAPM alpha is increasing in the relative downside beta, 
decreasing in the relative upside beta and, hence, increasing in the downside-upside beta 
asymmetry. Assets should have higher expected returns if they have higher relative downside 
betas because such assets perform poorly in bad states of the world when the marginal utility 
of wealth is high and asset returns are particularly important. Assets with high relative upside 
betas, on the contrary, do not require a high risk premium, because the marginal utility of 
wealth is low in such states.   
Ang et al. (2006) test the validity of the two-beta CAPM in the US stock market. They 
find that, indeed, the upside and downside risks are priced differently, and that the two-beta 
CAPM has a much higher explanatory power than the traditional CAPM. Even after 
controlling for other risk factors (size, book-to-market, momentum, liquidity and volatility), 
the estimates of the downside risk premium are statistically significant.  
More recently, asset pricing models with downside market risk proved to be as 
successful in explaining returns in the currency, commodity and bond markets (Lettau et al, 
2014; Dobrynskaya, 2014), as in the equity market. The downside risk is shown to be priced 
similarly in different asset markets and different geographical markets.   
 
2.3.DATA AND PORTFOLIO FORMATION 
I consider a variety of momentum and reversal portfolios around the globe to show that the 
upside-downside risk asymmetry is a universal phenomenon. 
Firstly, I consider 10 US equal-weighted and value-weighted momentum portfolios, 
which are formed by sorting NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks in month t by their total 
returns in months t-12 to t-2. The month prior to the sort date is excluded because of the 
short-term reversal. Portfolio 1 (low) is the past-loser portfolio, and portfolio 10 (high) is the 
past winner portfolio. I also construct the winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolios which have a 
long position in portfolio 10 and a short position in portfolio 1. The longest time series of data 
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is available for these portfolios: from January 1927 until July 2013. The data is taken from the 
Fama-French data library.   
Secondly, I consider global and regional momentum portfolios of individual stocks. 
These portfolios are formed by monthly sorts of stocks in the corresponding region by their 
previous-year (t-12 to t-2) performance. The data on these portfolios is also obtained from the 
Fama-French data library and covers the period from November 1990 until August 2013. I 
collect the raw data on 25 equal-weighted Global, European, Asian-Pacific, Japanese and 
North-American size-momentum portfolios and construct 5 momentum portfolios and 5-1 
WML portfolio for each region. The Global portfolios consist of stocks from 23 countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, the UK, and the USA; the European portfolios consist of stocks 
from 16 countries; the Asian-Pacific portfolios consist of stocks from 4 countries; and the 
North-American portfolios consist of stocks from Canada and the USA.  
The third set of momentum portfolios is formed by double sorts of individual stocks by 
their previous year performance and the market capitalization. I consider global 25 size-
momentum portfolios form the Fama-French data library. 
The fourth set of global momentum portfolios is formed by sorting country indices in 
month t by their total returns in US dollars in months t-12 to t-2. The portfolios are rebalanced 
every month. Following Richards (1997) and Cenedese et al. (2013), I use MSCI country 
indices as the base assets. These indices often represent a benchmark for country index ETFs, 
and hence they are traded assets which can be used to form such momentum portfolios in 
practice. There are 40 countries in the sample: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South 
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Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the USA. The 
sample period is from January 1983 until August 2013, the first sort is done in December 
1983 and the first return is measured in January 1984. For 20 countries, the indices are 
available for the whole period, 12 indices start in December 1987, 4 indices start in December 
1992 and 4 indices start in December 1994. I form 6 equally-weighted portfolios of indices, 
where portfolio 1 represents past loser countries and portfolio 6 represents past winner 
countries. Once new indices appear, they enter the portfolios a year later, and the portfolios 
become more diversified. I also form the 6-1 WML portfolio which represents a global 
momentum strategy. 
The fifth set consists of 5 currency momentum portfolios which are formed by sorting 
currencies in month t by their exchange rate appreciation relative to the US dollar during the 
period t-12 to t-2 and held for 1 month. The sample consists of 45 currencies, but the actual 
number of currencies varies from 10 (November 1984) to 41 (December 1998) due to data 
limitations and creation of the Euro zone. The exchange rate data cover the period from 
October 1983 until August 2013, the first sort is done in October 1984 and the first portfolio 
returns are measured in November 1984. The end-of-month exchange rate data are collected 
from various data sources via Datastream.    
I also consider short-term and long-term reversal portfolios of US stocks for the periods 
January 1927 - July 2013 and January 1931 – July 2013, respectively. The short-term reversal 
portfolios are sorted by the performance in the previous month, whereas the long-term 
reversal portfolios are sorted by the performance in the previous five-year period. All 
portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The data is taken from the Fama-French data library.   
I use the following risk factors in the analysis: the market factor (the US market index 
for the US portfolios and the developed countries World MSCI index for the global and 
regional portfolios), the market volatility factor (the squared market factor), the momentum 
factor (the Fama-French US momentum factor before November 1990, the Fama-French 
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global momentum factor afterwards, which is formed by sorting individual stocks in 23 
countries by their trailing previous-year performance), and the global size factor (the Fama-
French global SMB factor).  
 
2.4.RESULTS 
2.4.1. US MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS 
I start the analysis of US momentum portfolios because the longest time series of data is 
available for these portfolios. Table 2.1 reports the return and risk characteristics of 10 value-
weighted and 10 equal-weighted momentum portfolios, as well as the WML zero-cost 
portfolios.  
The momentum effect is strong in the US; the zero-cost value-weighted (equal-
weighted) momentum strategy generated an average return of 14.27 (9.80) percent per annum 
during 1927-2013. Past-winner portfolios generally have lower return standard deviation, 
skewness, kurtosis and market beta than past loser portfolios, but higher returns. Therefore, 
the WML portfolios generate high and virtually risk-free returns, if these measures of risk are 
considered. This represents the well-known momentum anomaly.  
Keeping the Ang et al. (2006) two-beta CAPM in mind, I estimate the upside and 
downside market betas of the momentum portfolios in the following time-series regression: 
ittMtiMtiiit Drrr  
 *** ,                   (2.1) 
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D , itr  is the return on portfolio i, Mtr  is the US market return, 

i  is the 
estimate of the downside beta
3
, i is the estimate of the upside-downside beta asymmetry, 
iii  

 is the upside beta and εit is the error term. Then, the relative downside beta is 
 ii   , and the relative upside beta is  ii   , where i  is the traditional beta, 
                                                          
3
 As defined here, the downside beta is conditional on the negative market return. Another way to define 
downside beta is to condition on the episodes when the market return is below its mean. This alternative 
specification produces similar results and it is not reported.  
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estimated in the regression of portfolio return on the market return. This approach to estimate 
the upside and downside betas jointly is superior to the one, used in Lettau et al. (2014), 
because no information regarding the upside is lost
4
. The relative downside beta measures 
additional market risk on the downside, after controlling for the overall market risk (the 
traditional market beta). A portfolio may have lower market beta, but greater exposure to the 
downside risk, and hence may require higher returns, because investors care more about 
performance in downstates. This can only be seen after separating the overall market risk and 
the downside market risk. 
Table 2.1 reports the relative downside betas, the relative upside betas and the beta 
asymmetry  iii     of the US momentum portfolios. We observe a striking 
increasing pattern for the relative downside betas and decreasing pattern for the relative 
upside betas along the portfolio rank. Past winner portfolios have higher downside risk and 
lower upside risk than past loser portfolios. Therefore, the WML portfolios are exposed to the 
downside risk, but hedge against the upside risk. Since the downside risk is more important 
for an investor, the WML portfolios require risk premiums. 
Because both the relative downside betas and the relative upside betas are different for 
past winners and past losers, there is an even stronger positive relationship between the beta 
asymmetry and portfolio rank. Past losers have higher upside betas than downside betas, 
whereas past winners have higher downside betas than upside betas. The beta asymmetry 
ranges from -0.71 to 0.99 and it is statistically significant for several top and bottom 
portfolios, as well as the WML portfolios. The results are similar in cases of value-weighted 
and equal-weighted portfolios.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationships between the relative upside betas, relative 
downside betas, beta asymmetry and portfolio rank (for the value-weighted portfolios). We 
observe clear monotonic relationships.  
                                                          
4
Lettau et al. (2014) just pick the downside episodes and estimate the downside beta in that sub-sample. 
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The differences in the upside and downside risks of momentum portfolios can explain 
the differences in their returns. Figure 2.2 plots the predicted versus realized returns of US 
momentum portfolios, where the predictions are made by the traditional CAPM (left-hand-
side) and the two-beta CAPM (right-hand side). Indeed, the two-beta CAPM has very high 
explanatory power (R
2
 of 0.93 and 0.94), whereas the traditional CAPM performs worse (R
2
 
of 0.46 and 0.66), and the beta premium is even negative.  
I use the following specification of the two-beta CAPM for the cross-sectional 
regressions: 
  iiiifi rr    ,                         (2.2) 
where  is the traditional beta premium,   is the extra downside beta premium, and   is the 
common pricing error, which can be restricted to zero
5
. This specification nests the traditional 
CAPM if the extra downside risk is not priced or if the downside beta is equal to the 
traditional beta (and, hence, to the upside beta). This specification of the two-beta CAPM 
(called downside-risk CAPM) was estimated in Lettau et al. (2014) for different asset classes, 
and it is alternative to the specification of Ang et al. (2006): 
iiifi rr  
 ,              (2.3) 
where   is the upside beta premium and  is the downside beta premium. Since the 
traditional beta is a weighted average of the upside beta and the downside beta, we need to 
have any two betas of the three to fully specify the model. If the relative downside beta 
premium is positive, it means that the relative upside beta premium is negative. Specification 
(2) is more convenient because we can easily compare it with the traditional CAPM 
specification and see the contribution of the relative downside risk.  
Table 2.2 reports the estimates of risk premiums in the cross-sectional tests of the 
traditional CAPM and the downside-risk CAPM (DR-CAPM) with and without the constant. I 
                                                          
5
 It is common in the recent literature to restrict the pricing error to zero (e.g. Burnside et al., 2011; Lustig et al., 
2011; Cenedese et al., 2013). 
27 
 
employ two alternative methodologies to estimate risk premiums: the Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
and Hansen‟s (1982) two-step GMM. In the latter, the factor betas and risk premiums are 
estimated jointly, and the standard errors are corrected to account for the generated regressor 
problem. I use the identity weighting matrix in the first step, and then re-optimize using the 
efficient weighting matrix. The moment conditions are specified as in Cochrane (2005):   

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where tf  is either a risk factor or a vector of factors, jtr  is the excess return on portfolio j, bj is 
a factor beta, and λ is a factor risk premium. The first two moments estimate factor betas, and 
the third moment estimates factor risk premiums. 
 The traditional CAPM has negative R
2
 in case of no constant, and negative beta 
premiums, significant intercepts and low R
2
 in case with a constant. It is also rejected by the 
test for the over-identifying restrictions (J-statistics). Therefore, the traditional CAPM cannot 
explain the returns to the momentum portfolios. The downside-risk CAPM, on the contrary, 
performs very well in terms of both R
2
 and J-statistics. The relative downside beta premium is 
about 2 percent per month and it is highly significant irrespective of the estimation 
methodology
6
. The same magnitude of the downside risk premium was also obtained in 
Dobrynskaya (2014) for equity and carry trade portfolios. In case with a constant, the 
traditional beta premium and the constant are insignificant, so that the full explanatory power 
of the model comes from the downside risk component. The high momentum return is a 
compensation for its high relative downside risk and high downside-upside risk asymmetry. 
My results differ from Lettau et al.‟s (2014) results who do not find such a strong 
support for the downside-risk CAPM in the cross-section of six US size-momentum 
                                                          
6
 In an alternative specification of the two-beta CAPM with relative upside betas instead of the relative downside 
betas, the relative upside beta premium is negative and the explanatory power of the model is exactly the same 
by construction. These results are not reported because they are redundant.   
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portfolios, although they write that the returns are “broadly positively associated with the 
downside beta”. The reason is that they look at the downside betas instead of relative 
downside betas which measure downside-upside beta asymmetry. It turns out that the 
downside betas of these portfolios are similar and, hence, they cannot explain the differences 
in these portfolio returns. But the relative downside betas, relative upside betas and the 
downside-upside-beta asymmetry vary across the portfolios significantly and are well aligned 
with the portfolio returns. Neglecting the upside component leads to misinterpretation of the 
results. I confirm the validity of the downside-risk CAPM for the cross-section of 25 global 
size-momentum portfolios in section 2.4.3.       
 
2.4.2. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS OF STOCKS 
In this section, I consider global and regional momentum portfolios of individual stocks and 
show that the downside-upside risk asymmetry of momentum returns is a global phenomenon. 
Table 2.3 reports the returns and risks of 5 global, 5 European, 5 Asian-Pacific and 5 North-
American momentum portfolios and the corresponding 5-1 WML portfolios. The momentum 
strategies are profitable in all regions with the highest momentum return in Europe (17.58 
percent pa) and the lowest momentum return in the Asian-Pacific region (6.55 percent pa)
7
.  
In all regions, the high returns to the WML portfolios cannot be explained by the market 
factor because their global market betas are negative in all cases, as in Fama and French 
(2012). While the market betas are somewhat decreasing with the portfolio rank, the relative 
downside betas are monotonically increasing and the relative upside betas are monotonically 
decreasing. The past winner portfolios have greater exposure to the downside risk and lower 
exposure to the upside risk than the past loser portfolios. Consequently, the winner portfolios 
exhibit a greater degree of the downside-upside risk asymmetry (β–-β+). This asymmetry is 
                                                          
7
 The exception is Japan where the WML portfolio is unprofitable (as in Fama and French, 2012), and its upside 
and downside betas do not differ significantly too. The results for the Japanese momentum portfolios are not 
reported. 
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statistically significant for the winner and WML portfolios in all regions. In general, the 
global and regional momentum portfolios have similar risk structure as the US momentum 
portfolios despite the different base assets and different sample periods. 
As in the US case, the two-beta CAPM has a high explanatory power in the cross-
section of momentum portfolios in all regions (figure 2.3). The predicted returns are very 
close to the realized returns with R
2
 of 77-96 percent. 
Table 2.4 reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) and Hansen‟s (1982) GMM estimates of 
risk premiums in the CAPM and DR-CAPM specifications. In case of the CAPM, the beta 
premium is negative and insignificant, the intercept is highly significant, the adjusted R
2
 is 
negative in most cases and the model is rejected by the J-statistics in case with a constant. As 
in case of the US, the traditional market factor alone cannot explain the returns to the global 
momentum portfolios. When the relative downside risk is also taken into account, the beta 
premiums become positive but insignificant, the intercepts become insignificant, and the 
relative downside beta premiums are highly significant in all cases. The DR-CAPM is never 
rejected by the J-statistics. The DR-CAPM has high explanatory power for all sets of 
momentum portfolios, and this explanatory power comes solely from the downside risk 
component which captures the downside-upside risk asymmetry.  
 
2.4.3. GLOBAL SIZE-MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS 
Table 2.5 reports the returns, downside and upside betas and the beta asymmetry of 25 global 
size-momentum double-sorted portfolios. The portfolio average returns are decreasing with 
size and increasing with past returns. As a result, all SMB and WML long-short portfolios 
generate positive returns. The momentum strategy is profitable for all size quintiles, and the 
momentum effect is stronger for small firms.  
The relative downside betas are decreasing with size and increasing with past returns. 
The relative upside betas, on the contrary, are increasing with size and decreasing with past 
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returns. Small winner stocks have the highest downside risk, the lowest upside risk and the 
greatest downside-upside risk asymmetry. Big loser stocks have the lowest downside risk, the 
highest upside risk and the lowest (negative) risk asymmetry. The WML portfolios have 
positive and statistically significant beta asymmetry for all size quintiles. The SMB portfolios 
have positive, but insignificant, beta asymmetry. Therefore, this risk asymmetry does not fully 
explain the size anomaly. 
In figure 2.4, I plot predicted versus realized returns of the 25 global size-momentum 
portfolios where the predictions are made by the traditional CAPM, the three-factor CAPM 
with the market, size and momentum factors, and the two-beta CAPM. The traditional CAPM 
has low explanatory power (R
2
 is 0.35), and the market risk premium is negative. The three-
factor CAPM explains the returns much better (R
2
 is 0.70), but this result is not surprising 
because the size and momentum factors are derived from these portfolios themselves. The 
two-beta CAPM has an even higher explanatory power despite the lower number of factors 
(R
2
 is 0.75). The asymmetry in betas is aligned well with the portfolio returns.  
Table 2.6 reports the Fama-MacBeth risk premiums in alternative multifactor 
specifications. In the CAPM (column (1)), the beta premium is negative and the intercept is 
highly statistically significant. In the DR-CAPM (column (2)), only the relative downside beta 
premium is significant. This model outperforms the three-factor model (column (3)), where 
the beta premium is negative and the intercept is significant again. When all risk factors are 
included (column (4)), the downside risk factor has the highest statistical significance, 
although the size and momentum factors are significant too. Only the traditional beta is dead.  
 
2.4.4. GLOBAL MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS OF COUNTRY INDICES  
In this section, I consider alternative set of global momentum portfolios, which are formed by 
sorting country indices instead of individual stocks. Country indices also exhibit momentum, 
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and the WML portfolio of country indices generates high returns which cannot be explained 
by conventional risk factors (e.g. Richards, 1997; Cenedese et al., 2013). 
Table 2.7 reports the return and risk characteristics of 6 momentum portfolios of 
country indices and the 6-1 WML portfolio. Both the returns in the local currencies and the 
returns in the US dollars are increasing with the portfolio rank. According to the Uncovered 
Equity Parity (Hau and Rey, 2006), equity return differential in the domestic currency should 
be offset by the depreciation of the domestic currency, but this is clearly not the case. Winner 
portfolios consistently generate higher exchange-rate adjusted returns in excess of the US 
returns, whereas loser portfolios generate negative excess returns (row 4 in table 2.7). This 
violation of the UEP has been documented in Cenedese et al. (2013), and it leads to the global 
momentum strategies being profitable. Such global momentum strategy WML had an average 
USD return of about 13 percent per annum in 1984-2013. 
The profitability of this momentum strategy cannot be explained by conventional risk 
measures, like the standard deviation, skewness or market beta because all of them are similar 
for the 6 portfolios considered. As a result, the WML portfolio has no market risk and low 
volatility.  
As in the previous sections, portfolios with higher rank have higher relative downside 
betas and lower relative upside betas. Whereas the loser portfolios 1 and 2 have symmetric 
upside and downside risks, the difference between the downside and upside betas is 
monotonically increasing with the portfolio rank and it is statistically significant for portfolios 
3-6 and the WML portfolio. As a results, although the WML portfolio has the traditional beta 
of almost zero, it has a positive relative downside beta, a negative relative upside beta and a 
high beta asymmetry.  
The last row of table 2.7 shows how the index momentum portfolios load on the Fama-
French global momentum factor, which is formed by sorting individual stocks
8
. The loadings 
                                                          
8
 The momentum beta is estimated in a two-factor beta-momentum specification. 
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monotonically increase with the portfolio rank and are highly statistically significant for the 
loser and winner portfolios. The index-level momentum portfolios and the stock-level 
momentum portfolios have a similar risk structure and a similar exposure to downside and 
upside market risks.   
Figure 2.5 plots realized versus predicted returns of the 6 momentum portfolios of 
country indices, where the predicted returns are estimated using the traditional CAPM and the 
two-beta CAPM. The CAPM does not explain the returns to the momentum portfolios at all 
because the CAPM betas and, hence, predicted returns of all portfolios are similar while the 
realized returns differ significantly. The two-beta CAPM, on the contrary, predicts the returns 
very well with R
2
 of 0.91.  
Table 2.8 reports the risk premiums in cross-sectional regressions. As before, the DR-
CAPM has a much higher explanatory power than the CAPM, the relative downside beta 
premium is highly significant whereas the traditional beta premium is not. The estimates of 
the downside risk premium are similar to the estimates obtained for the global portfolios of 
individual stocks. Once again, we see that the downside-upside risk asymmetry of momentum 
portfolios is a global phenomenon and it is priced similarly around the world. It is crucial to 
account for this asymmetry to fully understand risks of momentum strategies.  
 
2.4.5. CURRENCY MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS 
In addition to various equity momentum strategies, I consider currency momentum strategies 
as an out-of-sample test.A recent comprehensive study of currency momentum strategies by 
Menkhoff et al. (2012) provides strong evidence that currency momentum strategies are 
profitable, particularly for short holding periods (1 month), and the profits are mostly 
generated by the momentum in spot exchange rates rather than in forward discounts. The 
authors show that the currency momentum returns cannot be fully explained by transaction 
costs, business cycle risk, liquidity and volatility risks and other traditional risk factors, used 
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in equity and currency literature. They conclude that although the FX markets are more liquid 
and efficient than the stock markets, “the properties of momentum strategies are fairly similar, 
which suggests that momentum profits in different asset classes could share a common root”.  
To be consistent with my previous analysis of the equity market, I consider a currency 
momentum strategy with 11-month formation period and 1-month holding period. This 
strategy is one of the most profitable strategies out of 50 strategies considered in Menkhoff et 
al. (2012). Its average annual return was 6 and 7.6 percent in 1976-2010, depending on 
whether the spot rate changes or the total excess returns (including the interest rate 
differentials, or the forward discounts) were used to sort currencies into portfolios and to 
measure the subsequent returns. Since the spot rate changes exhibit greater momentum, I form 
5 momentum portfolios by sorting currencies by their preceding spot rate appreciation relative 
to the US dollar. The winner portfolio includes 1/5 of currencies that have appreciated mostly 
and the loser portfolio includes 1/5 of currencies that have depreciated mostly.   
Panel A of table 2.9 reports the returns and risk characteristics of the 5 currency 
momentum portfolios and the WML portfolio. Indeed, the average portfolio return is 
increasing with the portfolio rank, and the WML portfolio generated a return of 7.82 percent 
per annum during 1984-2013. This return is lower compared to the stock market, but still 
significant and it cannot be explained by the traditional risk measures such as standard 
deviation, skewness or the market beta.  
The relative downside and upside betas exhibit similar patterns as in the stock market. 
The loser portfolio has the lowest relative downside beta and the highest relative upside beta 
whereas the winner portfolio has the highest relative downside beta and the lowest relative 
upside beta. The asymmetry in betas increases with the portfolio rank and it is high and 
statistically significant for the WML portfolio.  
The last row in panel A shows how the currency momentum portfolios load on the 
global equity momentum factor. Although the loadings are not very high, they have 
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predictable signs and are statistically significant for the winner, loser and WML portfolios. 
Therefore, momentum portfolios in different asset markets have a common component. My 
findings suggest that the relative downside risk can explain this common component because 
all momentum portfolios have similar exposure to the downside risk.  
Panel B of table 2.9 shows the Fama-MacBeth and the efficient GMM risk premiums in 
the cross-sectional regressions. Since the intercepts are insignificant in all specifications, they 
are dropped out. As before, the traditional CAPM has low explanatory power and the beta 
premium is negative. The DR-CAPM has higher explanatory power, which comes 
predominantly from the downside-risk component. The estimates of the relative downside 
beta premium are all statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the estimates 
obtained for the stock market.  
 
2.4.6. ALL MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS TOGETHER 
In this section, I show that the asymmetric exposure to the downside and upside market risks 
is a unifying explanation of returns to momentum portfolios in different markets. I analyze all 
portfolios studied previously as a single cross-section. I have 48 portfolios in total: 10 US 
portfolios, 5 global, 5 European, 5 Asian-Pacific and 5 North-American portfolios of stocks, 6 
global portfolios of country indices, 5 currency portfolios and 7 corresponding WML 
portfolios. The sample period is restricted November 1990 – August 2013 since some 
portfolios are not available prior to that period.  
The correlation matrix for returns of the 7 WML portfolios is presented in table 2.10. 
Generally, all portfolios have positive and statistically significant correlations with each other, 
but the correlation coefficient vary. The highest correlations are observed between portfolios 
of individual stocks (up to 0.9), and the lowest correlation are observed for the portfolios of 
country indices and currencies (0.15-0.3). Therefore, global momentum portfolios perform 
differently over time despite the similarities in their relative upside and downside betas. 
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In figure 2.6, I plot predicted and realized returns of the 48 momentum portfolios. In the 
left-hand-side figure, the predictions are made by the CAPM. There are three clear clusters of 
momentum portfolios. The 7 portfolios in the oval cluster are the WML portfolios. The 5 
portfolios in the rhombus cluster are the currency portfolios. The portfolios in the right-angle 
cluster are equity portfolios of stocks and country indices. Within each cluster, all predicted 
returns are similar whereas the actual returns vary significantly. The CAPM is not able to 
explain the momentum portfolio returns. 
When the DR-CAPM is used to predict returns (the right-hand-side figure), all 
portfolios are scattered around the 45-degree line with R
2
 of 57%. The currency portfolios are 
closer to the origin and the equity portfolios are further from it. But there are no visible 
clusters, and all WML portfolios are close to the 45-degree line. Therefore, the DR-CAPM 
has a high explanatory power for the single cross-section of 48 momentum portfolio. 
Table 2.11 reports the Fama-MacBeth estimates of cross-sectional regressions with 
alternative specifications. The traditional CAPM is rejected because the market risk premium 
is statistically insignificant in case with a constant and the R
2
 is negative in case of no 
constant. When the market and momentum factors are included (column (3)), both are 
significant, the intercept becomes insignificant, and the adjusted R
2
 increases from 16 to 49 
percent. Therefore, inclusion of the momentum risk factor improves the explanatory power of 
the CAPM dramatically. 
The DR-CAPM has an even higher adjusted R
2
, and the both premiums are statistically 
significant, whereas the intercept is not
9
. The relative downside beta premium is 3-4 percent 
per month which can be considered a unifying estimate across different markets around the 
world. Most importantly, inclusion of the momentum factor (column (5)) does not improve 
the explanatory power of the DR-CAPM, and the momentum factor itself is statistically 
                                                          
9
 The intercepts in specifications (3)-(5) are statistically insignificant and can easily be dropped out without 
affecting the results.  
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insignificant. After controlling for the downside-upside risk asymmetry, the momentum factor 
becomes redundant.  
 
2.4.7. US REVERSAL PORTFOLIOS  
As an extension, I analyze reversal portfolios which have also been shown to generate 
abnormal returns. I consider short-term and long-term reversal portfolios of US individual 
stocks. The short-term reversal portfolios are sorted by the previous month return and held for 
one month. The long-term reversal portfolios are sorted by the previous five-year return and 
held for one month.  
There is a strong short-term and a moderate long-term reversal effect. Stocks which had 
higher prior return perform worse in the subsequent month. The loser-minus-winner one-
month reversal portfolio had an average return of 19 percent per annum during 1984-2013. 
The loser-minus-winner five-year reversal portfolio generated an average return of 6 percent 
per annum during the same period.  
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 plot the predicted versus realized returns of the short-term and long-
term reversal portfolios, respectively. In the left panels, the prediction is made by the 
traditional CAPM, whereas the two-beta CAPM is used in the right panels. As in the case of 
momentum portfolios, the traditional CAPM has weak or no explanatory power for the cross-
section of reversal portfolios. But the two-beta CAPM performs well again (the R
2
is between 
58 and 80 percent).  
In the cross-sectional tests (table 2.12), the relative downside beta premium is lower in 
magnitude than in the case of momentum portfolios, but still statistically significant. In case 
of short-term reversal, the beta premium is also significant. In case of long-term reversal, only 
the downside risk premium is weakly significant. The downside-upside risk asymmetry 
explains the returns to the reversal portfolios as well. The past loser portfolios generally have 
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higher relative downside betas and lower relative upside betas (greater beta asymmetry) than 
past winner portfolios and require risk premiums.  
 
2.5. ROBUSTNESS TEST: RISKS OF MOMENTUM PORTFOLIOS IN SUB-
PERIODS 
As a robustness check, I study whether the asymmetry in the upside and downside betas of 
momentum portfolios was persistently observed in different periods of time. I consider the US 
momentum portfolios of individual stocks for which the longest time series of data is 
available. Firstly, I split the whole time period into two equal sub-periods 1927-1969 and 
1970-2013 and calculate the return and risk characteristics of the momentum portfolios in 
theses sub-periods. Secondly, I consider a more recent period 2000-2013 separately. This 
period is characterized by high volume of trade by institutional investors.  
Table 2.13 reports the returns and betas of the momentum portfolios in the three sub-
periods. The momentum strategy was always profitable, although the average WML return is 
much lower in 2000-2013. The reason is the crash in momentum profits during the recent 
financial crisis. 
The market betas of the past loser portfolios were always higher than those of the past 
winner portfolios. Therefore, the market betas cannot explain the high returns to the WML 
portfolio in any period. The relative downside betas and the beta asymmetry, on the contrary, 
were always increasing with the portfolio rank. In any sub-period, the past winner portfolios 
had higher relative downside betas and lower relative upside betas that the past loser 
portfolios. The asymmetry in the upside and downside betas was persistent in different 
periods of time. 
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2.6.CONCLUSION 
Momentum strategies generate high returns with insignificant overall market risk. Therefore, 
the momentum return is either evidence for market inefficiency, or a compensation for 
another risk factor. In this paper, I provide a novel risk-based explanation for momentum 
returns. I show that once we separate the overall market risk into the upside and downside 
risks, the momentum strategies appear to have asymmetric risk profile: they are exposed to 
the downside risk, but hedge against the upside risk. Since the upside and downside risks are 
priced differently, the momentum return is a compensation for this risk asymmetry.  
I consider US, global and regional momentum and reversal portfolios of individual 
stocks and global momentum portfolios of country indices and currencies. I show that the 
asymmetry in upside and downside market risks explains all cross-sections of momentum 
portfolio returns well. Past loser portfolios have lower downside risk and higher upside risk, 
whereas past winner portfolios have higher downside risk and lower upside risk and, hence, 
greater downside-upside risk asymmetry. For any set of momentum portfolios, the risk 
asymmetry is monotonically increasing with portfolio rank. The downside-risk CAPM 
explains the cross-section of momentum returns much better than the traditional CAPM. The 
estimates of the relative downside beta premium are always statistically significant and 
similar in magnitude to the estimates obtained for other asset markets. Therefore, the 
momentum return is not anomalous, but a compensation for the asymmetric upside and 
downside market risks.   
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Figure 2.1. Relative upside and downside risks of US momentum portfolios 
 
 
The figure shows the OLS estimates of relative downside and upside betas and beta asymmetry (β--β+) of 10US 
value-weighted momentum portfolios, formed by sorting stocks at time t by their total return in time t-12 to t-2, 
and the winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolio. January 1927 - July 2013. 
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Figure 2.2. Predicted versus realized returns of US momentum portfolios 
 
CAPM Two-beta CAPM 
Value-weighted portfolios 
  
Equal-weighted portfolios 
  
 
The figures show predicted (on the horizontal axis) versus realized (on the vertical axis) returns of 10 US 
momentum portfolios, formed by sorting stocks at time t by their total return in time t-12 to t-2.The predictions 
are made assuming the CAPM (left-hand side) and the two-beta CAPM (right-hand side) using the OLS 
estimates.January 1927 - July 2013. 
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Figure 2.3. Predicted versus realized returns of global and regional momentum 
portfolios: Two-beta CAPM 
 
Global portfolios European portfolios 
  
Asian-Pacific portfolios North-American portfolios 
  
 
The figures show predicted (on the horizontal axis) versus realized (on the vertical axis) returns of global and 
regional momentum portfolios, formed by sorting stocks in the corresponding region at time t by their total 
return in time t-12 to t-2. The prediction is made assuming the two-beta CAPM using the OLS estimates. Nov 
1990 - Aug 2013. 
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Figure 2.4. Predicted versus realized returns of 25 global size-momentum portfolios 
 
CAPM 
 
3-factor CAPM with the market, size and momentum factors 
 
Two-beta CAPM 
 
The figures show predicted (on the horizontal axis) versus realized (on the vertical axis) returns of 25 global 
double-sorted size-momentum portfolios. The predictions are made using alternative factor models and OLS 
estimates. Nov 1990 - Aug 2013. 
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Figure 2.5. Predicted versus realized returns of momentum portfolios of country indices 
 
CAPM Two-beta CAPM 
  
 
The figures show predicted (on the horizontal axis) versus realized (on the vertical axis) returns of 6 global 
momentum portfolios, formed by sorting 40 country indices at time t by their total return in time t-12 to t-2The 
predictions are made assuming the CAPM (left-hand side) and the two-beta CAPM (right-hand side) using the 
OLS estimates. Jan 1984 - Aug 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2
3
4
5
6
R² = 0.038
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10 15 20
1 2
3
4
5
6
R² = 0.911
0
5
10
15
20
0 5 10 15 20
44 
 
Figure 2.6. Predicted versus realized returns of 48 global and regional momentum 
portfolios 
 
CAPM DR-CAPM 
  
 
The figures show predicted (on the horizontal axis) versus realized (on the vertical axis) returns of 48 global and 
regional momentum portfolios (10 US portfolios, 5 global, 5 European, 5 Asian-Pacific and 5 North-American 
portfolios of stocks, 6 portfolios of country indices and 5 currency portfolios, and 7 corresponding WML 
portfolios). All portfolios are formed by sorting base assets at time t by their total return in time t-12 to t-2. The 
predictions are made assuming the CAPM (left-hand side) and the DR-CAPM (right-hand side) using the OLS 
estimates. Nov 1990 - Aug 2013. 
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Figure 2.7. Predicted versus realized returns of US short-term reversal portfolios 
 
CAPM                                               Two-beta CAPM 
Equal-weighted 
 
Value-weighted 
 
The figures show predicted (on the horizontal axis) versus realized (on the vertical axis) returns of 10 US short-
term reversal portfolios, formed by sorting individual stocks in month t by their return in month t-1. The 
predictions are made assuming the CAPM (left-hand side) and the two-beta CAPM (right-hand side) using the 
OLS estimates. Jan 1984 - Jul 2013. 
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Figure 2.8. Predicted versus realized returns of US long-term reversal portfolios 
 
CAPM                                               Two-beta CAPM 
Equal-weighted 
 
 
Value-weighted 
 
The figures show predicted (on the horizontal axis) versus realized (on the vertical axis) returns of 5 US long-
term reversal portfolios, formed by sorting individual stocks in month t by their return in the preceding 5-year 
period. The predictions are made assuming the CAPM (left-hand side) and the two-beta CAPM (right-hand side) 
using the OLS estimates. Jan 1984 - Jul 2013. 
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Table 2.1. Return and risk characteristics of US momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports return and risk characteristics of 10 value-weighted and 10 equal-weighted US momentum 
portfolios, formed by sorting NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks at time t by their total return in time t-12 to t-
2, and the corresponding winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolios. The returns are annualized and expressed in 
percent. The reported betas are the OLS time-series estimates. The US market index serves as a proxy for the 
market portfolio. The momentum factor is the corresponding WML portfolio. T-statistics are in brackets, t-
statistics are calculated using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Jan 1927 – July 2013.  
 
 
Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High WML 
 Value-weighted 
Average return (%pa) 3.99 8.64 8.81 10.37 10.52 11.22 12.24 13.56 14.50 18.26 14.27 
Standard deviation 117.98 98.05 84.72 77.30 71.82 69.90 66.74 64.74 68.33 78.62 95.44 
Skewness 1.82 1.79 1.48 1.46 1.24 0.69 0.12 0.00 -0.32 -0.50 -2.44 
Kurtosis 16.32 20.15 18.70 17.40 17.33 11.77 7.36 4.58 3.62 2.15 18.29 
Market beta (β) 1.55 1.34 1.18 1.10 1.03 1.03 0.97 0.94 0.97 1.02 -0.52 
 
[18.34] [16.16] [17.58] [23.61] [21.37] [35.25] [45.72] [45.46] [29.33] [15.14] [-3.54] 
Relative downside beta 
(β--β) 
-0.28 -0.20 -0.13 -0.16 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.44 
Relative upside beta 
(β+-β) 
0.24 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.14 -0.38 
Betaasymmetry -0.51 -0.37 -0.25 -0.29 -0.18 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.18 0.31 0.83 
(β--β+) [-2.67] [-1.98] [-1.76] [-3.33] [-1.45] [-1.54] [-0.55] [0.71] [2.23] [2.37] [2.64] 
US momentum beta -0.63 -0.39 -0.28 -0.19 -0.14 -0.05 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.37 1.00 
 
[-33.47] [-17.06] [-12.40] [-12.04] [-5.45] [-2.72] [1.46] [7.02] [10.88] [19.67] 
 
 
Equal-weighted 
Average return (%pa) 12.38 13.73 13.78 14.80 14.73 16.15 16.39 17.56 19.38 22.18 9.80 
Standarddeviation 134.99 109.70 94.74 91.40 83.32 79.89 77.64 76.57 77.59 89.20 93.15 
Skewness 2.85 3.12 2.08 2.53 1.74 1.44 1.07 0.94 0.10 0.11 -4.25 
Kurtosis 22.15 31.71 20.01 24.76 20.35 16.11 14.51 13.55 5.80 5.71 38.34 
Market beta (β) 1.59 1.43 1.28 1.25 1.16 1.13 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.16 -0.43 
 
[16.26] [14.09] [19.86] [15.89] [21.45] [24.08] [26.40] [22.62] [28.40] [17.77] [-3.08] 
Relative downside beta 
(β--β) 
-0.38 -0.32 -0.18 -0.23 -0.11 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.15 0.53 
Relative upside beta 
(β+-β) 
0.33 0.28 0.16 0.20 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.13 -0.46 
Betaasymmetry -0.71 -0.60 -0.34 -0.42 -0.21 -0.19 -0.05 -0.02 0.17 0.28 0.99 
(β--β+) [-2.69] [-2.15] [-2.10] [-2.23] [-1.50] [-1.64] [-0.47] [-0.16] [1.74] [1.81] [2.81] 
US momentum beta -0.83 -0.50 -0.34 -0.29 -0.21 -0.14 -0.07 0.00 0.06 0.17 1.00 
 
[-24.65] [-12.00] [-15.84] [-9.36] [-7.47] [-6.64] [-3.52] [-0.15] [2.53] [4.91] 
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Table 2.2. Cross-sectional regressions for US momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth and efficient GMM estimates of risk premiums (in percent per month) 
obtained for 10 value-weighted and 10 equal-weighted US momentum portfolios. The US market index serves as 
a proxy for the market portfolio. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using NW 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics for the over-identifying restrictions is also reported. P-
value for J statistics is in parentheses. Jan 1927 – July 2013. 
 
 Fama-MacBeth GMM 
 CAPM DR-CAPM CAPM DR-CAPM 
 Value-weighted 
Beta(β) 0.53 -1.35 0.75 -0.19 1.11 -0.81 0.71 0.12 
 
[2.96] [-3.71] [4.20] [-0.51] [7.11] [-2.31] [3.93] [0.15] 
Relative downside beta(β--β) 
  
3.11 2.07   4.29 3.03 
   
[6.08] [3.62]   [2.21] [2.04] 
Constant 
 
2.15 
 
0.99  1.57  0.65 
  
[6.37] 
 
[2.95]  [4.76]  [0.79] 
R
2
adj -0.66 0.62 0.80 0.93     
J-stat     20.49 22.57 4.57 4.39 
     (0.02) (0.00) (0.80) (0.73) 
  Equal-weighted 
Beta(β) 0.83 -0.98 1.06 0.65 1.26 0.23 1.06 0.98 
 
[4.04] [-2.28] [5.18] [1.34] [7.28] [0.62] [4.78] [1.36] 
Relative downside beta(β--β) 
  
2.25 1.90   2.27 2.19 
   
[5.59] [4.10]   [2.84] [2.25] 
Constant 
 
2.25 
 
0.48  0.84  0.10 
  
[5.18] 
 
[1.02]  [2.37]  [0.13] 
R
2
adj -1.13 0.39 0.90 0.91     
J-stat     19.09 25.67 1.38 1.72 
     (0.02) (0.00) (0.99) (0.97) 
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Table2.3. Return and risk characteristics of global momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports return and risk characteristics of 5 global equal-weighted momentum portfolios (panel A) and 5 
regional equal-weighted momentum portfolios (panels B-D), and the corresponding winner-minus-loser (WML) 
momentum portfolios. All portfolios are formed by sorting individual stocks in the corresponding region at time t 
by their total return in time t-12 to t-2. All returns are converted to USD, annualized and expressed in percent. 
The reported betas are the OLS time-series estimates. The MSCI global market index serves as a proxy for the 
market portfolio. The global Fama-French momentum factor is used to estimate the momentum betas. T-
statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Nov 
1990 – Aug 2013.   
 
  1 2 3 4 5 WML 
Panel A: Global momentum portfolios 
Average return (% pa) 9.35 11.43 12.76 15.50 20.48 11.13 
Standard deviation 75.04 51.93 46.72 48.23 62.46 47.84 
Skewness 0.07 -0.64 -0.90 -0.85 -0.94 -1.73 
Global market beta (β) 1.15 0.86 0.78 0.79 0.93 -0.22 
  [11.50] [14.06] [17.05] [18.34] [15.58] [-2.06] 
Relative downside beta (β--β) -0.04 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.22 
Relative upside beta (β+-β) 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09 -0.21 -0.26 
Betaasymmetry(β--β+) -0.10 0.07 0.15 0.17 0.39 0.49 
  [-0.32] [0.38] [1.18] [1.82] [3.15] [2.87] 
Momentumbeta -0.44 -0.16 0.00 0.18 0.46 0.90 
  [-3.38] [-2.88] [0.12] [3.65] [4.99] [17.99] 
Av. number of stocks 5545 2558 2204 2145 2932 
 
Panel B: European momentum portfolios 
Average return (% pa) 3.60 8.42 11.23 14.71 21.18 17.58 
Standard deviation 74.19 56.98 52.79 53.09 61.65 48.30 
Skewness 0.07 -0.89 -0.98 -0.82 -0.61 -1.47 
Global market beta (β) 1.07 0.87 0.80 0.79 0.82 -0.25 
  [9.41] [11.08] [11.86] [12.36] [12.03] [-2.27] 
Relative downside beta (β--β) -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.18 
Relative upside beta (β+-β) 0.02 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.19 -0.21 
Betaasymmetry(β--β+) -0.04 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.34 0.39 
  [-0.13] [0.60] [0.99] [1.18] [2.07] [2.26] 
Momentumbeta -0.43 -0.17 -0.04 0.11 0.30 0.73 
  [-3.50] [-2.80] [-0.76] [2.31] [4.58] [8.99] 
Av. number of stocks 1968 884 750 705 966 
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Table 2.3 (Continued). Return and risk characteristics of global momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports return and risk characteristics of 5 global equal-weighted momentum portfolios (panel A) and 5 
regional equal-weighted momentum portfolios (panels B-D), and the corresponding winner-minus-loser (WML) 
momentum portfolios. All portfolios are formed by sorting individual stocks in the corresponding region at time t 
by their total return in time t-12 to t-2. All returns are converted to USD, annualized and expressed in percent. 
The reported betas are the OLS time-series estimates. The MSCI global market index serves as a proxy for the 
market portfolio. The global Fama-French momentum factor is used to estimate the momentum betas. T-
statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Nov 
1990 – Aug 2013.   
 
 1 2 3 4 5 WML 
Panel C: Asian-Pacific momentum portfolios 
Average return (% pa) 15.83 16.63 18.28 22.27 22.38 6.55 
Standard deviation 102.75 79.77 72.61 74.89 91.98 56.46 
Skewness 0.30 -0.06 -0.63 -0.53 -1.03 -2.22 
Global market beta (β) 1.30 1.08 1.00 1.00 1.17 -0.13 
  [9.22] [10.27] [12.48] [12.02] [11.46] [-2.66] 
Relative downside beta (β--β) -0.15 -0.02 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.29 
Relative upside beta (β+-β) 0.17 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.17 -0.34 
Betaasymmetry(β--β+) -0.32 -0.05 0.16 0.17 0.31 0.62 
  [-0.73] [-0.14] [0.70] [0.80] [1.38] [3.06] 
Momentumbeta -0.19 -0.05 0.05 0.19 0.36 0.55 
  [-1.04] [-0.39] [0.63] [1.94] [3.26] [4.63] 
Av. number of stocks 885 319 269 270 413 
 
Panel D: North-American momentum portfolios 
Average return (% pa) 12.77 15.07 16.54 18.63 23.86 11.09 
Standard deviation 88.11 55.76 51.20 54.13 77.67 64.30 
Skewness 0.31 -0.98 -1.04 -0.82 -0.28 -1.34 
Global market beta (β) 1.23 0.88 0.80 0.82 1.03 -0.20 
  [10.67] [13.67] [16.18] [16.68] [13.31] [-3.07] 
Relative downside beta (β--β) 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.25 0.22 
Relative upside beta (β+-β) -0.03 -0.15 -0.17 -0.18 -0.29 -0.26 
Betaasymmetry(β--β+) 0.05 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.54 0.49 
  [0.16] [1.49] [2.37] [2.94] [2.88] [2.08] 
Momentumbeta -0.51 -0.14 0.05 0.25 0.66 1.18 
  [-2.90] [-2.60] [0.91] [3.73] [4.22] [18.29] 
Av. number of stocks 1990 861 733 753 1124 
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Table 2.4. Cross-sectional regressions for global momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth and efficient GMM estimates of risk premiums (in percent per month) 
obtained for global and regional equal-weighted momentum portfolios (five in each case). All portfolios are 
formed by sorting individual stocks in the corresponding region at time t by their total return in time t-12 to t-2. 
The MSCI global market index serves as a proxy for the market portfolio. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics 
are calculated using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics for the over-identifying 
restrictions is also reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses. Nov 1990 – Aug 2013.   
 
 
Fama-MacBeth GMM 
  CAPM DR-CAPM CAPM DR-CAPM 
 
Global 
Beta(β) 0.96 -0.80 0.66 0.43 1.83 -0.09 1.20 -0.21 
 
[2.44] [-1.14] [1.61] [0.65] [5.47] [-0.17] [2.54] [-0.11] 
Relative downside beta(β--β) 
  
4.93 4.68   4.15 5.71 
   
[3.97] [3.39]   [2.32] [2.53] 
Constant 
 
1.63 
 
0.22  0.84  0.95 
  
[3.61] 
 
[0.50]  [2.44]  [0.80] 
R
2
adj -0.45 -0.18 0.94 0.93     
J-stat 
    
7.83 16.31 3.89 3.02 
     
(0.10) (0.00) (0.27) (0.22) 
 
European 
Beta(β) 0.78 -3.49 0.12 0.90 2.10 -1.69 0.99 1.51 
 
[1.78] [-3.65] [0.25] [0.68] [4.91] [-2.62] [1.36] [0.61] 
Relative downside beta(β--β) 
  
8.36 9.62   5.58 5.90 
   
[5.56] [3.68]   [2.43] [2.19] 
Constant 
 
3.77 
 
-0.78  2.02  -0.47 
  
[5.24] 
 
[-0.66]  [4.09]  [-0.22] 
R
2
adj -0.28 0.38 0.87 0.83     
J-stat 
    
8.11 95.78 1.42 1.40 
     
(0.09) (0.00) (0.70) (0.50) 
 
Asian-Pacific 
Beta(β) 1.18 -0.76 1.14 0.53 2.32 -0.66 0.53 0.81 
 
[2.36] [-0.86] [2.24] [0.67] [5.09] [-0.96] [0.44] [0.40] 
Relative downside beta(β--β) 
  
2.79 2.35   8.07 10.11 
   
[2.56] [2.14]   [1.53] [0.75] 
Constant 
 
2.17 
 
0.69  1.98  -0.62 
  
[3.15] 
 
[0.99]  [3.23]  [-0.18] 
R
2
adj -0.79 -0.15 0.63 0.55     
J-stat 
    
8.01 13.42 1.92 1.83 
     
(0.09) (0.00) (0.59) (0.40) 
 
North-American 
Beta(β) 1.21 -0.42 0.56 0.49 2.04 13.25 0.61 0.40 
 
[3.13] [-0.67] [1.29] [0.79] [5.32] [1.10] [0.51] [0.38] 
Relative downside beta(β--β) 
  
4.80 4.69   5.78 4.12 
   
[3.57] [2.78]   [2.02] [2.05] 
Constant 
 
1.60 
 
0.09  -9.58  0.44 
  
[3.64] 
 
[0.16]  [-0.96]  [0.69] 
R
2
adj -0.66 -0.27 0.95 0.92     
J-stat 
    
8.96 13.69 1.14 0.76 
     
(0.06) (0.00) (0.77) (0.69) 
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Table 2.5. Returns and asymmetric betas of 25 global size-momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports returns and betas of 25 global double-sorted size-momentum portfolios, the winner-minus-loser 
(WML) momentum portfolios and the small-minus-big (SMB) size portfolios. The returns are annualized and 
expressed in percent. The betas are the OLS time-series estimates. The global market index serves as a proxy for 
the market portfolio. T-statistics for the long-short portfolios are reported in brackets. Nov 1990 – Aug 2013.   
 
  Average returns, % pa 
  1 - low 2 3 4 5 - high WML 
1 - small 10.72 13.61 15.62 19.67 24.91 14.18 
2 5.20 9.12 9.98 12.91 16.70 11.51 
3 6.80 9.18 9.92 10.54 13.83 7.03 
4 6.28 8.87 9.65 9.95 13.85 7.56 
5 - big 5.96 8.44 9.86 10.35 12.63 6.67 
SMB 4.76 5.17 5.75 9.32 12.27 
 
 
Beta asymmetry (β--β+) 
  1 - low 2 3 4 5 - high WML 
1 - small -0.03 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.43 0.46 [3.17] 
2 -0.21 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.43 0.64 [3.53] 
3 -0.30 -0.02 0.02 0.10 0.33 0.64 [3.29] 
4 -0.24 -0.04 0.06 0.12 0.28 0.52 [2.52] 
5 - big -0.26 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.25 0.51 [2.39] 
SMB 
0.23 
[1.32] 
0.14 
[1.07] 
0.18 
[1.60] 
0.16 
[1.34] 
0.18 
[1.02] 
   Relative downside beta(β--β) 
  1 - low 2 3 4 5 - high WML 
1 - small -0.01 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.21 
2 -0.10 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.20 0.29 
3 -0.14 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.29 
4 -0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.24 
5 - big -0.12 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.23 
SMB 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 
   Relative upside beta (β+-β) 
  1 - low 2 3 4 5 - high WML 
1 - small 0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.13 -0.23 -0.25 
2 0.11 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 -0.23 -0.35 
3 0.16 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.18 -0.34 
4 0.13 0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.15 -0.28 
5 - big 0.14 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.13 -0.28 
SMB -0.13 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 
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Table 2.6. Cross-sectional regressions for 25 size-momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth and the efficient GMM estimates of risk premiums (in percent per month) 
obtained for 25 global double-sorted size-momentum portfolios. Alternative multi-factor models are estimated in 
columns (1)-(4). The global market factor, the global momentum factor and the global size factor are used as risk 
factors. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors. J statistics for the over-identifying restrictions is also reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses. 
Nov 1990 – Aug 2013. 
 
  Fama-MacBeth GMM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Beta(β) -1,30 0,07 -0,75 0,06 -3,99 0,81 -0,96 0,45 
 [-2,69] [0,14] [-2,00] [0,14] [-7,64] [0,69] [-2,80] [0,32] 
Relative downside beta(β--β) 
 
3,61 
 
5,57  5,67  5,27 
 
 
[2,64] 
 
[5,12]  [2,03]  [5,19] 
SMB beta 
  
0,48 0,55   1,23 0,79 
 
  
[2,84] [3,15]   [7,93] [4,51] 
Momentumbeta 
  
0,62 0,62   0,42 0,41 
 
  
[2,13] [2,15]   [1,79] [1,86] 
Constant 1,95 0,50 1,12 0,34 4,71 -0,23 0,94 -0,32 
 [4,90] [1,23] [3,51] [0,90] [8,90] [-0,22] [3,17] [-0,35] 
R2 adj 0,32 0,72 0,66 0,79     
J-stat     22,24 29,04 22,10 23,77 
     (0,51) (0,14) (0,39) (0,25) 
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Table 2.7. Return and risk characteristics of momentum portfolios of country indices  
 
The table reports return and risk characteristics of 6 global momentum portfolios, formed by sorting 40 country 
indices at time t by their total return in time t-12 to t-2, the winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolio and the US 
market index. All returns are annualized and expressed in percent. The reported betas are the OLS time-series 
estimates. The MSCI global market index serves as a proxy for the market portfolio. The global Fama-French 
momentum factor is used to estimate the momentum betas. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated 
using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Jan 1984 – Aug 2013.   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 WML US ret 
Returnin local currency 8,05 6,20 10,16 11,47 14,01 34,23 26,18 8,99 
Exchangeratereturn -1,37 0,38 0,67 2,42 1,99 -14,64 -13,26 
 
Returnin USD 6,68 6,59 10,83 13,89 16,00 19,59 12,92 8,99 
Return in excess of US return -2,31 -2,40 1,84 4,90 7,01 10,60 
  
  [-0,58] [-0,83] [0,58] [1,71] [2,24] [2,71] 
  
Standard deviation 80,69 70,23 69,72 66,83 68,26 85,43 69,32 53,38 
Skewness -0,31 -0,53 -0,67 -0,71 -0,71 -0,68 -0,05 -0,74 
Global market beta (β) 1,12 1,08 1,08 1,02 1,02 1,12 0,00 0,87 
  [14,68] [16,47] [22,40] [20,29] [18,63] [13,19] [-0,01] [23,60] 
Relative downside beta (β--β) 0,07 0,06 0,18 0,17 0,16 0,34 0,27 0,08 
Relative upside beta (β+-β) -0,08 -0,06 -0,20 -0,18 -0,17 -0,37 -0,29 -0,08 
Betaasymmetry (β--β+) 0,15 0,12 0,38 0,34 0,34 0,71 0,57 0,15 
  [0,76] [0,65] [3,02] [2,68] [2,09] [3,13] [2,12] [1,81] 
Globalmomentumbeta -0,32 -0,15 0,04 0,05 0,08 0,13 0,45 -0,02 
  [-4,22] [-1,95] [0,48] [0,72] [1,26] [2,05] [5,20] [-0,56] 
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Table 2.8. Cross-sectional regressions for momentum portfolios of country indices 
 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth and GMM estimates of risk premiums (in percent per month) obtained for 
the 6 global momentum portfolios, formed by sorting 40 country indices at time t by their total return in time t-
12 to t-2. The MSCI global market index serves as a proxy for the market portfolio. T-statistics are in brackets, t-
statistics are calculated using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics for the over-
identifying restrictions is also reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses. Jan 1984 – Aug 2013. 
 
  Fama-MacBeth GMM 
  CAPM DR-CAPM CAPM DR-CAPM 
Beta(β) 0.95 -1.69 0.35 -3.31 0.84 -45.28 0.00 -2.56 
 
[2.96] [-0.95] [1.06] [-1.75] [2.37] [-0.31] [-0.01] [-0.87] 
Relative downside beta(β--β)  
 
3.89 4.08   4.73 4.37 
   
[3.92] [4.02]   [2.11] [2.10] 
Constant 
 
2.84 
 
3.90  49.33  2.80 
  
[1.55] 
 
[2.06]  [0.31]  [0.94] 
R
2
adj -0.05 -0.21 0.72 0.90     
J-stat 
    
13.42 5.59 9.23 6.09 
     
(0.02) (0.23) (0.06) (0.11) 
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Table 2.9. Returns, risks and risk premiums of currency momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports return and risk characteristics of 5currency momentum portfolios, formed by sorting currencies 
at time t by their returns in time t-12 to t-2 and held for 1 month, and the 5-1 winner-minus-loser (WML) 
portfolio (panel A) and the Fama-MacBeth and efficient GMM estimates of risk premiums (panel B). The returns 
are annualized, whereas the risk premiums are expressed in percent per month. The reported betas are the OLS 
time-series estimates. The MSCI global market index serves as a proxy for the market portfolio. The global 
Fama-French momentum factor is used to estimate the equity momentum betas. T-statistics are in brackets, t-
statistics are calculated using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics for the over-
identifying restrictions is also reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses. Nov 1984 – Aug 2013.   
 
 
Panel A: Time-series regressions 
 
1 2 3 4 5 WML 
Exchange rate return (% pa) -5.47 -0.36 0.95 2.65 2,35 7,82 
Standard deviation 34.27 27.51 30.66 29.78 29.07 36.55 
Skewness -0.70 0.30 -0.28 -0.31 -0.65 0.75 
Global market beta (β) 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.21 -0.03 
  [5.38] [4.32] [4.65] [4.60] [5.12] [-0.68] 
Relative downside beta (β--β) -0.14 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.13 
Relative upside beta (β+-β) 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.01 -0.16 
Betaasymmetry (β--β+) -0.31 -0.15 -0.12 -0.19 -0.01 0.30 
 
[-2.22] [-1.42] [-1.03] [-1.78] [-0.12] [2.43] 
Global equity momentum beta -0.10 -0.06 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.19 
 
[-2.51] [-1.55] [0.61] [0.83] [2.94] [4.59] 
 
Panel B: Cross-sectional regressions 
 
Fama-MacBeth GMM 
 
CAPM DR-CAPM CAPM DR-CAPM 
Beta(β) -1.56 -0.21 -1.91 1.10 
 
[-2.59] [-0.27] [-3.24] [0.55] 
Relative downside beta (β--β) 
 
3.97 
 
4.74 
  
[2.80] 
 
[2.42] 
R
2
adj 0.15 0.47 
  
J-stat 
  
7.91 7.99 
 
  
(0.09) (0.09) 
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Table 2.10. Correlation matrix for winner-minus-loser momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports correlation coefficients of returns of 7 global and regional WML portfolios and the global 
Fama-French momentum factor.  T-statistics are in brackets. Nov 1990 – Aug 2013. 
 
 
US Global European 
Asian-
Pacific 
North-
American 
Country 
indices 
Curren 
cies 
FF mom 
factor 
US 1.00 
       
Global 0.80 1.00 
      
 
[21.68] 
       
European 0.56 0.81 1.00 
     
 
[11.06] [22.86] 
      
Asian-Pacific 0.39 0.56 0.29 1.00 
    
 
[7.06] [11.05] [5.01] 
     
North-American 0.89 0.89 0.64 0.44 1.00 
   
 
[32.34] [32.63] [13.60] [7.97] 
    
Country indices 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.34 0.27 1.00 
  
 
[4.01] [5.76] [3.53] [5.93] [4.69] 
   
Currencies 0.15 0.21 0.20 0.33 0.17 0.20 1.00 
 
 
[2.49] [3.55] [3.35] [5.67] [2.92] [3.42] 
  
Global FF mom factor 0.72 0.92 0.76 0.48 0.88 0.37 0.26 1.00 
 
[17.13] [38.91] [19.22] [8.98] [30.17] [6.50] [4.53] 
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Table 2.11. Cross-sectional regressions for 48 global and regional momentum portfolios 
 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth estimates of risk premiums (in percent per month) obtained for 48 global 
and regional momentum portfolios. Alternative multi-factor models are estimated in columns (1)-(5). The global 
market factor and the global momentum factor are used as risk factors. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are 
calculated using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Nov 1990 – Aug 2013. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Beta(β) 1.14 0.51 1.10 0.88 1.02 
 
[3.03] [1.14] [2.67] [2.12] [2.40] 
Relative downside beta (β--β) 
  
 3.94 2.79 
   
 [3.99] [2.06] 
Momentum beta 
  
1.04 
 
0.44 
   
[3.39] 
 
[1.02] 
Constant 
 
0.66 0.11 0.04 -0.01 
  
[3.75] [1.08] [0.43] [-0.06] 
R
2
 adj -0.21 0.16 0.49 0.55 0.57 
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Table 2.12. Cross-sectional regressions for reversal portfolios 
 
The table reports the Fama-MacBeth estimates of risk premiums (in percent per month) obtained for 10 value-
weighted US short-term reversal portfolios and 10 value-weighted US long-term reversal portfolios. The short-
term reversal portfolios are formed by sorting stocks in month t by their return in month t-1. The long-term 
reversal portfolios are formed by sorting stocks in month t by their return in the preceding 5-year period. The US 
market index serves as a proxy for the market portfolio. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated 
using NW heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The sample period is Jan 1927 – July 2013 for the short-
term reversal portfolios and Jan 1931 – July 2013 for the long-term reversal portfolios.  
 
  CAPM DR-CAPM 
  Short-term reversal 
Beta(β) 0.65 0.88 0.71 1.02 
 
[3.70] [2.37] [4.04] [2.59] 
Relative downside beta(β--β)  
 
1.62 1.67 
   
[2.35] [2.35] 
Constant 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.34 
  
[-0.69] 
 
[-0.87] 
R
2
 0.18 0.19 0.35 0.38 
  Long-term reversal 
Beta(β) 0.74 1.28 0.64 0.49 
 
[2.05] [2.52] [1.48] [1.10] 
Relative downside beta(β--β)  
 
0.93 1.04 
   
[1.62] [1.73] 
Constant 
 
-0.61 
 
0.15 
  
[-1.23] 
 
[0.36] 
R
2
 0.61 0.74 0.93 0.94 
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Table 2.13. Return and risk characteristics of US momentum portfolios in sub-periods 
 
The table reports return and risk characteristics of 10 value-weighted US momentum portfolios, formed by 
sorting NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks at time t by their total return in time t-12 to t-2, and the 
corresponding winner-minus-loser (WML) portfolios in sub-periods. The returns are annualized and expressed in 
percent. The reported betas are the OLS time-series estimates. The US market index serves as a proxy for the 
market portfolio. Jan 1927 – July 2013.  
 
 Low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High WML 
 
1927-1969 
Average return (%pa) 6,00 8,63 6,74 9,27 10,81 11,21 12,59 13,77 15,42 19,27 13,27 
US market beta 1,60 1,43 1,26 1,18 1,10 1,08 1,02 0,95 0,97 0,95 -0,66 
Relativedownsidebeta -0,34 -0,23 -0,13 -0,20 -0,12 -0,07 -0,02 0,03 0,11 0,21 0,55 
Relativeupsidebeta 0,28 0,19 0,10 0,16 0,10 0,06 0,01 -0,03 -0,09 -0,18 -0,45 
Betaasymmetry -0,62 -0,41 -0,23 -0,36 -0,22 -0,14 -0,03 0,06 0,20 0,39 1,00 
 
1970-2013 
Average return (%pa) 2,01 8,66 10,85 11,47 10,23 11,22 11,90 13,34 13,60 17,26 15,25 
US market beta 1,45 1,19 1,03 0,96 0,92 0,93 0,89 0,91 0,97 1,16 -0,29 
Relativedownsidebeta -0,13 -0,12 -0,14 -0,06 -0,03 0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,07 0,06 0,19 
Relativeupsidebeta 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,06 0,03 -0,02 0,00 0,01 -0,06 -0,05 -0,18 
Betaasymmetry -0,25 -0,24 -0,27 -0,12 -0,06 0,04 0,00 -0,02 0,13 0,11 0,37 
 
2000-2013 
Average return (%pa) 2,86 6,38 6,83 9,23 8,52 6,42 7,67 7,52 6,27 7,19 4,34 
US market beta 1,95 1,41 1,14 0,98 0,88 0,84 0,78 0,78 0,86 1,08 -0,86 
Relativedownsidebeta -0,45 -0,16 -0,20 -0,10 -0,15 0,05 -0,03 0,04 0,08 0,07 0,53 
Relativeupsidebeta 0,55 0,20 0,25 0,12 0,18 -0,06 0,04 -0,05 -0,10 -0,09 -0,64 
Betaasymmetry -1,00 -0,36 -0,45 -0,21 -0,33 0,11 -0,07 0,09 0,18 0,17 1,17 
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Chapter 3 
Downside Market Risk of Carry Trades 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the puzzles in international finance that challenges traditional theory is the forward 
premium puzzle, or the violation of uncovered interest parity (UIP). According to UIP, free 
capital mobility ensures that investments in different currencies with different levels of local 
interest rates do not consistently generate excess returns because a negative interest rate 
differential should be compensated by the expected exchange rate appreciation of the target 
currency or the forward premium. In reality, however, investments in high-interest currencies 
consistently generate higher excess returns than investments in low-interest currencies. This 
empirical „anomaly‟ has led to the growing popularity of carry trades – an investment strategy 
in which an investor borrows in low-interest currencies and invests in high-interest currencies.  
The aim of this paper is to answer the following question: are the high returns to carry 
trades a fair compensation for their risk? Brunnermeier at al. (2008) show that high-interest 
currencies tend to crash occasionally and that their returns are negatively skewed
10
. However, 
non-systematic crashes should not be relevant to a diversifying investor and thus cannot 
rationalize high returns. What is relevant is the systematic covariance of carry trade returns 
with the stochastic discount factor. 
There is an ongoing debate as to whether carry trade portfolios have significant 
covariances (or betas) with the stochastic discount factor and whether these covariances can 
explain the cross-section of currency returns. Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) suggest that the 
consumption CAPM can explain the returns to carry trades because higher interest rate 
currencies have higher consumption betas. However, Burnside (2011) argues that the 
consumption betas of currency portfolios are statistically insignificant and economically too 
                                                          
10 
A number of papers quantify the crash risk of carry trades and estimate the crash risk premium (e.g., Farhi et 
al., 2013; Jurek, 2014; Chernov et al., 2013). 
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small to rationalize high carry trade returns, and he concludes that consumption risk cannot 
explain any of the cross-sectional variation in the expected returns of currency portfolios. 
Burnside (2012) investigates whether traditional factor models, the CAPM, the Fama-French 
three-factor model and the CAPM with industrial production, can explain the returns to carry 
trades. He finds that these models do not have sufficient explanatory power, either because 
the returns to carry trade portfolios are uncorrelated with US market factors or because the 
market betas are too small and the models estimated for currency and stock portfolios jointly 
are rejected. The author concludes that „there is no unifying risk-based explanation of returns 
in these two markets‟. 
In this chapter, I propose the global downside market risk factor to explain currency 
returns. When we examine the downside market risk of carry trade portfolios, we observe a 
clear risk-return relationship. High interest rate currencies have high and statistically 
significant downside market risk, which is measured by the downside beta, the „disaster beta‟ 
or the coskewness
11
 with respect to the global stock market return; by contrast, low interest 
rate currencies have zero downside risk and hence can serve as a hedging instrument. 
Whereas the consumption betas or traditional market betas of carry trade long-short portfolios 
are rather small, the downside market betas are several times higher and statistically 
significant, especially if we measure them in the worst states of the world (e.g., when there is 
a market crash or a disaster event).  
I show that the spread in the downside market betas and the coskewness across currency 
portfolios sorted by interest rate is sufficient to justify the spread in their returns. The GMM 
estimates of the downside beta and coskewness premiums in the currency market are highly 
significant. Moreover, the estimation of the downside beta or coskewness CAPM for currency 
and stock portfolios jointly produces a good fit of the model, whereas the traditional CAPM is 
                                                          
11   The downside beta is defined as the market beta conditional on the negative market return(the downside 
market factor beta); the „disaster beta‟ is defined as the market beta in times of economic, political or natural 
disasters (the appendix provides a list of disasters); and coskewness is defined as the beta of the squared market 
return (the market volatility factor beta). 
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rejected on several grounds
12
. The downside risk has much higher explanatory power for the 
cross-section of returns in both markets, and the downside risk premiums are similar in both 
markets and are close to the theoretical values. In fact, I cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
downside risk is priced similarly in the currency and stock markets. I conclude that the high 
excess returns to carry trades are not a free lunch but rather fair compensation for their high 
downside market risk. 
The estimates for the downside beta premium are approximately 1-2 percent per month, 
and the estimates for the coskewness premium are approximately minus 0.4-0.6 percent per 
month, depending on the specification
13
. An easy calculation allows us to obtain the expected 
excess return on a currency or stock portfolio with a particular level of downside risk. For 
example, the high-interest currency portfolio of developed countries had a downside beta of 
0.38 and coskewness of -1.37 in 2000-2013. Multiplied by the corresponding monthly risk 
premiums and annualized, the expected return on this portfolio is calculated to be 6-8 percent 
per annum, which is similar to the historical return for this portfolio during this period. The 
high-interest currency portfolio of emerging markets had downside risk and return that were 
almost twice as high.  
The results are robust to different levels of diversification within carry trade portfolios, 
different estimation methods employed (GMM with identity and efficient weighting matrices 
and Fama-MacBeth with time-varying betas), different cut-off levels for the downside betas, 
different samples of countries (the entire sample of developed and emerging economies as 
well as a sub-sample of developed countries) and different time periods. My downside market 
risk factor also wins the „horse race‟ between alternative risk factors previously proposed in 
the literature on carry trades. The results are even stronger in the first decade of the 21
st
 
century – a period of rising popularity for carry trades among institutional investors (Jylhä 
                                                          
12 The spread in the traditional market betas across currency portfolios is insufficient, the estimate of the market 
beta premium is too high relative to its theoretical value, and the overall fit of the model is worse in both the 
currency and stock markets.  
13
 These estimates are obtained for stock and currency portfolios sorted by downside betas, as well as for carry 
trade portfolios of developed countries.  
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and Suominen, 2011)
14
. Lettau et al. (2014) provide further evidence in favor of the downside 
risk CAPM for the cross-section of currency, equity, bond and commodity portfolios. 
In theory, the downside risk is a better measure of risk because it shows the covariance 
of an asset‟s return with the market in the worst states of the world when the overall market 
performs poorly and when the marginal utility of investors is high. If an asset also performs 
poorly in such states, then it is highly unattractive and should provide high expected returns. 
Ang, Chen and Xing (2006)provide an asset pricing model with downside and upside betas 
and empirically show that the downside beta has greater explanatory power in the stock 
market than the traditional beta. In an alternative asset pricing model – the three-moment 
CAPM by Harvey and Siddique (2000) – assets with lower coskewness with the market 
should provide higher expected returns because they perform poorly in states of high market 
volatility. The authors show that adding coskewness to the asset pricing regressions improves 
their explanatory power in the cross-section of stock returns. Coskewness can be considered a 
complimentary measure of downside risk because high market volatility is typically observed 
on the downside.  
Empirically, the co-movement of several major currencies with the stock market has 
already been explored by Campbell et al. (2010) and Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010). Campbell 
et al. (2010) find a positive correlation of the Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar with 
the global equity markets and a negative correlation of the euro and the Swiss franc (the 
Japanese yen, the British pound and the US dollar fall in the middle of the two extremes). A 
high-frequency analysis in Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) uncovers a similar pattern: the 
Swiss franc and the Japanese yen (and, to a lesser extent, the euro) appreciate when the US 
stock market declines, whereas the opposite is observed for the British pound. The „safe 
haven‟ properties of the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen are confirmed in periods of 
political, natural or financial disaster. Although these two studies do not examine carry trades 
                                                          
14
 Jylhä and Suominen (2011) show that the tremendous growth in hedge funds‟ assets under management led to 
their greater influence in currency and bond markets and carry trade returns. 
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explicitly, their findings suggest that there is a particular relationship between local interest 
rates and the hedging properties of the currencies. In both papers, the currencies that move in 
the opposite direction to the stock market are also the most common funding currencies for 
carry trades (the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc), whereas the currencies with the highest 
exposure to the stock market are the usual target currencies. Hence, carry trades may be prone 
to high stock market risk, and this idea is explored thoroughly in my paper.  
Rather than examining single currencies, I form portfolios of currencies sorted by the 
forward discount in the same manner as a carry trade is performed. This portfolio approach 
allows me to diversify the idiosyncratic risk and to concentrate on those properties that are 
attributable to currencies with different levels of interest rates. I include 42 developed and 
emerging economies in the sample, hence providing evidence for a much wider spectrum of 
currencies than in the papers cited above. I show that there is a systematic positive 
relationship between the global market risk of a currency and the local interest rate level, and 
this relationship is stronger for emerging market currencies. Moreover, this relationship is 
even stronger if we measure the market risk on the downside. High-interest currencies tend to 
crash along with the stock market, whereas low-interest currencies represent a „safe haven‟. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I briefly review the 
related empirical literature on currency returns and describe the theoretical asset pricing 
models with downside risk to motivate my risk measures. Section 3.3 is devoted to the data 
description and the currency portfolio formation. In section 3.4, I present the portfolio 
statistics and the main results of the estimation of alternative asset-pricing models by GMM. I 
compare the downside risk pricing in the currency and stock markets, vary thresholds for the 
downside beta and propose the „disaster beta‟ as an alternative measure of downside risk. 
Section 3.5 is devoted to robustness tests. I study a sub-sample of developed countries and the 
more recent period of active carry trades, run „horse races‟ between alternative risk factors, 
previously proposed in the literature, sort currencies by their downside betas and nominal 
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interest rates rather than forward discounts, and perform Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimations 
with time-varying betas. Section 3.6 concludes the paper.  
 
3.2. RELATED LITERATURE 
3.2.1.EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON CURRENCY RETURNS 
Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) were among the first researchers to sort currencies by nominal 
interest rate level into portfolios and to study the cross-section of returns to these carry trade 
portfolios. They examine carry trades through the consumption CAPM lens and find that 
returns of high-interest currencies co-move with US non-durable and durable consumption 
growth, whereas returns of low-interest currencies serve as a hedge against domestic 
consumption risk. The authors conclude that the high average returns to carry trades 
compensate for the consumption risk because carry trades yield low returns when 
consumption growth is low and when the marginal utility of wealth is high. The relevance of 
the consumption CAPM framework for explaining currency returns was also confirmed by De 
Santis and Fornari (2008) for several European countries.  
However, Burnside (2011) argues that the consumption risk explains none of the cross-
sectional variation in carry trade returns. He finds that although the consumption betas of 
carry trade portfolios increase with the interest rate level, none are statistically different from 
zero, and there is no statistically significant spread in these betas. If the rank of betas is low, 
perhaps zero, then there are problems with weak identification of the beta premium. 
Moreover, the estimates of the consumption risk premium in the second-pass regressions in 
Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) do not account for the fact that the betas are generated 
regressors. Burnside (2011) shows that the estimates of the consumption risk premium are 
statistically insignificant once the standard errors are appropriately corrected (Shanken, 1992, 
or GMM). Furthermore, the consumption CAPM performs poorly (low R
2
) if the constant is 
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restricted to zero. Therefore, the validity of the consumption CAPM for currency returns is 
rejected on many grounds. 
Subsequently, Lustig and Verdelhan (2011) provide additional evidence in favor of the 
consumption CAPM; their results are particularly visible during the global financial crisis of 
2008, when carry trades crashed and consumption growth was low. By examining data with 
higher frequency, the authors show that the consumption risk factor loadings of carry returns 
vary over time and tend to increase during recessions and other crisis episodes. Therefore, 
their estimates of consumption betas on quarterly data understate the true risk. These 
researchers also provide evidence of the US stock market risk of carry trades and show that 
the correlation with the stock market increases during episodes of financial crisis. Overall, 
Lustig and Verdelhan (2011) conclude that „the forward premium puzzle has a risk-based 
explanation‟. 
Burnside (2012) provides further evidence against the market risk-based explanation of 
carry trade returns. He tests whether the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model, and 
models with industrial production and stock market volatility can explain the returns to two 
currency portfolios: an equally weighted portfolio of all currencies and an HML portfolio with 
a long position in high-interest currencies and a short position in low-interest currencies. The 
author finds that the US market betas of these two portfolios are too small to rationalize their 
returns. He estimates the asset-pricing models using the 25 Fama-French stock portfolios and 
the two currency portfolios together and finds that the pricing errors for the currency 
portfolios are significant and that the models are rejected. Burnside (2012) concludes that the 
traditional risk factors that explain stock returns cannot explain the returns to carry trades. A 
discussion of his estimation methods is given in section 3.4.2 of this paper.  
Meanwhile, other risk factors are proposed to explain currency returns. These risk 
factors are derived from the currency portfolios themselves, sorted by certain characteristics. 
Examples are the HML carry factor (Lustig et al., 2011), global currency volatility factor 
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(Menkhoff et al., 2012a), global currency skewness factor (Rafferty, 2012), FX correlation 
risk factor (Mueller et al., 2013) and dollar factor (Verdelhan, 2013). Although these risk 
factors are successful in explaining the carry trade returns, they fail to explain stock portfolio 
returns (e.g., Burnside, 2012). Hence, as Burnside argues, „there is no unifying risk-based 
explanation of returns in these two markets‟. 
In this paper, I provide ample evidence in favor of the market risk-based explanation of 
carry trade returns. However, rather than using the traditional market beta as a risk measure, I 
use the downside market beta, the „disaster beta‟ and the coskewness, which are conditional 
on low market returns or high market volatility. I also contribute to the debate between Lustig 
and Verdelhan (2007, 2011) and Burnside (2011) regarding the explanatory power of the 
consumption CAPM in the currency market by showing that the downside consumption risk 
of carry trades is much stronger but still insufficient to explain the cross-section of currency 
returns. 
In a more recent study, Lettau et al. (2014) extend this analysis of the downside risk 
CAPM to the cross-section of currency, equity, bond and commodity portfolios. Our papers 
agree that the model with the downside market factor has better explanatory power than the 
traditional CAPM in all markets. However, our papers differ in several respects. First and 
most importantly, we employ different methodologies (Lettau et al. (2014) use Fama-
MacBeth (1973) two-pass estimates, whereas I use GMM to estimate betas and risk premiums 
jointly, following the criticism in Burnside (2011)). Second, I consider alternative measures 
of the downside risk (the downside beta, the „extreme‟ downside beta, the „disaster beta‟ and 
the coskewness) and show that the „extreme‟ downside risk measures have even higher 
explanatory power for the carry trades. Third, I use the global market index as a proxy for the 
market portfolio, whereas Lettau et al. (2014) use the US market index. Fourth, I compare the 
downside market factor to other currency risk factors proposed in the literature and run „horse 
races‟. Finally, I also separately study a period of active carry trades by institutional investors 
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and show that all results are stronger in this period, thereby providing empirical support for 
the Basak and Pavlova (2013) model of the effects of institutional trading.  
 
3.2.2. ASSET PRICING MODELS WITH DOWNSIDE RISK 
3.2.2.a. THREE-MOMENT CAPM WITH BETA AND COSKEWNESS 
Since currency returns are distributed asymmetrically (Brunnermeier at al., 2008), we should 
call for a model where the third moment is priced – the three-moment CAPM. The three-
moment CAPM goes back to Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), where there is preference for 
systematic skewness. But for a diversifying investor, the coskewness with the market is 
important.  
To show how coskewness enters the asset pricing equation, I lay out the three-moment 
CAPM of Harvey and Siddique (2000). The first-order condition for a utility-maximizing 
representative investor is the following standard pricing equation: 
1])1[( 11,   ttit mRE (3.1) 
whereRi,t+1 is the total return on asset i and mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor, which is 
equal to the marginal rate of substitution between periods t and t+1. To produce the three-
moment CAPM, the authors assume that the marginal rate of substitution is quadratic in the 
market return, which can be derived by expanding the marginal rate of substitution to the 
second order: 
(3.2) 
Expanding the expectation in equation (1) and substituting the expression for the 
stochastic discount factor (2), the authors obtain the following asset-pricing equation:      
],[],[][ 2 1,1,,21,1,,11,   tMtitttMtitttit rrCovrrCovrE              (3.3) 
where ri,t+1 is the excess return on asset i, rM,t+1 is the market risk premium, and λ1,t and λ2,t are 
functions of the expected market excess return, variance and skewness and expectation and 
2
1,1,1   tMttMttt RcRbam
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variance of the squared market excess return. What is important is that λ1,t and λ2,t are the 
same across all assets, 0,1 t  and 0,2 t .  
According to equation (3), an asset with higher covariance with the market return 
(higher beta) should have a higher expected return while an asset with higher covariance with 
the squared market return (higher coskewness) should have a lower expected return. 
Intuitively, adding an asset with a high coskewness to a market portfolio increases the 
skewness of the portfolio, and, hence, such asset is valuable and its expected return should be 
lower.  
 
3.2.2.b. CAPM WITH DOWNSIDE AND UPSIDE BETAS 
There are different reasons that investors may be more averse to losses than they are attracted 
to gains: behavioral loss aversion in the utility function (Barberis et al., 2001), rational 
disappointment aversion in the utility function (Ang, Chen and Xing, 2006), binding short-
sale constraints (Chen, Hong and Stein, 2001), wealth constraints (Kyle and Xiong, 2001), 
funding liquidity constraints and liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), fund 
flow considerations and other reasons. In such settings, assets with higher downside risk 
relative to their upside risk should have higher expected returns. 
Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) show how the downside risk may be priced cross-
sectionally in an equilibrium setting by assuming that agents have Gul‟s (1991) 
disappointment aversion utility function, which down-weights elating (above the certainty 
equivalent) outcomes relative to disappointing (below the certainty equivalent) outcomes. In 
this setting, the traditional market beta „is not a sufficient statistic to describe the risk-return 
relationship of an individual stock‟ because agents are particularly concerned about the 
downside risk. The authors numerically show that the traditional CAPM alpha is increasing in 
the downside beta and decreasing in the upside beta. However, because the marginal utility of 
wealth decreases when the overall market rises, the upside risk is not as important as the 
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downside risk. Therefore, measures of downside risk have greater explanatory power for 
describing the cross-section of expected returns.  
 
3.3. DATA AND PORTFOLIO FORMATION 
The data covers the period from January 1984
15
 until June 2013 at a monthly frequency. The 
sample of countries consists of 42 developed and emerging economies. Compared with 
Burnside‟s (2012) sample of 20 countries, my sample includes many emerging market 
economies, some of which are popular targets of carry trades because of their high local 
interest rates. I also consider a sub-sample of 15 developed countries. The full list of countries 
is provided in the appendix. 
As is common in the currency literature, I adopt the perspective of a US investor. For 
each country, I collect the spot and one-month forward exchange rates against the US dollar. 
An increase in the exchange rate means an appreciation of the respective currency against the 
US dollar. The exchange rate data are corrected for denominations, and periods of fixed 
exchange rate regimes are omitted because otherwise the currency risk would be artificially 
lower. 
US non-durable real consumption is used to calculate the consumption risk, and the 
MSCI All-Country World Index (ACWI) serves as a proxy for the market portfolio. This 
index aggregates the stock market performance in 45 countries. I use the global stock market 
index rather than the US stock market index because the main carry trade investors are 
institutional investors investing globally
16
. 
The sources of data are Datastream and the Global Financial Database. I also collect 
monthly data on NYSE stock total returns from CRSP. 
                                                          
15
 A longer period from January 1974 to June 2013 is analyzed in the online appendix. Because forward prices 
are unavailable for such a long period, the carry trade portfolios are sorted by the nominal interest rate 
differential.  
16 
The global market index has a correlation coefficient of 0.89 with the US stock market index, and 
considering the US stock market index instead does not affect the results (not reported). 
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Following Lustig et al. (2011), I sort currencies by the forward discount and form 5, 10 
and 25 equally weighted currency portfolios to consider different levels of diversification 
within portfolios. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. When the covered interest parity is 
satisfied, the forward discount is approximately equal to the interest rate differential. Hence, 
portfolio 1 always consists of currencies with the lowest local interest rates; portfolio 2 
consists of the next basket of currencies in the ranking; and portfolios 5, 10 and 25 always 
contain currencies with the highest interest rates. Obviously, the 5 portfolios are more 
diversified, whereas the 25 portfolios are rather noisy. The monthly rebalancing ensures that 
the portfolios resemble carry trade portfolios, the composition of which changes over time as 
the forward discounts change. 
For each level of diversification, I form HML portfolios, which have long positions in 
the portfolios with the highest rank (portfolios 5, 10 and 25) and short positions in the 
portfolios with rank 1. The HML portfolios can be considered the most aggressive carry trade 
strategies because they exploit the highest interest rate differentials.  
For the sub-sample of developed countries, the 15 currencies are sorted by the forward 
discount into five portfolios. These portfolios are analyzed in section 3.4.3 and, in more 
detail, in section 3.5.1. 
 
3.4. RESULTS 
3.4.1. RETURN AND RISK CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENCY PORTFOLIOS 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationships between the average excess returns of the 10 currency 
portfolios sorted by the forward discount and the 10-1 HML portfolio and their traditional 
downside and upside betas. Here, all betas are estimated by OLS, and the downside and 
upside betas are estimated in the following time-series regressions using a dummy variable: 
jtMttjMtjjjt rdummyrr   * (3.4) 
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where jtr  is the return of portfolio j, Mtr  is the global stock market return, 

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dummy , j  is the estimate of the downside beta and )( jj    is the estimate 
of the upside beta. As defined here, the downside beta measures the sensitivity of an asset‟s 
return to the market return in states when the market return is negative. Other cut-off levels 
for the downside beta are considered in section 3.4.4. 
Figure 3.1 shows that the spread of the downside betas (the middle panel) across 
portfolios is much wider than the spread in the traditional betas (the top panel), and the 
downside betas have much greater explanatory power in the cross-section of portfolio returns. 
There is an insignificant negative relationship between the upside betas (the bottom panel) 
and portfolio returns. The downside and upside betas do not have a symmetric relationship 
with portfolio expected returns, as the theoretical model of Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) 
predicts. Hence, separating the beta into its upside and downside components improves the 
validity of the CAPM in the currency market.  
Table 3.1 presents the returns and various risk characteristics of the 10 currency 
portfolios sorted by the forward discount and the 10-1 HML portfolio
17
. The first row shows 
the average annualized excess returns of the portfolios. Although portfolios of higher rank 
appear to depreciate more against the US dollar than the lower-rank portfolios, the exchange 
rate depreciation does not offset the gain from the interest rate differential, as predicted by the 
UIP, such that the total portfolio excess returns are generally increasing with the portfolio 
rank. The HML portfolio, which consists of high-interest high-inflation emerging markets, 
generated an average return of 16.56 percent per annum during the studied period
18
. This 
return illustrates the profitability of carry trades.  
                                                          
17 
The characteristics of the 5 and 25 portfolios have the same pattern and are not reported. 
18 
 Returns do not account for transaction costs. 
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Portfolios of higher rank have higher return standard deviation and lower skewness. 
Although the relationship between portfolio returns and skewness is not completely 
monotonic, it generally confirms the findings of Brunnermeier et al. (2008).  
The subsequent rows of table 3.1 show the efficient GMM estimates of consumption 
and the market betas of the currency portfolios
19
. The portfolio betas and beta premiums are 
estimated jointly by GMM using a similar system of moment conditions as in Cochrane 
(2005):   

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where tf  is either a risk factor or a vector of factors, jtr  is the excess return on portfolio j, bj is 
a factor beta, λ is a factor risk premium and γ is a constant (pricing error). The first two 
moments estimate the factor betas of each portfolio, and the third moment estimates the factor 
risk premium. I use both the efficient and identity-weighting matrices in the estimation; 
however, table 3.1 reports only the efficient GMM estimates, and the first-step GMM 
estimates are similar. 
The consumption betas of all portfolios are statistically insignificant, which confirms 
Burnside‟s criticism of the relevance of the consumption CAPM for the currency market. The 
downside consumption betas of all portfolios are much higher and statistically significant, 
although the spread in them across portfolios is still insignificant to account for the cross-
section of returns. 
The traditional market betas are increasing with the portfolio rank from 0.11 for 
portfolio 1 to 0.22 for portfolio 10. All betas are statistically significant, but the spread in 
them across portfolios is insufficient to explain the differences in the portfolio returns.  
                                                          
19 
 The efficient GMM estimates of betas in table 3.1 are not exactly the same as the OLS estimates in figure 
3.1 because of the joint estimation of betas and beta premiums using the efficient weighting matrix. The OLS 
estimates are generally higher and more statistically significant. These estimates are available upon request. 
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The downside market betas are also monotonically increasing with the portfolio rank 
from -0.01 for portfolio 1 to 0.40 for portfolio 10
20
. The spread in the downside betas across 
portfolios is nearly four times as wide as the spread in the traditional betas. The downside 
betas are close to zero and statistically insignificant for portfolios 1-3; thus, these portfolios 
are immune to the stock market downturns and can serve as a „safe haven‟. Portfolios 9, 10 
and HML, on the contrary, have high and statistically significant downside betas. Hence, 
these portfolios have significantly negative returns when the global stock market falls. The 
downside betas of these portfolios are nearly twice as high as their traditional betas. Although 
the average covariance of the high-interest currencies with the market is modest, it rises 
significantly during market downturns. Hence, carry trades tend to crash systematically along 
with the stock market. 
Estimates of the market betas and the downside market betas in a five-year rolling 
window also exhibit different patterns over time. The market betas of the HML portfolio were 
close to zero and even negative before 2000, whereas its downside betas were usually 
positive, high and significant. The explanatory power of the downside market factor was high 
even in the beginning of the studied period, when the traditional market factor had no 
explanatory power at all. 
Unlike the downside betas, the upside betas are decreasing with portfolio rank. When 
the stock market rises, low-interest currencies tend to provide higher returns than high-interest 
currencies. Although the upside betas of nearly all portfolios are statistically significant, they 
do not differ greatly.  
Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between the traditional market betas, the downside 
betas and the upside betas of these 11 currency portfolios. Because the downside betas are 
increasing with the portfolio rank and the upside betas are decreasing and because the 
                                                          
20 
 If the currencies are sorted into portfolios by their downside betas rather than the forward discounts, then a 
similar monotonic relationship between the downside betas and portfolio returns is observed (see the online 
appendix). 
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traditional betas are the weighted averages of the downside and the upside betas, the pattern 
of traditional betas across portfolios is rather flat. The traditional market betas cannot explain 
the returns to carry trades because they are not informative about the actual risks of the 
currency portfolios. By separating the traditional beta into the upside beta and the downside 
beta, we obtain much more information about the performance of the carry trade portfolios.  
The last row of table 3.1 reports the coskewness of portfolio returns with the global 
stock market, which is estimated in a time series regression of returns on the squared market 
returns (or the market volatility factor). Similar to skewness, coskewness is positive and 
statistically significant for portfolio 1, is monotonically decreasing with the portfolio rank, 
and is negative and significant for the high-interest portfolios. A significant negative 
coskewness indicates that a portfolio has negative returns in periods of high stock market 
volatility, and investing in such a portfolio increases the crash risk for investors. The same 
conclusion has been drawn by Menkhoff et al. (2012a), Christiansen et al. (2011) and Clarida 
et al. (2009) in examining conditional currency returns using different proxies for volatility. 
However, coskewness as a measure of volatility risk has not been analyzed previously in the 
currency literature.  
The coskewness and the downside beta can be considered alternative measures of the 
downside market risk because high stock market volatility is typically observed on the 
downside. The downside betas are strongly correlated with the coskewness across portfolios 
(the correlation coefficient is -0.999), and both are statistically significant in multifactor 
setting (see the online appendix for the multifactor specifications and „horse races‟ between 
alternative risk factors). 
Overall, table 3.1 suggests that the high returns to carry trades is compensation for their 
high downside market risk, which cannot be diversified away because the global market 
portfolio performs poorly in such states.  
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3.4.2. DOWNSIDE RISK PRICING IN THE CURRENCY MARKET 
In this section, I test the validity of alternative asset pricing models for the cross-section of 10 
currency portfolios of developed and developing countries sorted by the forward discount and 
the 10-1 HML portfolio. I consider the following models: the consumption CAPM, the 
CAPM with the downside consumption beta, the traditional CAPM, the downside beta 
CAPM, the upside beta CAPM and the coskewness CAPM.  
The models are estimated by GMM using the moment conditions in (5). GMM 
minimizes the weighted sum of these moments, and the covariance matrix between the two 
sets of moments captures the effect of generated regressors on the standard errors of the risk 
premiums. The GMM estimation is preferable to the Fama-MacBeth two-step procedure, 
because following the latter we are more likely to falsely accept the model due to generally 
lower standard errors of risk premiums.   
For each specification, I estimate both the first-step GMM with the identity weighting 
matrix and the iterated GMM with the efficient weighting matrix, which assigns more weight 
to moments that are estimated more precisely. 
The GMM estimates of the risk premiums and the various fit statistics for the alternative 
specification are reported in table 3.2. 
First, the consumption CAPM is rejected on all grounds. Not only are the consumption 
betas in table 3.1 insignificant, but all consumption beta premiums are statistically 
insignificant (as in Burnside, 2011). The consumption CAPM with the downside consumption 
betas performs better in terms of the overall fit of the model, but the downside consumption 
risk premiums are still statistically insignificant. Non-durable consumption is not sufficiently 
volatile for the consumption betas to be measured precisely, and consumption betas cannot 
account for the cross-sectional spread of carry trade returns.  
Second, the traditional CAPM and the upside beta CAPM do not perform well. Both 
models are rejected by the J-statistics in the case of the identity weighting matrix. The market 
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risk premium is economically too high and statistically insignificant in the case of the identity 
weighting matrix. The upside beta premium is even negative. This result is consistent with the 
Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) model, which predicts that in good states of the world, the 
marginal utility of wealth is low, and assets that perform well in such states are not 
particularly valuable. 
Third, the downside beta premiums and the coskewness premiums are all highly 
statistically significant and have the correct signs, all intercepts are close to zero and the 
models are not rejected by the J statistics. The downside beta CAPM wins the „horse race‟ 
because it has the lowest J-statistics and the lowest mean sum of squared errors (MSSE) and 
hence a better overall fit.  
As Lewellen, Nagel and Shanken (2010) note, to make the correct judgment about an 
asset pricing model, we must consider not only the statistical significance of risk premiums 
but also their magnitude and economic meaning. Whereas the estimates of the traditional beta 
premium are 13-17 percent per month, the estimates of the downside beta premium are 3-4 
percent per month. The estimates of the coskewness premium are minus 0.5-0.6 percent per 
month. Such estimates for the downside beta and coskewness premiums make economic 
sense. For example, if we multiply them by the downside beta and coskewness of the HML 
portfolio in table 3.1 (0.4 and -2.41, respectively) and annualize, then the expected excess 
return for this portfolio is approximately 16-17 percent per annum. The actual average annual 
excess return on this portfolio was 16.56 percent during 1984-2013. It follows that the high 
returns to carry trades were simply compensation for their high downside market risk. 
Lustig et al. (2011) propose two factors – EW (level) and HML (slope) – to explain the 
returns to currency portfolios. The authors show that currency portfolios sorted by the forward 
discounts load differently on the HML factor and that the spread of these loadings accounts 
for the spread of the portfolio returns. However, the HML portfolio itself has high loading on 
the downside market factor. For example, the HML strategy considered in this paper (10-1 
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portfolio) has a downside beta of 0.4 and is highly statistically significant. Because higher-
interest currency portfolios load more on the downside market factor, they load more on the 
HML factor. The two factors are closely linked, and their explanatory power in the cross-
sectional regressions is similar. See the online appendix for the „horse races‟ between 
alternative factors. 
My findings are inconsistent with Burnside‟s (2012) claim that the stock market risk 
cannot explain the returns to carry trades. He argues that the market betas of carry trade 
portfolios are too small to rationalize their high returns, and once a traditional market-risk-
based model is estimated for currency and stock portfolios together, it is rejected because of 
high pricing errors for the currency portfolios. However, Burnside‟s sample of countries is 
much smaller than mine. Even my OLS estimates of the market betas are higher because my 
sample includes more emerging countries, which are riskier. Moreover, when I measure the 
market risk on the downside, it is higher for the high-interest currencies and lower for the low-
interest currencies; thus, the spread is much wider. The OLS downside beta of my HML 
portfolio is 0.48
21
. Therefore, the market risk of carry trades is more than twice as high when 
measured on the downside.  
In the cross-sectional tests, Burnside estimates the models for 25 Fama-French stock 
portfolios and two currency portfolios. Even in the case of the identity weighting matrix, the 
weight of the stock portfolios is much higher (25/27) than the weight of the currency 
portfolios (2/27) in the estimation. Therefore, the models are in fact estimated for the stock 
portfolios, and he then determines whether the currency portfolios „fit‟ these models. Because 
the Fama-French portfolios can be priced by the Fama-French factors, not surprisingly, he 
finds that the Fama-French model is the only model that is not rejected. However, why would 
the size and value factors price the currency portfolios? These factors would not do so, and he 
                                                          
21 
 The OLS estimates are only shown in figure 3.1. They are available upon request. 
80 
 
finds that the pricing errors are significant indeed
22. Burnside concludes that „there is no 
unifying risk-based explanation of returns in these two markets‟. I show that the asset pricing 
models with downside market risk fit the cross-section of currency portfolio returns well. In 
the next section, I estimate the same models for the currency and downside-beta-sorted stock 
portfolios jointly, and I arrive at the same conclusion.  
 
3.4.3. COMPARISON OF CURRENCY AND STOCK MARKETS  
Is the downside risk priced similarly in the currency and stock markets? The efficient GMM 
estimate of the downside risk premium is approximately 4 percent for the 10 currency 
portfolios of developed and developing countries. Regarding the evidence from the stock 
market, Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) estimate the downside beta premium at between 2.8 and 
6.9 percent (statistically significant) in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for individual 
NYSE stock returns during 1963-2001. But the Fama-MacBeth estimates are not directly 
comparable to the efficient GMM estimates. Therefore, I estimate the market risk premiums 
for currency and stock portfolios jointly using GMM.  
Rather than considering the Fama-French stock portfolios, as in Burnside (2012), I 
consider stock portfolios sorted by the downside beta because these portfolios have a clear 
downside risk-return relationship, whereas other risks are diversified away within the 
portfolios. Following Ang, Chen and Xing (2006), I restrict the sample to NYSE stocks to 
minimize the illiquidity effect of small firms
23
. Stocks with fewer than 60 time series 
observations are excluded. This filter leaves 3,349 stocks in the sample. 
Every month, all stocks are sorted by their downside betas, estimated in a five-year 
rolling window prior to the sort date, into five equally weighted portfolios. Portfolio 1 always 
contains 20 percent of the stocks with the lowest pre-ranking downside betas, and portfolio 5 
                                                          
22 
 The efficient GMM makes the „fit‟ of the currency portfolios even worse because it attaches an even higher 
weight to the stock moments that are measured more precisely. 
23 
Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) show that the validity of the downside beta is confirmed in a wider sample of 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms. 
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contains 20 percent of the stocks with the highest downside betas. Because the number of 
stocks in the sample is large, all portfolios are highly diversified, and this sorting procedure 
allows a focus on the downside risk of portfolios. 
I consider two sets of currency portfolios sorted by the forward discount. The first set 
includes five currency portfolios for developed and developing countries. These portfolios are 
formed from the same currencies as in the previous section, but they are more diversified. On 
average, each portfolio consists of seven currencies. The second set of five portfolios is 
formed from currencies of developed countries only. Each portfolio consists of three 
currencies, on average. 
I estimate alternative asset pricing models for five currency and five stock portfolios 
together
24
 using the moment conditions (5). It is important to have the same number of 
currency and stock portfolios in the estimation to ensure that the first-step GMM treats 
currencies and stocks equally a priori. The efficient GMM will then amend the weights based 
on asset-pricing considerations.  
Table 3.3 reports the efficient GMM estimates of risk premiums and various test 
statistics for the downside beta CAPM, the coskewness CAPM and the traditional CAPM for 
five currency and five stock portfolios. The first-step GMM estimates are similar and are not 
reported. 
Regardless of which set of currency portfolios is used (all countries or developed 
countries only), the results are similar. The downside beta premium, the traditional beta 
premium and the coskewness premium are all highly statistically significant. None of the 
models is rejected by the test for overidentifying restrictions. The MSSE for the currency 
moments are even lower than those in table 3.2. Hence, adding stock portfolios does not 
worsen the fit of the models. However, the MSSE for the stock moments are all higher 
because of the generally higher volatility of stock returns. The downside beta CAPM and the 
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 I also estimated the models for 10 currency and 10 stock portfolios, sorted in the same manner. The results 
are similar and are not reported. 
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coskewness CAPM have lower J statistics and MSSE than the traditional CAPM and are thus 
superior for both currency and stock portfolios. 
The downside beta premium estimated for the currency and stock portfolios jointly 
(1.69 percent in table 3.3) is lower than the downside beta premium estimated for the currency 
portfolios alone (3.96 percent in table 3.2), and the coskewness premium is also lower by the 
absolute value. Although the downside risk is priced in both markets, the price of risk appears 
to be higher in the currency market. This outcome may be a consequence of underpricing 
currencies of high-interest emerging economies. These currencies have overly high returns 
relative to their downside betas and drive the downside beta premium upward
25
. Indeed, if we 
restrict the sample to currencies of developed countries, the estimate of the downside beta 
premium obtained for these currency and stock portfolios is lower (0.93 percent in table 3.3). 
The downside beta premium estimated for the developed countries‟ currency portfolios alone 
is also lower (a more detailed analysis of currencies of developed countries is presented in the 
online appendix).  
Figure 3.3 plots the downside risk-return relationship for five currency (triangles) and 
five stock (round dots) portfolios. The currencies of all countries are plotted in the top panel, 
and the currencies of developed countries are plotted in the bottom panel. We observe that 
portfolio C5 in the top panel, which consists of currencies of high-interest emerging markets, 
is an outlier. Once we exclude this portfolio or restrict the sample of currencies to developed 
countries, the currency and stock portfolios lie closely to the security market line with high R
2 
in the case of both the downside beta CAPM and the coskewness CAPM.   
Overall, the currency portfolios have lower downside risk (lower downside betas and 
higher coskewness) and lower expected returns than the stock portfolios, but the downside 
                                                          
25 
 Why do capital flows not eliminate this underpricing? These countries have high country risk (e.g., 
measured by the Fitch sovereign rating). Substantial uncertainty is associated with investments in these 
currencies; in some cases, there were (are) explicit or implicit capital controls and insufficient liquidity. 
Institutional investors may establish country limits to prevent position-taking in the currencies of high-risk 
countries; hence, country risk is a natural limit to arbitrage. Menkhoff et al. (2012b) find that high country risk 
may explain why arbitrageurs do not also fully exploit high currency momentum returns. 
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risk premiums in the currency and stock markets are similar, except for the currencies of high-
interest emerging economies, which provide a higher premium. I cannot formally reject the 
hypothesis that the downside market risk is priced similarly in the two markets. 
Is a risk premium of 1-2 percent per month fair compensation for the downside risk? 
According to the traditional CAPM, the expected market excess return is fair compensation 
for the overall market risk. According to Kahneman and Tversky‟s (1979) prospect theory, 
people are approximately 2.5 times more averse to losses than to gains, and we may therefore 
expect the downside risk premium to be approximately two times higher. Because the market 
excess return was approximately 6 percent per annum during the studied period, the fair 
downside risk premium should be approximately 15 percent per annum.  
Another approach to identify the fair downside risk premium is to construct the 
downside market factor-mimicking portfolio. The risk price of the factor should be equal to 
the mean return on this traded portfolio to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. I follow the two-
step methodology of Breeden et al. (1989) and Menkhoff et al. (2012a). First, I regress the 
downside market factor on the five currency portfolio excess returns and obtain the betas
26
. I 
then use the betas as the weights of the currency portfolios to construct the factor-mimicking 
portfolio. The average annual return to this factor-mimicking portfolio is 11 percent. 
 The two approaches suggest that the fair downside risk price is approximately 1 percent 
per month, which is what I find in the cross-section of developed currencies and stock 
portfolios. Therefore, the high returns to carry trades are fair compensation for their high 
downside market risk. However, the currencies of emerging markets provide a higher risk 
premium, perhaps because of other risks involved.  
 
 
 
                                                          
26 
 These betas are monotonically increasing in the portfolio rank. 
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3.4.4. EXTREME DOWNSIDE RISK AND DISASTER RISK  
In the previous sections, the downside betas are estimated conditional on the negative market 
return. In this section, I use different cut-off levels for downside betas to examine the 
behavior of carry trades in more extreme market conditions. 
I use the following alternative dummy variables to estimate downside betas: 
 
 
 
 
where is the mean global market return and σ is the return standard deviation. The downside 
beta, estimated with dummy 4, for example, shows the normalized covariance with the market 
subject to the market return being below its mean by 1.5 standard deviations. This downside 
beta is the most „extreme‟ because it shows an asset‟s performance in the worst states of the 
world – in the states of stock market crashes. 
I also construct a disaster dummy to measure „disaster betas‟ – market betas in times of 
different disasters. Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) create a list of economic, political and 
natural disaster events using a news search, and they study the performance of several major 
currencies on these dates. Economic disasters include famous financial crises, defaults or 
bankruptcies; political disasters include wars, terrorism and bombings; and natural disasters 
include hurricanes, tornados, tsunamis and earthquakes. The full list of disasters is provided in 
the appendix.I use their list to create a disaster dummy that is equal to zero in the month in 
which a disaster occurs and one otherwise:  
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Table 3.4 reports the efficient GMM estimates of the „extreme‟ downside betas and 
„disaster betas‟, estimated with dummy 4 and the disaster dummy, respectively (panel A)27, as 
well as the estimates of the alternative downside beta premiums and the „disaster beta‟ 
premium (panel B).  
The „extreme‟ downside betas are all higher than the downside betas in table 3.1, and 
they are all highly statistically significant. The „disaster betas‟ are even higher. Therefore, the 
carry trades perform disproportionally worse in times of stock market crashes or disasters. 
However, even the low-interest currency portfolios have statistically significant „disaster 
betas‟. Hence, all currencies generally depreciate against the US dollar during global distress, 
which confirms the „safe haven‟ properties of the US dollar as a reserve currency, as 
documented by Maggiori (2013).   
Turning to panel B, all downside beta premiums and the „disaster beta‟ premium are 
highly statistically significant and are higher if we consider more adverse market conditions. 
All specifications have similar test statistics. The intercepts are statistically significant in the 
cases of dummy 4 and the disaster dummy, reflecting the „safe haven‟ properties of the dollar 
in times of extreme stock market downturns or economic, political or natural disasters. This 
intercept reflects the „dollar safety premium‟.  
Overall, the results do not change when I vary the cut-off level for the downside beta 
and consider the „disaster beta‟ as an alternative downside risk measure. Carry trades perform 
even worse in extreme stock market conditions, and high returns to carry trades serve as 
compensation for this poor performance.  
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 The downside betas estimated with dummies 1, 2 and 3 are similar to those in table 3.1 and are not reported.  
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3.5. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
3.5.1. SUB-SAMPLE OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
I study a sub-sample of developed countries separately for two reasons. First, some of the 
emerging countries may not have had a sufficiently liquid futures market in the earlier years, 
or some currencies were pegged to the US dollar, hence with artificially lowered exchange 
rate risks. Therefore, the downside beta premium obtained for the entire sample may be 
overestimated. Second, the most popular carry trade currencies are still the currencies of 
developed countries, and institutional investors limit their exposure to emerging markets 
despite their high returns. Again, the downside risk premium obtained for the entire sample 
may be higher than in other markets because of such limits to arbitrage. Easily accessible 
currencies of developed countries are better test assets for a comparison of the currency and 
stock markets, as shown in section 3.4.3.  
Table 3.5 presents the return and risk characteristics of five currency portfolios of 
developed countries (panel A) and the efficient GMM estimates of various risk premiums 
(panel B). Portfolios of higher rank have higher returns and return standard deviations and 
lower (negative) skewness. The efficient GMM estimates of the consumption betas and the 
downside consumption betas are all statistically insignificant. Moreover, both the 
consumption beta premium and the downside consumption beta premium are statistically 
insignificant. There is no evidence that the consumption risk can explain the cross-section of 
these currency portfolio returns. 
All global stock market betas (the traditional beta, the downside beta, the „extreme‟ 
downside beta, the „disaster beta‟ and the upside beta) are monotonically increasing with 
portfolio rank from close to zero and insignificant values for portfolio 1 to rather high and 
significant values for portfolio 5. The spread in the market betas across the portfolios is highly 
significant. Examining the 5-1 HML portfolio, we observe that its market beta is 0.18, its 
downside beta is 0.27, its „extreme‟ downside beta is 0.29 and its „disaster beta‟ is 0.40.  
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These betas are lower than those of the 10-1 HML portfolio, except for the „disaster 
beta‟. The „disaster beta‟ is higher here because portfolio 1 of currencies of developed 
countries has a lower „disaster beta‟ than portfolio 1 of all currencies. In times of economic, 
political and natural disaster, all currencies generally depreciate against the US dollar, except 
for the low-interest currencies of developed countries (e.g., the Japanese yen or the Swiss 
franc). Therefore, the US dollar and the low-interest currencies of other developed countries 
possess „safe haven‟ properties (as in Ranaldo and Söderlind, 2010). However the „disaster 
betas‟ of the high-interest currencies of developed countries are comparable in magnitude to 
the „disaster betas‟ of high-interest currencies of developing countries. Hence, regardless of 
which sample of currencies we consider, carry trades crash during periods of disaster or 
significant stock market downturns. 
In panel B, the traditional beta, the downside beta, the „extreme‟ downside beta, the 
„disaster beta‟ and the coskewness premiums are all statistically significant, are lower in 
absolute values than in the case of all currencies and are similar to the premiums obtained for 
the stock market. The downside beta premium is between 1 and 2 percent per month, and the 
coskewness premium is -0.4 percent per month. The downside beta CAPM, the „extreme‟ 
downside beta CAPM and the „disaster beta‟ CAPM have the lowest J-statistics and MSSE 
and are therefore again superior to other models.  
 
3.5.2. PERIOD OF ACTIVE CARRY TRADES BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: 
2000-2013 
The early 1990s were years of soaring interest rates, capital controls, political instability and 
related currency crashes in several emerging countries in the sample. This turmoil was 
reflected in the extreme behavior of the top portfolios, such as their high returns and negative 
skewness. At the end of 1990s, after the financial crises in East Asia and Russia, the economic 
situation in most emerging countries stabilized. We observe a tremendous growth of carry 
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trade activity that began in the late 1990s (Galati et al., 2007). This growth was supported by 
huge inflows of assets under management of hedge funds, the main carry trade investors 
(Jylhä and Suominen, 2011).In this section, I study the latest period from January 2000 until 
June 2013 – the period of active carry trades.   
Table 3.6 reports the return and risk characteristics of 10 portfolios of all currencies and 
five portfolios of currencies of developed countries (panel A) as well as the efficient GMM 
estimates of risk premiums for the two sets of portfolios (panel B).  
All market betas and coskewness values are highly statistically significant in the recent 
period. All currencies strongly co-vary with the global stock market, especially on the 
downside, which can actually be a consequence of active institutional trading in currencies 
during the last decade, as the model of Basak and Pavlova (2013) predicts. The market betas, 
the downside betas and the „disaster betas‟ of the high-interest portfolios are even higher now.  
The increase in the market betas is greater for the high-interest portfolios of developed 
countries, particularly if we consider the „extreme‟ downside betas (0.46 versus 0.28). The 
coskewness of portfolio 5 also decreased significantly from -0.18 to -1.37 and became 
significant. A carry trade strategy that involved only developed countries had significantly 
higher downside market risk in 2000-2013. In fact, regardless of which set of currencies we 
consider, the carry trade long-short portfolios have similar downside market risk, whereas the 
downside risk of currencies of emerging markets was previously much higher. High-interest 
currencies of developed and developing countries tend to crash equally in states of adverse 
stock market conditions or political and natural disasters. This behavior is evidence of the 
„asset-class effect‟ in the currency market, as these currencies are the most popular target 
currencies of carry traders. Basak and Pavlova (2013) provide theoretical explanation that the 
assets that institutions trade exhibit a greater degree of co-movement than other traded assets.      
As before, the spread in the downside betas is wider than the spread in the traditional 
betas across both sets of portfolios, and the spreads in the „extreme‟ downside beta and 
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„disaster betas‟ are even wider. All risk premiums are similar and highly significant, and all 
models perform equally well in the recent period. However, the traditional CAPM has the 
highest J-statistics and MSSE and hence performs worse.  
The estimates of the downside beta premiums obtained for the entire sample of 
currencies are higher than the estimates obtained for the sub-sample of currencies of 
developed countries, although the differences are less significant. The price of downside risk 
is higher for the currencies of emerging markets, perhaps because of the limits that institutions 
set for their exposure to emerging markets. Such limits and the high sovereign risk of these 
countries prevent capital flows from arbitraging away the excess returns in the emerging 
markets.  
 
3.5.3. ‘HORSE RACES’ BETWEEN ALTERNATIVE RISK FACTORS 
In this paper I claim that the downside market factor (or the downside beta) and market 
volatility factor (or the coskewness) both can explain the cross-section of carry trade returns 
well. The two factors are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is -0.71) and it is 
difficult to separate their effects, because high market volatility is usually observed on the 
downside. Therefore, I consider the both factors as the downside risk factors. 
Among other risk factors which have proved to have high explanatory power for carry 
trades are the Lustig et al. (2011) HML factor and the Menkhoff et al. (2012a) global currency 
volatility innovation factor. These two factors are derived from currency returns themselves 
and are both highly correlated with the second principal component of carry trade portfolios, 
which is shown to explain a great proportion of currency return variance. 
In this section, I ran „horse races‟ between the four alternative factors in one-factor and 
multifactor settings. I use my own HML factor, which is a little bit different from the Lustig 
et al. (2011) HML factor due to the different samples of countries, and I use Menkhoff et al. 
(2012a) currency volatility factor (VOL). 
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First of all, the currency factors (HML and VOL) are not highly correlated with the 
downside market factor and the market volatility factor (the correlation coefficient is 0.35-
0.39 by the absolute value). The second principal component (which together with the first 
principal component explains 91% of variance) has the highest correlation with the HML 
factor
28
 and the lowest correlation with the VOL factor. The market factors are in between. 
I also construct the factor-mimicking portfolios for the downside market factor, the 
market volatility factor and the currency volatility factor by regressing each factor on the five 
currency portfolio returns, and using the obtained betas as the weights of the currency 
portfolios in the factor-mimicking portfolios. Interestingly, the three factor-mimicking 
portfolios are almost perfectly correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.99 by the absolute 
value), because the currency portfolios load similarly on the factors (portfolio 1 has the lowest 
loading on the factors and portfolio 5 has the highest loading). The second principal 
component correlates similarly with the three factor-mimicking portfolios. 
Table 3.7 reports the efficient GMM estimation results for the five portfolios of all 
currencies
29
. In columns 1-4 I compare one-factor models. All four factors are highly 
statistically significant, their premiums have the correct signs, and none of the models is 
rejected by the J-statistics. So, all factors are doing well in explaining the currency returns. 
But the model with the downside market factor has the lowest MSSE and J-statistics and 
hence has the lowest pricing errors.   
In columns 5-9 I consider two-factor specifications and in columns 10-11 three-factor 
specifications. When both the downside market factor and the market volatility factor are 
included (column 5), none of them loses the statistical significance. Since the two factors are 
highly multicollinear, it is difficult to disentangle their effects. The downside beta and 
coskewness premiums are the same as in the one-factor specifications.   
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 This is not surprising given that they are constructed in approximately the same way. 
29 
 The results for the 10 portfolios of all currencies, for the 5 portfolios of currencies of developed countries, 
and for the 5 currency and 5 stock portfolios are similar. 
91 
 
When I consider the downside market factors and the VOL factor (columns 6, 8 and 
10), the downside market factors remain significant while the VOL factor does not. The VOL 
premium shrinks dramatically. Whereas the VOL factor alone can explain the carry trade 
returns, its explanatory power is swiped off by the downside market factors. Menkhoff et al. 
(2012a) provide ample evidence in favour of their currency volatility factor, but they never 
control for the market factors in their specifications. It turns out, that the downside market 
factors are superior in explaining currency returns. 
When I consider the downside market factors and the HML factor (columns 7, 9 and 
11), the HML factor remains significant, while the downside market factor and the market 
volatility factor become insignificant
30
. Menkhoff et al. (2012a) also find that the VOL factor 
becomes insignificant when they control for the HML factor. So, the HML factor has the 
highest appeal to explain the currency returns. But the HML factor is not “exogenous” to 
these portfolios, it is constructed form these portfolios in the first place. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that it has such a high explanatory power. 
Unfortunately, the HML factor cannot be considered as a unifying risk factor because it 
does not explain returns to stock portfolios. Table 3.8 shows the efficient GMM estimates for 
the 5 stock portfolios sorted by the downside betas. Although none of the factors is rejected 
by the J-statistics, only the downside market factor and the market volatility factor are 
statistically significant, and their premiums are the same as in the currency market. The HML 
and the VOL factors do not have significant explanatory power in the stock market. Burnside 
(2012) also finds that the HML factor (and other currency factors) cannot explain the returns 
to the 25 Fama-French portfolios sorted on size and value.  
While the currency factors (HML and VOL) have high explanatory power in the 
currency market, they have low explanatory power in the stock market. But the downside 
market factors have high explanatory power in the both stock and currency markets. Lettau et 
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 The same holds if the factor-mimicking portfolios are used instead of the factors themselves. 
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al. (2014) also show the validity of the downside market risk in the bond and commodity 
markets. The downside market factors also have theoretical grounds, as discussed in section 
3.2.2. Therefore, the downside market risk wins the „horse race‟ and can be considered as a 
unifying explanation of returns in various asset markets.   
 
3.5.4. DOWNSIDE BETA SORT 
If the downside beta is an appropriate risk measure, then sorting currencies into portfolios by 
their downside betas would result in a monotonic risk-return relationship. Currencies with 
higher downside betas should provide higher expected returns.  
In this section, instead of looking at carry trade portfolios, sorted by the forward 
discount, I look at currency portfolios, sorted by their downside betas, which are estimated in 
a 5-year rolling window prior to the sort date. The first set of downside betas is estimated 
during the period from January 1984 until December 1988, and the first sort is done in 
January 1989. Then the window moves by one month forward, and the procedure is repeated. 
All currencies are assigned to five portfolios. Generally, these portfolios are similar to the 
carry trade portfolios, although not exactly the same.     
Table 3.9 reports the return and risk characteristics of these portfolios. As expected, 
portfolios with higher downside beta yield higher excess returns. Although I sort by the 
downside betas, all market betas and the coskewness of these portfolios exhibit monotonic 
patterns. The market beta ranges from 0.13 to 0.26, the downside beta ranges from 0.15 to 
0.41, the „extreme‟ downside beta ranges from 0.20 to 0.44, the „disaster beta‟ ranges from 
0.21 to 0.43, and the coskewness ranges from -0.62 to -1.66. The spread in the market betas 
across the portfolios is the smallest, the traditional market risk premium is insignificant (panel 
B), and the CAPM has the highest MSSE. But all downside risk premiums are statistically 
significant, and their estimates are similar to the estimates for carry portfolios and 
economically meaningful. The downside beta premium is about 2 percent per month and the 
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coskewness premium is about -0.5 percent per month. This test confirms that the downside 
risk is priced in the currency market.       
 
3.5.5. LONG TIME SERIES OF DATA: 1974-2013 
In this section, I study the longest period from 1974 until 2013. This period starts after the 
break down of the Bretton Woods system. Since the forward prices are not available for such 
a long period, the currency portfolios are sorted by the nominal interest rate differential. I use 
3-month Treasury bill rates or rates of comparable instruments for all countries (developed 
and developing), for which data is available. If the covered interest parity is satisfied, the 
interest rate differential should be approximately equal to the forward premium, and the two 
alternative sorts should produce similar currency portfolios. 
Table 3.10 reports the risk premiums obtained for 10 interest rate sorted currency 
portfolios. The results have hardly changed. The consumption risk premium and the 
traditional market risk premium are insignificant, and the both models have high MSSE. The 
CAPM and the upside beta CAPM are rejected by the J-statistics (at 10% significance level). 
The downside beta premium, the „extreme‟ downside beta premium and the coskewness 
premium are statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the premiums obtained for 
1984-2013. Inclusion of 10 years of data did not affect the results.  
Moreover, if we look at the dynamics of 5-year rolling betas of the HML currency 
portfolio, the downside betas were always high while the traditional betas were not. 
Therefore, the traditional CAPM had no explanatory power in the beginning of the period 
while the downside beta CAPM always explained the cross-section of currency returns.     
 
3.5.6. TIME-VARYING MARKET BETAS AND FAMA-MACBETH ESTIMATION 
While in the previous sections betas were assumed constant in the sample, in this section, I 
allow betas to vary over time. I follow the two-step Fama-MacBeth (1973) procedure where, 
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in the first step, betas are estimated in a five-year rolling window, and in the second step, the 
cross-sectional regression of portfolio returns on betas in the preceding five years is 
estimated. Hence, this is an out-of-sample test. I concentrate on the latest period from January 
2000 until June 2013 when the stock market risk of currency portfolios seems to be more 
important. Since the first set of betas is estimated during the period from January 1995 until 
December 1999, the first cross-sectional regression is run for January 2000. Then the rolling 
window moves by one month and the procedure is repeated. This generates a time series of 
beta premiums, from which I find the average beta premium and its statistics. 
Lustig and Verdelhan (2011) find significant time variation of betas of their currency 
portfolios, with betas increasing dramatically during crisis periods. I also find some variation 
in the estimated upside and downside betas over time, although the overall pattern is more 
monotonic (generally, all stock market betas have monotonically increased over time in the 
studied period). The variation in the downside betas is much lower than the variation in the 
traditional market betas. 
The cross-sectional relationship of time-varying betas of 10 currency portfolios of 
developed and developing countries is the same as before. The lowest-interest currency 
portfolio downside beta is always negative with the average value of -0.06 and little time 
variation. The downside beta of the highest-interest portfolio is always the highest in the 
cross-section with the average value of 0.54 and the maximum and minimum values of 0.76 
and 0.16, respectively (OLS estimates). The downside betas of all portfolios, except portfolio 
1, increased significantly during the financial crisis in 2008-2009, when carry trades crashed 
dramatically. There is a particularly visible positive relationship between portfolio rank and 
the downside beta in this period.     
In the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for 10 currency portfolios, the 
downside beta premium is 12 percent per annum with a t-statistic of 2.12, while the upside 
beta premium is -0.02 and insignificant, as before. The two betas explain 45 percent of 
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portfolio excess returns, on average, while the traditional beta explains only 32 percent of 
returns. Generally, the conclusion that the downside market risk can explain the returns to 
carry trades is robust when betas are time-varying and premiums are estimated by OLS. 
 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examine the global downside market risk of currencies as an explanation for 
the high excess returns to carry trades. These excess returns have been consistently observed 
empirically and led to the growing popularity of carry trades among both institutional and 
private investors. 
I consider three alternative measures of downside risk (the downside beta, the „disaster 
beta‟ and the coskewness) and show that these measures have high explanatory power.I find 
that the downside market risk of currency portfolios is monotonically increasing in the local 
interest rate level. The returns of high-interest (investment) currencies have high downside 
stock market betas and „disaster betas‟ and significant negative coskewness with the stock 
market; by contrast, the returns of low-interest (funding) currencies have insignificant 
downside betas and positive coskewness. This finding suggests that returns to carry trades are 
asymmetrically distributed with a high crash risk and that the crashes occur exactly in the 
worst states of the world, with declining stock markets and a high marginal utility of wealth.  
The downside market beta and the coskewness have much greater explanatory power 
than the traditional market beta in the cross-section. The GMM estimates of the downside beta 
and coskewness premiums are highly significant, similar in the currency and stock markets 
and close to the theoretical values. The downside risk is priced similarly in different markets, 
and the high returns to carry trades are fair compensation for their high downside market risk. 
The results are robust to the use of different sets of currency portfolios and different 
methods of estimation, and they are even stronger if we consider the „extreme‟ downside risk 
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and disaster risk or the latest period of active carry trades
31
. The downside risk of investment 
currencies is even higher in the recent period, regardless of whether these currencies belong to 
developed or developing countries, and the explanatory power of the downside risk in the 
cross-section is greater. This result suggests that there is a closer link between the currency 
and stock markets today. The increasing volume of carry trade activity by institutional 
investors may have contributed to this trend. According to the Chairman of UK‟sFinancial 
Services Authority, Adair Turner, the carry trade can be destructive to some economies: „if 
the trades were reduced, the world would be a better place‟32. 
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 The analysis of the recent period is provided in the online appendix. 
32 “Davos: FSA chief turns on „valueless‟ carry trade”, The Times, 30 January 2010. 
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Figure 3.1. Risk-return relationship for 11 currency portfolios (all countries) 
Return VS Beta 
 
Return VS Downside beta 
 
Return VS Upside beta 
 
Note: The figures show average annualized portfolio excess returns (on the vertical axis) and the global 
market betas (on the horizontal axis) of 10 currency portfolios, sorted by the forward discount, and the 
HML portfolio. The betas are estimated by OLS. Jan 1984 – June 2013.  
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Figure 3.2. Betas, downside betas and upside betas  
of 10 carry trade portfolios and the 10-1 HML portfolio (all countries) 
 
Note: The figure shows the efficient GMM estimates of the global market betas, downside betas and 
upside betas (on the vertical axis) of 10 currency portfolios, sorted by the forward discount, and the HML 
portfolio.  
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Figure 3.3. Downside risk-return relationships for currency and stock portfolios 
Currencies of all countries 
 
Downside beta 
 
Coskewness 
Currencies of developed countries 
  
Downside beta Coskewness 
 
Note: Average portfolio excess returns on the vertical axis, downside betas and coskewness on the 
horizontal axis. Triangles represent currency portfolios, sorted monthly by the forward dicount (all 
countries in the top panel, developed countries in the bottom panel). Round dots represent stock 
portfolios, sorted monthly by the downside betas, which are estimated in a 5-year rolling window prior to 
the sort date. Downside betas and coskewness of the currency and stock portfolios are estimated jointly 
by the efficient GMM. 
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Table 3.1. Return and risk characteristics of currency portfolios 
The table reports return and risk characteristics of 10 currency portfolios, sorted by the forward discount, and the 
10-1 HML portfolio. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. All returns are annualized and expressed in absolute 
values. The reported betas and coskewness are the efficient GMM estimates. The global market index serves as a 
proxy for the market portfolio. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. Jan 1984 – June 2013.   
 Pfl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Pfl 10 HML 
Annualized excess 
return (%) 
-0.37 0.83 2.19 4.12 4.29 4.93 4.11 4.34 7.91 16.07 16.56 
St. deviation (%) 21.85 27.96 30.49 28.89 31.69 32.49 31.86 36.29 35.00 39.52 41.27 
Skewness 0.03 0.07 -0.26 -0.05 -0.32 0.06 -0.33 -0.80 -0.99 -0.69 -0.59 
Kurtosis 3.54 3.99 4.73 3.94 4.43 4.98 4.54 6.19 7.56 6.19 6.48 
Consumptionbeta -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.16 0.17 
 [-0.48] [0.22] [0.63] [0.77] [0.77] [0.75] [0.77] [0.77] [0.83] [0.90] [0.89] 
Downside cons. 
beta 
0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.28 0.34 0.34 
 [3.93] [3.57] [2.91] [2.29] [2.13] [1.99] [1.99] [2.20] [1.50] [0.94] [0.92] 
Marketbeta 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.22 
 [4.41] [4.97] [5.93] [5.88] [6.01] [5.37] [6.01] [5.63] [5.97] [4.97] [4.75] 
Downsidebeta -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.37 0.40 
 [-0.49] [1.23] [1.70] [2.81] [3.02] [2.92] [3.05] [3.06] [5.17] [6.56] [6.94] 
Upsidebeta 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.07 0.06 
 [6.42] [6.90] [6.00] [5.50] [5.96] [5.92] [5.88] [6.19] [3.86] [1.06] [0.77] 
Coskewness 0.67 0.48 0.26 0.08 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.70 -2.06 -2.41 
 [4.40] [2.91] [1.27] [0.44] [-0.02] [-0.12] [-0.08] [-0.26] [-3.26] [-6.44] [-7.41] 
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Table 3.2. GMM estimates of risk premiums 
The table reports GMM estimates of monthly consumption and market risk premiums (in percent per month) 
obtained for the 10 currency portfolios, sorted by the forward discount, and the 10-1 HML portfolio using the 
identity and the efficient weighting matrices. The global market index serves as a proxy for the market portfolio. 
T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J 
statistics for the overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of squared errors (MSSE) for all moments are 
reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses. Jan 1984 – June 2013. 
 C-CAPM 
Downside  
C-CAPM 
CAPM 
Downsidebet
a CAPM 
Upsidebeta 
CAPM 
Coskewness 
CAPM 
Weightingmatri
x 
Iden
. 
Effic
. 
Iden
. 
Effic
. 
Iden
. 
Effic
. 
Iden. 
Effic
. 
Iden
. 
Effic
. 
Iden
. 
Effic
. 
Premium 6.24 8.56 3.90 12.77 16.67 13.42 3.27 3.96 -4.84 -9.22 -0.48 -0.56 
 
[0.58] [0.87] [0.40] [0.31] [1.02] [2.34] [3.29] [6.29] 
[-
2.53] 
[-
2.29] 
[-
4.18] 
[-
7.38] 
Constant 0.32 0.06 -1.20 -2.91 -3.05 -1.45 -0.13 -0.04 1.64 2.12 0.27 0.20 
 
[0.26] [0.42] 
[-
0.32] 
[-
0.31] 
[-
0.92] 
[-
1.91] [-0.42] 
[-
0.95] [2.99] [2.38] [0.65] [3.35] 
J-stat 5.86 5.23 10.06 9.43 18.05 12.25 4.85 3.14 15.79 14.31 7.03 6.45 
 (0.75) (0.81) (0.35) (0.40) (0.03) (0.20) (0.85) (0.96) (0.07) (0.11) (0.63) (0.69) 
MSSE 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.18 
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Table 3.3. Downside risk premiums for currency and stock portfolios 
The table reports the efficient GMM estimates of the global market beta, downside beta and coskewness 
premiums (in percent per month), estimated jointly for 5 currency portfolios, sorted by the forward discount, and 
5 stock portfolios, sorted by their 5-year downside betas. Two sets of currency portfolios are considered: all 
countries and developed countries only. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics for the overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of 
squared errors (MSSE) for stock and currency moments are reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses.  
 Downside beta CAPM Coskewness CAPM CAPM 
 
All 
countries 
Dev. countries 
All 
countries 
Dev. countries All countries Dev. countries 
Premium 1.69 0.93 -0.36 -0.19 3.69 1.39 
 [7.33] [4.29] [-4.55] [-3.26] [5.24] [3.46] 
Constant -0.39 0.00 0.16 0.27 -0.60 -0.12 
 [-3.25] [0.02] [1.47] [2.06] [-3.30] [-0.82] 
J-stat 5.75 4.50 3.93 2.13 14.15 5.69 
 (0.76) (0.88) (0.92) (0.99) (0.12) (0.77) 
MSSE (currencies) 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.10 
MSSE (stocks) 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.22 
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Table 3.4. Different thresholds for the downside betas and disaster betas 
The table reports the efficient GMM estimates of the global „extreme‟ downside betas and „disaster betas‟ of 10 
currency portfolios, sorted by the forward discounts (panel A), and the efficient GMM estimates of the downside 
beta premiums (in percent per month) using different cut-off levels for the downside betas (panel B). The 
downside betas are estimated using the following dummy variables: Dummy 1 = 1 if rm> and 0 otherwise, 
Dummy 2 = 1 if rm>-0.5σ and 0 otherwise, Dummy 3 = 1 if rm>-σ and 0 otherwise, Dummy 4 = 1 if rm>-1.5σ 
and 0 otherwise, where  is the mean global market return and σ is the return standard deviation; Disaster 
dummy  = 0 in the month in which there was a disaster according to Ranaldo and Soderlind (2010) classification 
of disasters (Appendix) and 1 otherwise. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics for the overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of 
squared errors (MSSE) for all moments are reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses.  
Panel A: Extreme downside betas 
 Pfl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Pfl 10 
Extreme downside beta  0.05 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.48 
(dummy4) [1.53] [2.64] [2.84] [3.80] [3.76] [3.84] [4.00] [4.23] [5.63] [7.51] 
Disasterbeta 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.32 0.48 
(disaster dummy) [4.42] [4.09] [5.70] [5.73] [5.56] [5.23] [5.41] [5.79] [8.42] [8.15] 
Panel B: Downside risk premiums in the CAPM with 
 Dummy 1 Dummy 2 Dummy 3 Dummy 4 Disasterdummy 
Premium 3.95 4.26 4.60 4.69 4.86 
 [6.56] [6.11] [6.40] [7.19] [4.94] 
Constant -0.03 -0.02 -0.13 -0.30 -0.80 
 [-0.20] [-0.14] [-0.98] [-2.26] [-2.85] 
J-stat 2.87 2.17 6.07 5.48 4.50 
 (0.97) (0.99) (0.73) (0.79) (0.88) 
MSSE 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.06 
Number of  'extreme' 
observations 
164 99 45 26 41 
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Table 3.5. Return and risk characteristics of 5 currency portfolios  
of developed countries and the risk premiums 
The table reports the annualized returns, the return standard deviation and skewness, the efficient GMM 
estimates of the consumption betas, global market betas, disaster betas and coskewness of 5 currency portfolios 
of developed countries, sorted by the forward discounts (panel A), and the efficient GMM estimates of 
consumption and  market risk premiums (panel B). T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics for the overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of 
squared errors (MSSE) for all moments are reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses.  Jan 1984 - June 
2013. 
Panel A: Return and risk characteristics 
 Pfl 1 2 3 4 Pfl 5 
Annualized excess 
return (%) -0.05 1.31 3.48 3.17 5.54 
Standarddeviation 
(%) 34.95 34.63 33.89 34.27 37.26 
Skewness 0.33 0.04 -0.02 -0.42 -0.23 
Consumptionbeta -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.10 
 [-0.10] [0.07] [0.22] [0.24] [0.43] 
Downside cons. 
beta 
0.36 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.52 
 [1.04] [1.33] [1.46] [1.46] [1.41] 
Marketbeta 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.31 
 [3.15] [4.55] [4.58] [5.81] [6.22] 
Downside market 
beta 
-0.04 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.23 
 [-0.51] [0.81] [1.39] [2.03] [3.25] 
Extremedownsidebet
a 
-0.01 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.28 
 [-0.22] [1.36] [1.91] [2.38] [3.63] 
Disasterbeta 0.02 0.15 0.28 0.28 0.42 
 [0.22] [2.34] [3.80] [3.95] [6.83] 
Upside market beta 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.39 
 [5.51] [6.33] [6.78] [7.14] [6.22] 
Coskewness 1.25 0.77 0.31 0.41 -0.18 
 [3.47] [1.89] [0.70] [0.94] [-0.43] 
Panel B: Riskpremiums 
 C-
CAPM 
Downsid
e C-
CAPM 
CAPM 
Downside
beta 
CAPM 
Extremedownsideb
eta CAPM 
Disasterbe
ta CAPM 
Upsidebe
ta CAPM 
Coskewne
ss CAPM 
Premiu
m 3.90 3.25 2.66 1.80 1.75 1.26 8.05 -0.36 
 [0.60] [0.43] [2.37] [2.47] [2.61] [3.28] [1.11] [-2.31] 
Consta
nt 0.05 -1.20 -0.35 0.07 0.03 -0.03 -2.55 0.44 
 [0.05] [-0.34] [-1.27] [0.38] [0.14] [-0.16] [-1.00] [1.89] 
J-stat 4.53 1.39 3.45 1.62 1.16 0.63 3.93 0.37 
 (0.34) (0.85) (0.48) (0.81) (0.88) (0.96) (0.42) (0.98) 
MSSE 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.20 
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Table 3.6. Downside risk in the period of active carry trades (2000-2013) 
The table reports the annualized returns and the efficient GMM estimates of the global market betas and coskewness of 
10 currency portfolios (all currencies - AC) and 5 currency portfolios (developed countries - DC), all sorted by the 
forward discounts, in panel A, and the efficient GMM estimates of various market risk premiums (in percent per month) 
in panel B. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J 
statistics for the overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of squared errors (MSSE) for all moments are reported. 
P-value for J statistics is in parentheses. Jan 2000 – June 2013. 
Panel A: Return and risk characteristics 
All currencies (AC) 
 Pfl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Pfl 10 
Annualized excess 
return (%) 0.71 0.82 1.99 5.00 4.05 6.57 1.81 5.84 8.33 12.71 
Marketbeta 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.24 0.31 0.36 0.41 
 [5.38] [8.57] [9.19] [10.91] [11.27] [11.10] [8.69] [9.41] [13.74] [12.00] 
Downsidebeta 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.27 0.34 0.47 
 [2.79] [5.75] [4.62] [5.91] [6.40] [6.77] [4.87] [6.48] [6.96] [7.80] 
Extremedownsidebeta 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.22 0.33 0.38 0.52 
 [5.22] [8.76] [6.98] [8.62] [8.15] [9.17] [7.02] [8.89] [9.47] [8.81] 
Disasterbeta 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.52 
 [4.61] [5.58] [6.40] [6.14] [6.57] [8.09] [5.41] [7.26] [13.00] [9.54] 
Coskewness -0.24 -0.38 -0.63 -0.92 -0.93 -1.12 -0.64 -1.29 -1.64 -2.48 
 [-1.36] [-1.99] [-2.89] [-3.59] [-3.66] [-3.69] [-2.54] [-4.01] [-4.99] [-5.37] 
Currencies of developed countries (DC) 
 Pfl 1 2 3 4 Pfl 5 
Annualized excess 
return (%) 
1.09 1.10 3.10 2.87 6.95 
Marketbeta 0.18 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.36 
 [3.46] [6.00] [5.49] [7.05] [8.00] 
Downsidebeta 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.29 0.38 
 [2.42] [3.59] [3.71] [5.21] [5.00] 
Extremedownsidebeta 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.46 
 [3.14] [4.91] [4.59] [6.12] [6.24] 
Disasterbeta 0.13 0.21 0.32 0.31 0.51 
 [1.69] [4.05] [4.62] [4.65] [8.24] 
Coskewness -0.40 -0.48 -0.86 -0.90 -1.37 
 [-1.41] [-1.50] [-2.63] [-2.83] [-2.90] 
Panel B: Riskpremiums 
 CAPM 
Downsidebeta 
CAPM 
Extremedownsidebeta 
CAPM 
Disasterbeta 
CAPM 
Coskewness  
CAPM 
 AC DC AC DC AC DC AC DC AC DC 
Premium 3.50 3.23 3.32 2.32 3.60 2.26 3.15 1.74 -0.54 -0.56 
 [4.81] [2.31] [4.76] [2.81] [4.57] [3.02] [4.35] [3.19] [-4.07] [-2.05] 
Constant -0.48 -0.37 -0.26 -0.30 -0.58 -0.31 -0.51 -0.17 -0.14 -0.18 
 [-3.11] [-1.37] [-3.17] [-1.34] [-3.38] [-1.45] [-2.46] [-0.68] [-2.53] [-0.74] 
J-stat 6.59 3.97 3.99 3.96 4.36 1.95 3.34 1.17 4.70 1.99 
 (0.68) (0.91) (0.91) (0.91) (0.89) (0.99) (0.95) (1.00) (0.86) (0.99) 
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MSSE 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 
Table 3.7. Comparison of alternative risk factors for currency portfolios 
The table reports the efficient GMM estimates of risk premiums of different risk factors, estimated for the 
currency portfolios, sorted by the forward discounts. Alternative 1-factor and multifactor models are considered. 
T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J 
statistics for the overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of squared errors (MSSE) are reported. P-value 
for J statistics is in parentheses.  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Downside 
market factor 
0.04       0.04 0.04 0.03     0.02 -0.07 
[4.66]       [3.67] [2.47] [1.44]     [1.87] [-0.19] 
Market 
volatility 
factor 
  -0.006     -0.005     -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 0.024 
  [-5.09]     [-2.82]     [-3.00] [-0.73] [-1.96] [0.23] 
Currency 
volatility 
factor 
    -0.22     -0.06   -0.04   -0.03   
    [-3.14]     [-1.04]   [-0.57]   [-0.32]   
HML factor       0.01     0.01   0.01   0.01 
       [7.35]     [6.94]   [5.61]   [5.99] 
Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 [-0.22] [2.06] [0.91] [1.82] [-0.02] [-0.64] [-0.46] [2.09] [-0.07] [1.17] [-0.23] 
J-stat 0.82 1.75 2.38 2.26 1.00 1.16 1.49 1.10 0.65 0.86 0.01 
 (0.94) (0.78) (0.67) (0.69) (0.91) (0.88) (0.83) (0.89) (0.96) (0.93) (1.00) 
MSSE 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.07 
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Table 3.8. Comparison of alternative risk factors for stock portfolios 
The table reports the efficient GMM estimates of risk premiums, estimated for the 5 stock portfolios, sorted by 
their 5-year downside betas. T-statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. J statistics for the overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of squared errors 
(MSSE) are reported. P-value for J statistics is in parentheses.  
 
Downside 
market factor 
Market volatility 
factor 
Currency 
volatility factor 
HML 
factor 
Premium 0.01 -0.001 -0.03 0.016 
 [2.29] [-1.99] [-1.78] [1.35] 
Intercept 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 [1.79] [2.28] [2.22] [0.86] 
J-stat 1.16 0.81 0.59 1.76 
 (0.76) (0.85) (0.90) (0.62) 
MSSE 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.30 
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Table 3.9. Currency portfolios sorted by the downside betas 
The table reports the annualized returns and the efficient GMM estimates of the global downside market betas and 
coskewness of 5 currency portfolios, sorted by the downside betas, estimated in a 5-year rolling window prior to the sort 
date, in panel A, and the efficient GMM estimates of market risk premiums (in percent per month) in panel B. T-
statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics for the 
overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of squared errors (MSSE) for all moments are reported. P-value for J 
statistics is in parentheses.  
Panel A: Return and risk characteristics 
 Pfl 1 2 3 4 Pfl 5 
Annualized excess return (%) 3.34 3.50 3.87 3.61 8.52 
Beta 0.13 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.26 
 [4.57] [4.43] [5.36] [4.77] [5.26] 
Downside beta 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.41 
 [2.95] [4.36] [5.24] [4.99] [8.53] 
Extreme downside beta 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.44 
 [3.42] [4.87] [6.06] [6.44] [7.76] 
Disaster beta 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.43 
 [3.52] [4.95] [5.58] [5.82] [9.01] 
Coskewness -0.62 -0.79 -0.73 -0.84 -1.66 
 [-2.86] [-3.99] [-2.86] [-3.15] [-4.12] 
Panel B: Risk premiums 
 
CAPM 
Downside beta 
CAPM 
Extreme down beta 
CAPM 
Disaster beta 
CAPM 
Coskewness 
CAPM 
Premium 1.14 2.11 2.28 2.33 -0.46 
 [1.18] [2.45] [2.23] [2.10] [-2.28] 
Constant 0.15 0.02 -0.09 -0.15 0.02 
 [0.82] [0.07] [-0.31] [-0.43] [0.10] 
J-stat 1.43 1.47 1.87 2.00 0.86 
 (0.84) (0.83) (0.76) (0.74) (0.93) 
MSSE 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 
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Table 3.10. Risk premiums in the long run: 1974-2013 
The table reports the efficient GMM estimates of consumption and market risk premiums, estimated for 10 
currency portfolios of developed and emerging countries, sorted by the nominal interest rate differential. T-
statistics are in brackets, t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. J statistics 
for the overidentifying restrictions and the mean sum of squared errors (MSSE) are reported. P-value for J 
statistics is in parentheses. Jan 1974 - June 2013.  
 C-CAPM CAPM 
Downside 
beta CAPM 
Upside beta 
CAPM 
Extreme 
downside  beta 
CAPM 
Coskewness 
CAPM 
Premium 4.96 27.47 4.09 -7.55 3.75 -0.53 
 [1.31] [1.17] [4.50] [-2.46] [5.13] [-5.81] 
Constant -0.03 -3.53 -0.12 1.58 -0.29 0.12 
 [-0.56] [-1.08] [-1.57] [2.55] [-2.19] [3.14] 
J-stat 3.33 15.86 6.27 16.72 5.90 8.50 
 (0.95) (0.07) (0.71) (0.05) (0.75) (0.48) 
MSSE 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.24 
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Chapter 4 
Currency Exposure to Downside Risk: Which 
Fundamentals Matter? 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
If currencies serve as investment assets, the correlation of exchange rates with the stock 
market (or the market beta) is importantfor a diversifying investor. Currency exposure to 
downside risk, i.e. a conditional correlation of exchange rates with the market in times of low 
market returns (or the downside beta), is particularly important because the marginal utility of 
wealth is high in such „hard times‟.  
A growing volume of empirical evidence suggests that currency returns are not random; 
some currencies tend to move together with the stock market and depreciate in periods of low 
market returns and high volatility, while others seem to be immune to stock market downturns 
and, thus, can serve as a hedging instrument. In this chapter, I study whether or not there is a 
systematic relationship between currency exposure to the downside market risk and 
macroeconomic characteristicsof the respective countries. I try to answer the question as to 
which currencies tend to crash when the stock market goes down and which currencies serve 
as a „safe haven‟. 
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. Firstly, currencies 
systematically differ in terms of their exposure to the downside risk indeed and the spread in 
the downside betas of currencies is high and significant. Moreover, currency exposure to the 
downside risk has increased dramatically since the beginning of the 21
st
 century in parallel 
with the growing volume of currency trading. 
Secondly, currency downside betas are strongly associated with particular levels of 
three out of eight macroeconomic variables considered: the inflation rate, the real interest rate 
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and the net foreign asset position. Countries with high inflation rates, high real interest rates 
and low (negative) net foreign assets have currencies with high exposure to the downside risk 
whereas countries with the opposite characteristics have currencies with „safe haven‟ 
properties. 
These three macroeconomic variables are, in fact, related, because higher inflation and 
higher real interest rates in an economy lead to higher nominal interest rates and higher 
nominal currency returns, which, in turn, lead to higher capital inflows and lower net foreign 
assets. The high explanatory power of these variables for the downside risk suggests that the 
direction of currency trading is the reason why some currencies are exposed to the downside 
risk more than others. Currencies of debtor countries with high returns (investment 
currencies) have higher exposure to the downside risk because capital is withdrawn in bad 
times. Currencies of creditor countries with low returns (funding currencies) provide a hedge 
in bad times because capital flies back to them.  
In a multivariate setting, when inflation and/or real interest rates are controlled for, the 
net foreign asset position becomes an insignificant determinant of currency downside risk. 
Whereas the real interest rate has the highest explanatory power in the recent „post-euro‟ 
period, the inflation rate was a better determinant of currency risk in the 90s. I do not find 
evidence, that other macroeconomic variables, previously suggested in the literature, are 
systematically related to currency risk. 
The relationship between exchange rates and stock market returns has already been 
explored in Campbell et al. (2010) and Ranaldo and Söderlind (2009) for the currencies of 
fewdeveloped countries. Campbell et al. (2010) find a consistent positive correlation of the 
Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar with the global equity markets and a negative 
correlation of the euro and the Swiss franc. The Japanese yen, the British pound and the US 
dollar fall in the middle of the two extremes. A high-frequency analysis in Ranaldo and 
Söderlind (2009) uncovers a similar pattern; the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen (and to a 
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lesser extent the euro) appreciate when the US stock market goes down, while the opposite is 
observed for the British pound. The „safe haven‟ properties of the Swiss franc and the 
Japanese yen are confirmed in periods of political, natural or financial disasters. 
The abovementioned studies look at the overall market risk of currencies, whereas my 
paper is devoted to the analysis of currency downside risk. The downside beta is, perhaps, a 
better measure of risk than the traditional beta because it reflects an asset‟s performance in the 
worst states of the world when the overall market return is low and the marginal utility of 
wealth is high. The choice of the downside beta as a measure of risk was motivated by Ang et 
al. (2006), who consider investors with disappointment aversion utility function, derive a two-
beta CAPM with an upside beta and a downside beta and show that the downside betas 
explain the cross-section of stock returns better than the traditional betas whereas the upside 
betas are completely irrelevant. Two recent studies of the downside risk (Lettau et al., 2014, 
and Dobrynskaya, 2014) confirm that assets‟ exposure to the downside risk has a much 
greater explanatory power for returns in currency, stock, bond and commodities markets than 
assets‟ overall market risk.   
In a closely related recent study by Habib and Stracca (2012), the authors look at the 
macroeconomic determinants of currencies‟ „safe haven‟ properties, measured by their 
exposure to stock market volatility VIX. They find that, out of 20 macroeconomic 
fundamentals considered, the nominal interest rate differential, public debt to GDP ratio, the 
net foreign asset position, financial development and liquidity are associated with „safe haven‟ 
behavior of currencies of advanced economies, while only the net foreign asset position and 
the size of the stock market are relevant for emerging economies. They conclude that “the net 
foreign asset position is the most consistent fundamental determinant of the safe haven 
status…” A similar conclusion about the validity of net foreign assets in explaining currency 
„safe haven‟ behavior is drawn in Cenedese (2012) using a portfolio approach. 
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My paper contributes to the above studies in several ways. Firstly, rather than studying 
only the determinants of „safe haven‟ currencies, I study the determinants of currencies with 
both low and high exposure to the downside risk. Secondly, we employ different 
methodologies and use different measures of currency downside risk. I measure the exposure 
to the downside risk as the downside market beta, whereas Habib and Stracca (2012) define 
„safe haven‟ currencies as those that appreciate in times of high market volatility. Thirdly and 
most importantly, I provide an explanation why net foreign asset position is a relevant 
determinant of currency downside risk, I show that the real interest rate has an even higher 
explanatory power, especially in the „post euro‟ period, and once the real interest rate is 
controlled for, the net foreign asset position becomes statistically insignificant. 
Rather than looking at few particular currencies, I take a sample of 47 major currencies 
of developed and developing countries. The big sample of currencies allows me to run cross-
sectional tests for individual currencies as well as to build currency portfolios sorted by 
macroeconomic characteristics. The portfolio approach has an advantage that the 
measurement errors of betas are minimized and it allows to account for time variation in 
betas. I also look at a longer period of time, compared to the abovementioned studies, and 
analyze trends over time. My results are robust to different sub-samples of currencies, 
different sub-periods and different methods employed. 
My findings also shed some light on why a carry trade is a very risky investment 
strategy. A carry trade – borrowing in low nominal interest rate currencies and investing in 
high nominal interest rate currencies – generates high excess returns which are negatively 
skewed (Brunnermeier et al., 2008) and have high stock market beta (Lustig and Verdelhan, 
2010) and an even higher downside market beta (Dobrynskaya, 2014). Since nominal interest 
rates can be high due to high real interest rates, high inflation rates or both, I decompose 
nominal interest rates into inflation and real interest rates and form double-sorted currency 
portfolios. I show that currencies with the same level of real interest rates but different 
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inflation rates have the same downside risk, whereas, controlling for inflation, currencies with 
higher real interest rates have a higher downside risk. Therefore, the high downside risk of 
carry trades turns out to be a consequence of high real interest rates in the investment 
countries and low real interest rates in the funding countries, rather than the nominal interest 
rates. When nominal and real interest rates correlate significantly (e.g. in developed 
countries), high levels of these rates in an economy are both associated with the high 
downside risk of its currency, but when the correlation between these rates is low, only the 
real interest rate is associated with currency downside risk.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I describe the datain section 4.2. Section 
4.3 is devoted to results. In section 4.3.1, I analyze currency portfolios sorted by their 
downside betas, I show that there are indeed significant differences in the downside risk 
exposure of currencies, and I provide average macroeconomic characteristics of these 
portfolios. Section 4.3.2 is devoted to a cross-sectional regression analysis of downside risk 
for individual currencies whereasin section 4.3.3I show the risk characteristics of currency 
portfolios sorted by various macroeconomic variables. Section 4.4 concludes the paper.   
 
4.2.DATA 
The data covers the period from January 1990 until December 2012. Earlier years are not 
considered because of the predominance of fixed exchange rate regimes around the world and 
limited macroeconomic data for many countries. Because the introduction of euro changed the 
composition of countries significantly, I perform the analysis for two sub-periods: „pre-euro‟ 
period 1990-1998 and „post-euro‟ period 1999-2012.  
The total sample of countries consists of 47major developed and emerging economies 
with the highest volume of currency turnover and available macroeconomic data. Countries 
with fixed exchange rate regimes are not considered because their artificially low exchange 
rate risk would bias the analysis.The effective samples of countries are different (but 
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overlapping) in the two sub-periods because the post-soviet countries are excluded in the „pre-
euro‟ period and the euro zone countries are excluded in the „post-euro‟ period. Because of 
these restrictions, there are 36 currencies in each sub-period.The samples of currencies in the 
two sub-periods are reported in appendix A2. 
Exchange rate returns and total returns (including the interest rate differentials, or 
forward discounts) are measured on a monthly frequency. An increase in the exchange rate 
means an appreciation of the respective currency against the US dollar. The MSCI AC World 
index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio to estimate the downside market risk.  
Since many macroeconomic variables are only available on an annual frequency, I use 
annual time series of all macroeconomic data. The following macroeconomic variables are 
considered: the CPI inflation rate (from World Economic Outlook), the real lending interest 
rate (from World Bank), net foreign assets (NFA) relative to local GDP (from Milesi-Feretti 
database
33
), the current account relative to local GDP (from World Economic Outlook), the 
GDP share of the world GDP based on purchasing power parity (from World Economic 
Outlook), the market capitalization of listed companies relative to local GDP (from World 
Bank), the market volume of stock trades relative to local GDP (from World Bank), the Fitch 
country rating, converted to numeric scale from 1 to 24, where a higher number means a 
higher country risk. All macroeconomic data is available for the whole period of study except 
the Fitch country rating, which covered only a few countries in the early 90s. Therefore, I 
only use it in the second sub-period 1999-2012. 
The choice of the macroeconomic variables is motivated by previous studies (Habib and 
Stracca, 2012; Hassan, 2013; Cenedese, 2012) which show that some of these variables have 
explanatory power for currency returns and risk. 
 
 
                                                          
33
 I thank Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti for kindly sharing their data on countries‟ external positions. 
116 
 
4.3.RESULTS 
4.3.1. CURRENCY PORTFOLIOS SORTED BY THE DOWNSIDE BETAS 
First of all, I show that the downside market risk of currenciesis important indeed and varies 
significantly across currencies and over time. The downside market risk is measured by the 
downside beta which is defined as a market beta conditional on a negative performance of the 
stock market; it shows how a currency‟sreturn changes when the global stock market goes 
down. I estimate the downside betas on monthly returns for each sub-period separately in the 
following regression: 
jtmttjmtjjjt rdummyrer   *               (4.1) 
where jter  is the exchange rate return of asset j, mtr  is the stock market return, 
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dummy  and j  is the estimate of downside beta
34
. A positive value of j  
means that the currency systematically depreciates when the stock market return is negative, 
and a higher value of j  reflects a higher currency exposure to the downside risk. A close-to-
zero downside beta reflects „safe haven‟ properties of a currency. 
The individual currency downside betas are often highly statistically significant and the 
range of downside betas across currencies is wide. In the first sub-period 1990-1998, the 
lowest downside beta of -0.19 is observed for Japanese yen, and the highest downside beta of 
0.39 is observed for Polish zloty. In the second sub-period 1999-2009, the downside risk of all 
currencies is generally much higher. The Japanese yen has the lowest downside beta of -0.09 
again, whereas the highest downside beta of 0.71 is observed for Turkish lira. Other countries 
with the highest downside risk of their currencies are Brazil, Australia, New Zealand and 
                                                          
34
 It is also possible to estimate the downside betas by putting the total currency returns (including the interest 
rate differential) on the left-hand side of equation (4.1). The downside betas estimated in this way do not differ 
from the exchange rate downside betas by more than 0.02, which suggests that all market risk of currencies 
comes from exchange rate fluctuations. Since the data on interest rates is not available for all currencies in the 
earlier years, I consider the exchange rate downside betas throughout the paper.  
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South Africa. The full list of currencies and their downside betas in the two sub-periods is 
presented in appendix A2. 
Since individual currency betas can be measured with errors, to get a more reliable 
picture of the downside risk of currencies, I sort 36 currencies in each sub-period by their 
individual downside betas into 6 equal-weighted portfolios and estimate the downside betas 
and average macroeconomic characteristics for these portfolios
35
. Portfolios with higher ranks 
contain currencies with higher downside betas. Table 4.1 reports the results. 
The portfolio downside betas range from -0.12 to 0.23 in the first sub-period and from 
0.05 to 0.57 in the second sub-period. Currencies in the top portfolios systematically 
depreciate when the stock market performs poorly, whereas currencies in portfolio 1 are 
generally immune to the stock market downturns and can serve as a hedging instrument.The 
differences between the downside betas of the top and the bottom portfolios are statistically 
significant in the both sub-periods, although the individual portfolio downside betas are only 
significant in the second sub-period.  
The beginning of the 21
st
 centuryis marked by a much greater stock market risk of 
currencies. The downside betas are more than twice as high as they were in the 90s, the 
increase is more than 2 standard deviations and is statistically significant. This is a sign of a 
greater interdependence of the currency and the stock markets, but it can also be a result of 
more flexible exchange rate regimes and lower foreign exchange interventions in many 
countries. Furthermore, it can be a result of a higher carry trade activity, as evidenced in 
Galati et al. (2007), and unwinding of carry trade positions.   
Currency portfolios with higher downside risk have higher average returns in the both 
sub-periods in line with the findings of Dobrynskaya (2014) and Lettau et al. (2014) that the 
downside risk explains the cross-section of currency returns well.  
                                                          
35
Sorting by the traditional market betas produces a similar picture, although sorting by the downside betas gives 
the biggest rangein the market risk across portfolios. 
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Table 4.1 also reports the average macroeconomic characteristics of the 6 currency 
portfolios. Countries with higher currency exposure to the downside risk tend to have higher 
inflation and real interest rates (and, hence, higher nominal interest rates), lower (negative) 
net foreign asset positions and current accounts (debtor countries), somewhat lower size, 
market capitalization and market volume, and somewhat higher country risk. Countries with 
the lowest downside risk have the opposite characteristics. But none of the 8 macroeconomic 
variables considered exhibit strict monotonicity across portfolios, because there are often 
exclusions to the general trend. The highest explanatory power in terms of the cross-sectional 
R
2
 is observed for the inflation and real interest rates, lower explanatory power for the 
external position (net foreign assets and current account), and almost no explanatory power 
for the country and stock market size (GDP share, market capitalization and market volume) 
and country risk.The next sections explore these relationships thoroughly. 
 
4.3.2. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES 
This section is devoted to a cross-sectional analysis of the determinants of the downside risk 
of individual currencies. I estimate alternative univariate and multivariate specifications with 
the downside betas on the left-hand side and country average macroeconomic characteristics 
on the right-hand side
36
. The analysis is performed for the two sub-periods separately, and 
there are 36 cross-sectional observations in each sub-period. The estimation results are 
reported in table 4.2. 
Among the univariate specifications (1)-(8), only inflation rate, real interest rate and net 
foreign assets have statistically significant coefficients in the both sub-periods
37
. As before, 
                                                          
36
 Although the downside betas of individual currencies may be estimated with errors, this does not affect the 
regression coefficients because the betas are the dependent variables in these specifications and, hence, the 
common measurement error problem in asset pricing is irrelevant here. 
37 In alternative specifications with the traditional market betas on the left-hand side, none of the variables was 
statistically significant in the first sub-period. Hence, it was very difficult to explain the overall market risk of 
currencies which was rather random in that period.This is, perhaps, the reason why many early studies of 
exchange rate dynamics concluded that currency returns are random and are not related to macroeconomic 
variables. 
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countries with higher inflation and real interest rates and lower net foreign assets have higher 
exposure to downside risk. Regressions with these variables also have the highest cross-
sectional R
2
. Out of these three variables, the inflation rate and net foreign assets had the 
highest explanatory power in the first sub-period, whereas the real interest rate has the highest 
explanatory power in the second sub-period. All other macroeconomic variables are 
insignificant determinants of the currency downside risk, although the coefficients have the 
correct signs in accordance with the findings of Hassan (2013) and Habib and Stracca (2012).  
In bivariate specifications (9) and (10), I include two of the abovementioned significant 
variables
38
 and find that all of them are still significant in 1990-1998 and only the real interest 
rate remains significant in 1999-2012. When other macroeconomic characteristic are 
controlled for (specifications (11) and (12)), the net foreign asset position loses its 
explanatory power, whereas the inflation and real interest rates remain the only significant 
determinants of currency downside risk in the both sub-periods. In 1990-1998, the inflation 
and real interest rates were almostperfectly correlated, and it is impossible to determine which 
one is a better determinant of currency risk. But in 1999-2012, these variables were almost 
uncorrelated, and when they are included together (specification (12)), the real interest rate 
survives as the only statistically significant regressor.The inflation rate does not play a role in 
the more recent period because most countries managed to stabilize it. 
It should be noted that not only the downside risk is higher in the second sub-period, but 
also the explanatory power of the macroeconomic variables is higher. The 8 macroeconomic 
fundamentals considered can jointly explain up to 40 percent of cross-sectional variation in 
currency downside risk, whereas the real interest rate alone can explain about 20 percent of it. 
Since inflation and real interest rates determine nominal interest rates and nominal 
currency returns which, in turn, determine capital flows and net foreign asset position, these 
variables are related. Their high explanatory power for the cross-section of currency exposure 
                                                          
38
 The inflation rate and the real interest rate cannot be included together in 1990-1998 because of their high 
correlation of 0.97.  
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to the downside risk suggest that the direction of currency trading is the primary determinant 
of currency risk.  
Countries with high inflation (in the earlier years) and high real interest rates (in the 
more recent years) provide higher nominal returns to investors
39
 and, hence, have negative net 
foreign asset positions and negative current accounts (i.e. capital inflows). But in bad times, 
when the global stock market plunges, capital is withdrawn from these countries and these 
currencies depreciate. Therefore, these currencies are more vulnerable in severe stock market 
conditions.  
Countries with low inflation and real interest rate, on the contrary, provide low currency 
returns and become donor countries with positive net foreign asset positions and positive 
current accounts (i.e. capital outflows). In bad times, capital does not flow from these 
countries, and these currencies do not depreciate. Moreover, they may even appreciate if 
capital is returned. Such currencies are „safe haven‟ currencies because they provide a hedge 
against the global downside risk.   
My results also suggest that the high downside market risk of carry trades, which is 
clamed to explain the high returnsto this strategy (Lettau et al, 2014; Dobrynskaya, 2014),is a 
consequence of the big difference in the real interest rates of investment and funding 
currencies, which, in turn, affect the nominal interest rates and currency returns.  
 
4.3.3. CURRENCY PORTFOLIOS SORTED BY MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
4.3.3.a. ALTERNATIVE SOTRS BY ONE MACRO VARIABLE 
The previous analysis does not take into account the time variation in currency betas and 
macroeconomic characteristics of countries. In reality, though, a country‟s macroeconomic 
fundamentals may change over time and its currency downside risk may change accordingly. 
In this section, I allow for time variation in the downside risk by sorting 36 currencies in the 
                                                          
39
 Exchange rate fluctuations do not offset these nominal returns (e.g. Dobrynskaya, 2014) and, therefore, carry 
trades are so profitable. 
121 
 
sample into 6 portfolios based on their macroeconomic characteristics and estimating 
downside betas for the currency portfolios rather than for individual currencies. The portfolios 
are rebalanced annually. If a country‟s macroeconomic conditions change its currency moves 
to another portfolio with the respective level of the macroeconomic variable. At any point of 
time, a portfolio may have different currencies, but similar macroeconomic characteristics. 
Portfolio 1 always contains 6 currencies with the lowest value of the sort variable whereas 
portfolio 6 always contains currencies with the highest value of the sort variable. Some 
currencies do not change portfolios whereas other currencies change portfolios quite often.  
This portfolio approachnot only allows me to take into account the time variation in the 
macroeconomic variables and currency market risk, but also allows studying the whole period 
1990-2012 and derive more general results. Moreover, the downside betas are estimated for 
the currency portfolios instead of single currencies and, hence, the measurement errors are 
reduced.    
If a macroeconomic variable is indeed systematically related to the currency downside 
risk, sorting by this variable would produce the highest spread inthe downside betas of the top 
and bottom portfolios because, for instance, portfolio 6 would always pick the currencies with 
the highest value of the macro variable in the respective period and, hence, the highest 
downside risk. Since macroeconomic variables and the currency risk vary over time, periodic 
rebalancing should result in the most striking differences between the betas of the portfolios. 
We should also find a monotonic relationship between the downside betas and portfolio rank 
if the sort variable is a relevant one.  
 
The whole period 1990-2012 
Panel A of table 4.3reportsthe downside betas of seven groups of portfolios, sorted by the 
seven macroeconomic variables considered. The last column shows the characteristics of the 
high-minus-low (HML) portfolio which takes a long position in portfolio 6 and a short 
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position in portfolio 1. The downside betas of these long-short portfolios are equal to the 
differences in the downside betas of portfolios 6 and 1, and their statistical significance means 
that the differences in the betas of the top and the bottom portfolios are statistically 
significant. 
The average values of the sort variables for each portfolio are presented in the first line 
of each panel. They are increasing with the portfolio rank because this is how the portfolios 
were sorted.  
We observe strict monotonicity of the downside betas in the cases when portfolios were 
sorted by inflation rates, real interest rates and net foreign asset positions. Portfolios with 
higher levels of inflation and real interest rates and lower levels of net foreign assets have 
higher downside betas (the highest portfolio downside betais 0.35). The downside betas are 
always statistically significant, expect for the portfolios with the lowest level of inflation and 
real interest rate and the highest (positive) level of net foreign assets. These portfolios with 
insignificant downside betas contain „safe haven‟ currencies. 
The HML portfolios in these three alternative sorts have the highest and statistically 
significant downside betas, which means that portfolios with rank 6 and rank 1 have 
statistically different downside risk indeed. In the cases of the inflation rate sort and the real 
interest rate sort, portfolios with rank 6 have downside risk which is 2.5 times as high as the 
downside risk of portfolios with rank 1. In the case of net foreign assets sort, the downside 
risk of portfolio 1 is 3.5 times as high as the downside risk of portfolio 6. Sorting by net 
foreign assets produces the highest spread in the downside betas across the portfolios. 
Although the sorting by these three macroeconomic variables produces similar results, 
this is not due to the same currency composition of the portfolios obtained by the alternative 
sorts. In fact, portfolios with the same rank are somewhat different. This is because the real 
interest rate and the inflation rate are rather orthogonal to each other in the recent years. 
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Sorting by current accounts, GDP shares, market capitalization and market volumes do 
not produce monotonic patterns in the downside betas. Therefore, we cannot conclude that a 
higher level of any of these variables is systematically associated with a higher or lower level 
of the downside risk. The corresponding HML portfolios also do not have statistically 
significant downside betas. Hence, the spread between the downside risk of the top and 
bottom portfolios is very low and insignificant. These macroeconomic variables seem to be 
irrelevant in explaining currency downside risk. 
 
The ‘post-euro’ period 1999-2012 
To test the robustness of the results over time, I repeat the same exercise for the second sub-
period 1999-2012 separately. Panel B of table 4.3 presents the statistics of the portfolios in 
this recent sub-period. A striking difference is that the inflation rateof the top portfolio 
decreased significantly because many developing countries managed to stabilize their 
inflation in 90s, whereas the market capitalization and the market volume of the top portfolios 
increased. The currency downside risk has also increased. For any sort variable and any 
portfolio, the downside betas are almost twice as high as they were previously, and the 
spreads in the downside betas across portfolios are generally wider.  
The overall results are not different in the „post-euro‟ period. Only the sorts by inflation 
rates, real interest rates and net foreign assets produce monotonic patterns of the downside 
betas and significant spreads between the downside betas of the top and bottom portfolios. 
Other variables are irrelevant again.  
Sort by the country risk also does not generate monotonically increasing pattern of the 
downside betas. Even though, generally, a higher country risk is associated with higher 
currency downside risk, portfolios 1 and 2 stand out because portfolio 1 contains Australia 
and New Zealand with low country risk but high currency downside risk, and portfolio 2 
contains Japan with higher country risk but much lower currency downside risk.    
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4.3.3.b. DOUBLE SORT BY INFLATION AND REAL INTEREST RATE 
Since inflation and real interest rates are related,and both affect nominal interest rates which, 
in turn, affect net foreign asset positions, it is important to separate the effects of inflation and 
real interest rates and identify which variable has higher explanatory power for the currency 
downside risk. For this purpose, I use the following double sorting procedure. First, all 36 
currencies are sorted by inflation rate into three equal portfolios. Then, currencies of each 
portfolio are sorted by real interest rates and divided again into two portfolios. As previously, 
the portfolios are rebalanced every year. Each portfolio consists of 6 currencies, but the 
composition of portfolios changes over time. The descriptive statistics of the six double-
sorted portfolios is presented in table 4.4. 
Portfolio pairs 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6 have similar average inflation rates but different 
average real interest rates both in the whole period and in the „post-euro‟ sub-period. 
Therefore, the real interest rates and inflation rates are orthogonal to each other and we can 
separate their effects.  
The downside betas of the low-real-interest-rate portfolios (1, 3 and 5) are always lower 
than those of the respective high-real-interest-rate portfolios (2, 4 and 6). The differences in 
the downside betas are always significant, except for the low-inflation portfolios in the top 
panel. Controlling for inflation, a higher real interest rate in an economy is associated with 
higher downside risk of its currency. This relationship is even stronger in the recent sub-
period. 
Higher inflation rate is also related to higher downside risk, but this relationship is not 
that strong. The differences in the downside betas of portfolios 1 and 3, 2 and 4, 3 and 5, 4 
and 6 are rather small and statistically insignificant. There are some differences in the 
downside betas of low-inflation and medium-inflation portfolios, whereas there is almost no 
difference in the downside betas of medium-inflation and high-inflation portfolios despite 
significant differences in their inflation rates. This is particularly true in the recent sub-period. 
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For instance, portfolio pairs 3 and 5 and 4 and 6 have different inflation rates, similar real 
interest rates and similar downside betas.Therefore, controlling for the level of real interest 
rate, we cannot conclude that higher inflation rate is strongly associated with higher currency 
downside risk. 
Even though lower real interest rate is associated with lower downside risk, a low level 
of the real interest ratealone does not ensure „safe haven‟ properties of a currency, because 
countries with low real interest rates and high inflation rates have rather high downside risk 
(e.g. portfolio 5). „Safe haven‟ currencies have two features: the lowest real interest rate and 
the lowest inflation rate at the same time. Consequently, suchcurrencies also have the lowest 
nominal interest rate and net foreign asset position.  
Since countries with high real interest rates are supposed to have high default risk, and 
since their currencies also have the highest downside market risk, we can suggest that there is 
„flight to quality‟ in the currency market. When the general market conditions worsen, 
investors sell currencies of countries with high real interest rates and accumulate currencies of 
safe countries with low real interest rates and low inflation rates. This results in high 
downside risk of the former currencies and zero (insignificant) downside risk of the latter 
currencies.  
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
Several studies have shown that some particular currencies are exposed to the market risk 
whereas others serve as a „safe haven‟ (Campbell et al., 2010, Ranaldo and Söderlind, 2009). 
In this chapter, I explore which macroeconomic characteristics are systematically related to 
the downside risk of currencies. I show that „safe haven‟ currencies have low inflation and 
real interest rates and positive net foreign asset positions of the respective countries.  
Currencies which tend to crash with the stock market, on the contrary, belong to debtor 
countries with high real interest and inflation rates. The level of the real interest rate has the 
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highest explanatory power in the cross-section of currency exposure to the downside risk, 
especially in the 2000s. This suggests that there is a „flight to quality‟ in the currency market 
in „hard times‟ (i.e. capital is withdrawn from high real interest rate risky currencies of debtor 
countries and returned to low real interest rate „safe haven‟ currencies of creditor countries). 
Other macroeconomic variables, previously suggested in the literature, do not seem to play a 
significant role in explaining currency exposure to the downside risk.      
These findings have important implications for portfolio choice when currencies are 
considered as investment assets. Although market betas of currencies are generally lower than 
market betas of stocks, currencies of countries with high real interest rates are not attractive 
from the point of view of portfolio diversification because of their high downside betas. In 
order to reduce the downside market risk of a portfolio, investing into currencies of countries 
with low real interest rates and low inflation rates is desirable, because such currencies tend to 
be stable or even appreciate when the stock market goes down and, hence, they can serve as a 
hedging instrument.   
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Table 4.1. Macroeconomic characteristics of currency portfolios 
sorted by downside betas 
 
The table reports average downside betas, returns and macroeconomic characteristics of 6 currency 
portfolios sorted by individual currency downside betas. 36 countries are considered in each sub-
period. T-statistics for the downside betas are in brackets,t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The returns, inflation and real interest rates are reported 
in percent per annum. Net foreign assets, current account, market capitalization and market volume 
are measured in percent to local GDP. GDP share is measured relative to world GDP. Country risk is 
proxied by Fitch country rating on a scale from 1 to 24, a higher number means a higher risk.  
 
  Pfl 1 2 3 4 5 Pfl 6 
 
1990-1998 
Downside beta -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.23 
 
[-1.51] [-0.62] [-0.49] [0.52] [1.37] [1.84] 
Return  1.09 2.64 2.52 2.34 5.82 8.17 
Inflation  2.39 15.55 3.17 4.92 32.10 138.57 
Real interest rate 4.93 7.15 7.33 7.17 7.68 17.03 
Net foreign assets 16.18 -19.98 -14.40 -17.48 -33.63 -27.39 
Current account 0.09 0.64 -0.10 0.93 -2.28 -1.99 
GDP share 2.30 1.40 1.89 0.40 1.51 1.47 
Market capitalization 53.77 31.84 54.77 49.78 60.25 31.45 
Market volume 29.46 16.69 27.34 21.08 21.58 13.53 
 
1999-2012 
Downside beta 0.05 0.19 0.29 0.34 0.44 0.57 
 
[1.47] [3.21] [3.11] [3.68] [5.29] [8.03] 
Return 2.66 2.12 4.40 6.59 5.12 10.22 
Inflation  3.75 3.12 3.81 6.87 3.99 7.54 
Real interest rate 3.97 3.36 4.57 4.67 4.40 12.18 
Net foreign assets 32.24 -6.09 -38.46 -49.10 -31.30 -52.94 
Current account 3.75 -1.10 -4.92 0.18 0.90 -3.76 
GDP share 1.33 1.58 2.75 1.00 1.21 1.07 
Market capitalization 46.81 114.80 28.61 56.29 62.68 74.98 
Market volume 19.70 98.77 20.45 40.49 53.33 46.64 
Country risk 8.60 5.08 6.50 6.38 7.82 8.05 
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Table 4.2. Cross-sectional regressions for individual currencies 
 
The table reports coefficients of univariate and multivariate cross-sectional regressions of currency downside 
betas on country‟s macroeconomic characteristics. The regressions are estimated for two sub-periods. A cross-
section of 36 countries is considered in each sub-period. T-statistics are reported in brackets. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Panel A: 1990-1998 
Inflation 0.03 
       
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
 
[4.51] 
       
[4.20] 
 
[3.93] 
 
Real interest rate  
 
0.31 
       
0.22 
 
0.25 
  
[3.07] 
       
[2.66] 
 
[2.74] 
Net foreign assets 
  
-0.14 
     
-0.13 -0.14 -0.10 -0.12 
   
[-2.70] 
     
[-2.49] [-2.31] [-1.34] [-1.49] 
Current account 
   
-0.85 
      
-0.10 -0.07 
    
[-1.49] 
      
[-0.15] [-0.10] 
GDP share  
   
-1.20 
     
-1.11 -1.10 
     
[-1.54] 
     
[-1.43] [-1.47] 
Market cap. 
     
-0.07 
    
0.01 0.00 
      
[-0.93] 
    
[0.21] [-0.04] 
Market volume  
     
-0.16 
   
-0.05 -0.02 
       
[-1.96] 
   
[-0.60] [-0.21] 
Intercept 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 - 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 
 
[0.42] [-0.04] [0.05] [0.62] [1.08] [0.97] [1.26] - [-0.15] [-0.37] [0.25] [0.13] 
R2 0.10 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.08 - 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.24 
R2 adj 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.05 - 0.17 0.16 0.09 0.07 
Panel B: 1999-2012 
Inflation 1.66 
       
1.40 
 
2.16 1.61 
 
[2.15] 
       
[1.86] 
 
[2.17] [1.44] 
Real interest rate  
 
1.15 
       
1.04 
 
1.14 
  
[6.08] 
       
[7.12] 
 
[5.61] 
Net foreign assets 
  
-0.09 
     
-0.07 -0.07 -0.14 -0.14 
   
[-2.19] 
     
[-1.96] [-1.89] [-1.51] [-1.41] 
Current account 
   
-0.44 
      
0.63 0.83 
    
[-1.16] 
      
[0.95] [1.16] 
Size (GDP share)  
   
-0.41 
     
-1.05 -1.64 
     
[-0.57] 
     
[-0.45] [-0.84] 
Market cap. 
     
-0.01 
    
0.07 0.06 
      
[-0.10] 
    
[0.66] [0.53] 
Market volume  
     
0.00 
   
0.00 0.00 
       
[-0.04] 
   
[0.03] [-0.04] 
Country risk 
       
0.01 
  
-0.01 -0.01 
        
[0.66] 
  
[-0.67] [-0.95] 
Intercept 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.18 
 
[3.37] [4.03] [5.61] [5.52] [5.42] [4.82] [4.71] [4.03] [3.58] [4.07] [2.09] [1.64] 
R2 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.41 
R2 adj 0.13 0.17 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.16 0.22 0.14 0.21 
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Table 4.3. Risk characteristics of currency portfolios  
sortedby macroeconomic variables 
 
The table reports downside betas and average macroeconomic characteristics of currency portfolios, sorted 
yearly by country‟s macroeconomic variables. 36 currencies are used in sub-periods 1990-1998 and 1999-2012 
to form 6 equal-weighted portfolios, sorted by one macroeconomic variable at a time. HML is 6 minus 1 long-
short portfolio. T-statistics are in brackets,t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. The returns, inflation and real interest rates are reported in percent per annum. Net 
foreign assets, current account, market capitalization and market volume are measured in percent to local GDP. 
GDP share is measured relative to world GDP. Country risk is proxied by Fitch country rating on a scale from 1 
to 24, a higher number means higher risk. 
 
Panel A: 1990-2012 
    Pfl 1 2 3 4 5 Pfl 6 HML 
R
at
es
 
  Sort by inflation 
Inflation  0.73 2.01 2.83 4.01 6.87 78.03 
 
Downside beta 0.13 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.34 0.22 
 
[1.88] [2.64] [2.59] [2.71] [3.85] [4.59] [3.48] 
 
Sort by real interest rate 
Real interest rate  1.98 3.49 4.55 5.81 7.26 15.08 
 
Downside beta 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.34 0.21 
 
[1.85] [2.25] [3.45] [2.38] [3.11] [3.46] [3.98] 
E
x
te
rn
al
 p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
  Sort by net foreign assets 
Net foreign assets -89.80 -46.27 -30.51 -17.42 -4.46 62.72 
 
Downside beta 0.35 0.31 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.10 -0.25 
 
[4.43] [3.44] [2.59] [2.49] [2.78] [1.74] [-3.36] 
 
Sort by current account 
Current account  -8.05 -4.19 -2.18 0.12 2.80 9.85 
 
Downside beta 0.23 0.29 0.33 0.23 0.20 0.16 -0.07 
 
[2.17] [3.22] [3.54] [2.53] [2.95] [2.72] [-0.95] 
S
iz
e 
  Sort by GDP share 
GDP share 0.09 0.28 0.48 0.85 2.02 5.70 
 
Downside beta 0.18 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.32 0.17 -0.01 
 
[1.49] [3.05] [2.77] [3.48] [4.14] [2.74] [0.61] 
 
Sort by market cap 
Market cap 11.25 21.46 34.67 50.56 79.02 147.72 
 
Downside beta 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.00 
 
[2.36] [2.59] [4.20] [2.29] [3.49] [2.59] [-0.17] 
 
Sort by market volume 
Market volume 1.73 5.82 13.45 30.72 56.42 112.30 
 
Downside beta 0.27 0.19 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.20 -0.06 
 
[3.46] [2.89] [3.05] [2.71] [3.10] [2.38] [-1.21] 
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Table 4.3. Risk characteristics of currency portfolios  
sortedby macroeconomic variables (continued) 
 
The table reports downside betas and average macroeconomic characteristics of currency portfolios, sorted 
yearly by country‟s macroeconomic variables. 36 currencies are used in sub-periods 1990-1998 and 1999-2012 
to form 6 equal-weighted portfolios, sorted by one macroeconomic variable at a time. HML is 6 minus 1 long-
short portfolio. T-statistics are in brackets,t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. The returns, inflation and real interest rates are reported in percent per annum. Net 
foreign assets, current account, market capitalization and market volume are measured in percent to local GDP. 
GDP share is measured relative to world GDP. Country risk is proxied by Fitch country rating on a scale from 1 
to 24, a higher number means higher risk. 
 
Panel B: 1999-2012 
    Pfl 1 2 3 4 5 Pfl 6 HML 
R
at
es
 
  Sort by inflation 
Inflation 0.52 1.97 2.82 3.92 5.90 13.94 
 
Downside beta 0.18 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.48 0.30 
 
[3.43] [3.10] [4.16] [4.00] [4.78] [7.24] [5.33] 
 
Sort by real interest rate 
Real interest rate 1.54 2.77 3.69 4.88 6.31 15.73 
 
Downside beta 0.19 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.46 0.28 
 
[2.60] [3.59] [5.40] [3.04] [4.21] [5.06] [4.70] 
E
x
te
rn
al
 p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
  Sort by net foreign assets 
NFA -109.04 -51.50 -34.72 -20.00 -7.20 76.80 
 
Downside beta 0.48 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.17 -0.31 
 
[6.92] [4.31] [3.75] [3.54] [4.03] [3.27] [-6.10] 
 
Sort by current account 
Current account -9.74 -5.01 -2.69 0.20 3.21 11.87 
 
Downside beta 0.33 0.38 0.47 0.33 0.31 0.21 -0.12 
 
[2.94] [3.98] [5.85] [3.54] [5.45] [3.56] [-1.39] 
S
iz
e 
  Sort by GDP share 
GDP share 0.04 0.19 0.38 0.70 1.66 6.05 
 
Downside beta 0.27 0.38 0.31 0.30 0.47 0.26 -0.01 
 
[1.92] [3.96] [4.23] [4.38] [6.79] [5.91] [-0.06] 
 
Sort by market cap 
Market cap 11.84 23.20 38.42 56.86 89.32 164.55 
 
Downside beta 0.25 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.27 0.31 0.06 
 
[2.11] [4.51] [6.68] [3.96] [4.90] [4.02] [0.36] 
 
Sort by market volume 
Market volume 1.19 5.06 14.20 38.87 75.88 144.18 
 
Downside beta 0.30 0.25 0.46 0.39 0.29 0.30 0.00 
 
[3.38] [3.30] [5.63] [6.29] [4.21] [3.75] [0.07] 
C
o
u
n
tr
y
 
ri
sk
 
 
Sort by country risk 
Range of rating 1=2 3=5 6=7 8=9 10=12 13=24 
 
Downside beta 0.26 0.17 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.10 
 
[2.25] [3.89] [2.46] [2.81] [2.59] [4.37] [1.32] 
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Table 4.4. Risk characteristics of currency portfolios  
double sorted by inflation and real interest rates 
 
The table reports downside betas and average inflation and real interest rates of 3x2 currency portfolios, double 
sorted annually by inflation and real interest rates. 36 currencies are used in sub-periods 1990-1998 and 1999-
2012 to form 6 equal-weighted portfolios. T-statistics are in brackets,t-statistics are calculated using Newey-
West heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Inflation and real interest rates are reported in percent per 
annum. 
 
  Pfl 1 2 3 4 5 Pfl 6 
 
Low infl 
Low r 
Low infl 
High r 
Med infl 
Low r 
Med infl 
High r 
High infl 
Low r 
High infl 
High r 
 1990-2012 
Inflation 1.32 1.44 3.52 3.41 10.17 9.95 
Real interest rate 1.56 7.41 2.86 8.41 3.10 11.47 
Downside beta 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.26 0.20 0.30 
 
[1.79] [2.30] [2.27] [2.56] [2.86] [4.84] 
 
1999-2012 
Inflation 1.24 1.30 3.50 3.43 9.44 8.48 
Real interest rate -0.12 6.44 2.03 7.72 1.98 11.48 
Downside beta 0.12 0.22 0.27 0.37 0.29 0.36 
 
[2.40] [3.22] [4.07] [3.67] [4.05] [5.96] 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
This thesis is devoted to the study of downside risk in stock and currency markets. I show that 
the exposure to the downside risk can explain returns to momentum and carry trade strategies, 
two common investment strategies in the stock and currency markets, respectively. These 
strategies were thought to generate abnormal returns because if their high average returns and 
low average correlations with the market. I show that once we look at their conditional 
correlations with the market in states of low market returns, these strategies are very risky 
because they provide low returns exactly in „hard times‟, when returns are particularly 
valuable. 
In the first paper of this thesis, I show that once we separate the overall market risk of 
momentum portfolios into the upside and downside risks, the momentum strategies appear to 
have asymmetric risk profile: they are exposed to the downside risk, but hedge against the 
upside risk. Since the upside and downside risks are priced differently, the momentum return 
is a compensation for this risk asymmetry. I consider US, global and regional momentum and 
reversal portfolios of individual stocks and global momentum portfolios of country indices 
and currencies. I show that the asymmetry in upside and downside market risks explains all 
cross-sections of momentum portfolio returns well. Past loser portfolios have lower downside 
risk and higher upside risk, whereas past winner portfolios have higher downside risk and 
lower upside risk and, hence, greater downside-upside risk asymmetry. For any set of 
momentum portfolios, the risk asymmetry is monotonically increasing with portfolio rank. 
The downside-risk CAPM explains the cross-section of momentum returns much better than 
the traditional CAPM. The estimates of the relative downside beta premium are always 
statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the estimates obtained for other asset 
markets. Therefore, the momentum return is not anomalous, but a compensation for the 
asymmetric upside and downside market risks.   
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In the second paper of this thesis, I examine the global downside market risk of 
currencies as an explanation for the high excess returns to carry trades. I consider three 
alternative measures of downside risk (the downside beta, the „disaster beta‟ and the 
coskewness) and show that these measures have high explanatory power for returns.I find that 
the downside market risk of currency portfolios is monotonically increasing in the local 
interest rate level. The returns of high-interest (investment) currencies have high downside 
stock market betas and „disaster betas‟ and significant negative coskewness with the stock 
market; by contrast, the returns of low-interest (funding) currencies have insignificant 
downside betas and positive coskewness. The downside market beta and the coskewness have 
much greater explanatory power in the cross-section of currency portfolios than the traditional 
market beta. The GMM estimates of the downside beta and coskewness premiums are highly 
significant, similar in the currency and stock markets and close to the theoretical values. The 
downside risk is priced similarly in different markets, and the high returns to carry trades are 
fair compensation for their high downside market risk. 
In the third paper of this thesis, I explore which macroeconomic characteristics are 
systematically related to the downside risk of currencies besides the level of nominal interest 
rates. I show that „safe haven‟ currencies have low inflation and real interest rates and positive 
net foreign asset positions of the respective countries. By contrast, currencies which tend to 
crash with the stock market belong to debtor countries with high real interest and inflation 
rates. The level of the real interest rate has the highest explanatory power in the cross-section 
of currency exposure to the downside risk, especially in the 2000s.This suggests that there is a 
„flight to quality‟ in the currency market in „hard times‟ (i.e. capital is withdrawn from high 
real interest rate risky currencies of debtor countries and returned to low real interest rate „safe 
haven‟ currencies of creditor countries). Other macroeconomic variables, previously 
suggested in the literature, do not seem to play a significant role in explaining currency 
exposure to the downside risk.      
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Appendices 
A1. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
Samples of countries 
Full sample of 42 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Euro Zone, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK. 
 
Sub-sample of 15 developed countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Euro Zone, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK. 
 
Dates of disasters according to Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) classification 
 
Date Event Type Date Event Type 
12/03/1993 Storm of the Century  Nature 01/08/2003 European heat wave Nature 
20/12/1994 Tequila peso crisis Finance 11/03/2004 Madrid bombings Terror&war 
02/07/1997 
East Asian financial 
crisis 
Finance 24/09/2004 Hurricane Rita Nature 
27/10/1997 
Global stock market 
crash 
Finance 26/12/2004 Tsunami Nature 
23/08/1998 Russian financial crisis  Finance 07/07/2005 London bombings I Terror&war 
10/03/2000 Dot-com bubble burst Finance 27/07/2005 London bombings II Terror&war 
04/06/2001 2001 Atlantic hurricane Nature 23/08/2005 Hurricane Katrina Nature 
11/09/2001 WTC terrorist attacks Terror&war 08/10/2005 Kashmir earthquake Nature 
02/12/2001 
Accounting scandals 
(Enron) 
Finance 12/07/2006 Lebanon War Terror&war 
01/11/2002 SARS Nature 27/02/2007 
Sell-off of Chinese 
shares 
Finance 
20/03/2003 Second Gulf War Terror&war 
08/2007-
02/2009 
Global financial crisis Finance 
Source: Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010) 
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A2. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
Samples of currencies and their respective downside betas in two sub-
periods 1990-1998 and 1999-2012  
Currencies are listed in order of increasing downside betas. 
1990-1998 1999-2012 
Japan -0.19 Japan -0.09 
Switzerland -0.17 Malta -0.02 
Cyprus -0.14 Cyprus 0.03 
Malta -0.09 Slovenia 0.09 
Ireland -0.07 Argentina 0.09 
France -0.06 Philippines 0.14 
Denmark -0.06 Thailand 0.15 
Italy -0.05 Switzerland 0.17 
Spain -0.05 UK 0.17 
Belgium -0.05 Singapore 0.18 
Turkey -0.05 Estonia 0.23 
Finland -0.05 India 0.23 
Germany -0.05 Lithuania 0.24 
Portugal -0.04 Latvia 0.25 
UK -0.04 Slovakia 0.26 
Netherlands -0.04 Denmark 0.28 
Sweden -0.03 Bulgaria 0.28 
Iceland -0.03 Euro Zone 0.29 
Austria -0.03 Czech Rep 0.29 
Singapore 0.03 Russia 0.30 
Philippines 0.03 Romania 0.33 
Norway 0.04 Canada 0.35 
Greece 0.05 Norway 0.36 
New Zealand 0.07 Iceland 0.38 
Thailand 0.07 Indonesia 0.39 
India 0.09 South Korea 0.42 
South Africa 0.09 Sweden 0.42 
Argentina 0.11 Mexico 0.45 
Australia 0.12 Chile 0.46 
Canada 0.12 Poland 0.49 
Chile 0.14 Hungary 0.49 
Mexico 0.16 South Africa 0.50 
South Korea 0.17 New Zealand 0.51 
Brazil 0.22 Australia 0.54 
Czech Rep 0.28 Brazil 0.68 
Poland 0.39 Turkey 0.71 
 
